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MODULE - I

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

1.1 Introduction

The foreign policy of a country is the sum total of the principles, interests and objectives which it seeks to promote through its relations with other countries. It is also "for influencing and changing the behaviour of other states" and for 'adjusting' its own "activities to the international environment". So, "the conduct and formulation of foreign policy is governed by the interplay of numerous determinants, institutions, processes and personalities".

The basic determinants of India’s foreign policy are:

- Political Tradition and philosophical basis
- Geography
- National Interest
- International Milieu

1.2 Political Tradition and Philosophical basis

The history of Indian foreign policy is short but active. It was after the establishment of Indian National Congress that the politicization of the people and formulation of policy orientation had its origin. After the World War I the Indians led by Congress started taking more active interest in foreign affairs. In 1920 the Congress sent a message of sympathy to the Irish people who were struggling for their independence. In 1921 the AICC at its Delhi meeting adopted a complete resolution on foreign policy and affirmed India's desire to establish friendly and peaceful relations with others. The Calcutta Conference of 1928 directed the All India Congress Committee (AICC) to open a foreign department for developing contacts and organizing the anti-imperialist movement of the dependent people. Nehru came to head this department and became the director of the foreign policy of Congress. It was this experience that made him to act with precision and efficiency. So Nehru could rightly be called the ‘architect’ of independent India's foreign policy. However the historic declarations of the Congress were very fundamental in providing roots to the attitudes of anti-Cold War, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, anti-power politics and peaceful relationships.
The philosophical basis of Indian foreign policy includes an account of such moral ideals and values of India. Mutual love and faith in national and international peace and friendship with other countries are regarded as possible and practical values by India. In one of his characteristic expositions on foreign policy Nehru was of the opinion that there were several schools of thought on foreign affairs. There was, first of all, the Indian school which talked about negotiation through strength. Since this was also likely to be reciprocated by the other party, there was in effect the possibility of a stalemate. The school of ‘learned confusion’ talked learnedly of international affairs, but never got out of its confused state of mind. Finally, there was the school of ignorant confusion. India's foreign policy belonged to none of these schools of thought. “It was clear, simple and straightforward policy which, of course, benefited her but which equally sought to promote the cause of world peace. It might not be full of wisdom, but was simple and innocuous”. The cultural-philosophical foundations of India's foreign policy are, in fact, quite conspicuous. India has been the seat of a hoary civilization and a meeting place of great cultures. In view of such a cultural-philosophical tradition and its reflection on the personality of Nehru, the chief architect of independent India’s foreign and domestic policies carry attention. It is but natural that India should prefer the golden mean or the middle way between the two competing international ideologies of the day-Western liberal democracy and Russian egalitarianism. Indeed as the then vice-president of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan said: “India is profoundly convinced that power politics at any time meant misery to mankind in a shrinking world, with disaster to humanity”.

1.3 Geography

Geography is the foremost determinant of Indian foreign policy. The prediction that Lord Curzon made in 1903 has proved to be true. He observed, "The geographical position of India would more and more push it into the forefront of International affairs. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru too was fully conscious of the geographical importance of India. On 17th March 1950, in a speech in the Indian Parliament, he observed, "We are in a strategic part of Asia, set in the centre of Indian Ocean, with intimate past and present connection with West Asia, South-Ent Asia and Far Eastern Asia. Even if we could we would not want to ignore this fact." Himalayas and the Indian Ocean are determining factors of India's security. To begin with, the Himalayas was considered to be natural security guard for India. However, in the fifties and sixties it led to a new security orientation in Indian foreign policy. To defend Himalayas came to determine India's security and defence needs and consequently her relations with other nations. It is a determining factor of Sino-Indian relations. Similarly, being the largest littoral state of the Indian Ocean area with approximately 3500 km of coastal boundary, Indian security needs a strong and modernized navy as well as an end to the superpower rivalry in Indian Ocean. India’s
strong opposition to superpower naval bases in the Indian Ocean particularly to the American decision to develop Diego Garcia as a strong US. Naval base is governed by India's geographical position. However, the topographical nature of its long sea coast has not been very helpful for developing ports and naval facilities. India’s strategic location has placed it within easy reach of many sensitive areas including China, South-East Asia, West and East Africa.

1.3 National Interest

A country's foreign policy, also called the foreign relations policy, consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu. There has been a tremendous growth in politico-intellectual interest in interpreting Indian foreign policy. On the one hand, journals and newspapers are overflowing with analyses of India’s international activism, and on the other, we find a rise in institutions or ‘think-tanks’ specializing in it, both within India and abroad. However, it can be effectively contended that there is rarely any novelty in the approaches taken by these intellectuals, institutions and politicians on the issue. Most of them are restricted to producing permutation and combination of preconceived and ill-defined notions of “national interests”, “security interests”, “terrorism”, “pre-emptive measures” etc. Even progressive and ‘counter-hegemonic’ discourses are unable to go beyond conceiving the Indian policies as those of a ‘comprador’ third world ruling class, submitting to external pressures. This leads to analyses limiting themselves to mere tautological descriptions of the policies, different only in tone and of course in humanist tenor, but rarely disputing on the basic foundations of policy-making, that informs even the rightist jingoism and centrist pragmatism.

The indigenous corporate capitalist interests (immaterial of the adjectives we might choose to characterize them) today frame the agenda for the Indian state in the international scenario, whether pro-US or otherwise. These interests are formidably conscious and mature, as can be seen from the way the Indian state and capital combines their various strategies – a militarist combination with the US-Israel nexus, supposedly “progressive” alliance with various “third world” powers in WTO, independent oil dealings with varied forces, investments in oil fields, offer of lines of credit to developing countries in Africa and Tsunami affected countries, pipeline diplomacy and readiness to militarily-politically support all these. We cannot simply isolate one aspect of the Indian capitalist interests and generalize it to grasp their hydra-like nature. Competition and collaboration are inherent in the capitalist political economy.
1.4 International Mileu

The broad currents of international politics at any given point of time have direct bearing on foreign policies. The difficulty in conducting the foreign policy arises because states do not have sure means of controlling the behaviour of other states. During the inter-war period (1919-39), the quest for French security, followed by the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan had their impact on foreign policies. The US changed its policy towards the Soviet Union and recognised it because, in 1933, Hitler’s emergence in Germany posed a threat to the world order created after the War. The Japanese aggression in Manchuria (China) in 1931 provided a common threat to USA as well as USSR in the Far East. The two Powers gave up their hostility. The Cold War era (1945-90) has determined in a big way the foreign policy of most countries. The fear of nuclearised United States brought the countries of Eastern Europe under the control of the Soviet Union, with the result that all those countries adopted socialism and came under the Russian wings. The entire policy of containment of communism adopted by the US was evident in its setting up of NATO, SEATO and such other military alliances/arrangements. India’s efforts in expounding the policy of non-alignment was directly a response to this emerging polarisation in the international environment. The Cold War was the defining characteristic of world politics for nearly 45 years. Arms race, especially in the nuclear field, typically represented the height of suspicion and the impending disaster.

India’s policy to take up nuclear disarmament emanated from the imminent and perpetual threat to human civilisation if those weapons were to be accidentally or deliberately used. Related to nuclear field, India’s successful testing in 1998 of nuclear weapons was justified as a necessary response to the fast changing international environment that sought to dismiss the demand for nuclear disarmament and sanctify the inequitable hierarchy between the nuclear weapon powers and non-nuclear weapon powers. After the sudden end of the Cold War followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s foreign policy underwent appreciable shifts on numerous counts — lack of enthusiasm towards the non-aligned movement, eagerness to accommodate the American concerns, resumption of full diplomatic ties with Israel, emphasis on economic aspects of relations with Europe, Southeast Asia and even South Asia. Again, in the post-cold war era, the increasing sensitivity in international quarters to the issues of terrorism and human rights (along with the widely spread claims of self-determination) impelled necessary adjustments in India’s foreign policy. During the 1990s, the critical observers of India’s foreign policy have noted the government’s preoccupation with the question of Jammu and Kashmir in its contacts with major countries and in global forums. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on American targets in New York and Washington presented new opportunities to India to push its anti-terrorist foreign policy with greater conviction.
1.5 Conclusion

The multifarious objectives of India’s foreign policy achieve a blend of national and international interests. India has sought to achieve its security and socio-economic advancement while at the same time working for peace, freedom, progress and justice to all nations and peoples. Nonalignment, adherence to peaceful procedures for settlement of differences, support to the initiatives for disarmament, and active participation in international bodies constituted notable principles that flow from the objectives of the country’s foreign policy.

As elaborated, among several determinants of foreign policy, the relevance of factors like India’s geographical size, location, its historical experiences and traditions, the state of economy, the nature of political institutions and structure, and the personality of the country’s leadership have played significant role in shaping the country’s policy with countries in its neighbourhood and outside. Moreover, the impact of the changing international environment—be it the cold war politics, or the post-cold war trends—too is something not to be missed while understanding shifts in our foreign policy. All in all, India seems to have done pretty well in formulating and implementing a foreign policy behind which the nation stood united and which projected the country as a peace loving, mature, democratic, and law abiding country in the realm of world.
2. INTRODUCTION

South Asia is a most complex, volatile and one of the most socially and politically divided and region of the world. The region of South Asia mainly consists of eight states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. It is home to 1.4 billion people, more than 20 percent of the world population. Thus, about one-fifth of humanity lives between the western reaches of Afghanistan and Pakistan on one side and the eastern reaches of Bangladesh and India on the other. It is a region that lies between the sea routes of the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific) and the land routes of Central Asia connecting Europe to the East. It is a large reservoir of natural and human resources, making it a prime destination for finance capital, a lucrative market for trade and a source of cheap raw material. It also sits at the confluence of the richest sources of oil, gas, rubber, manganese, copper, gold, tea, cotton, rice and jute and is the transit point for most of the resources and manufactures that cross the world. Moreover, it is the most heavily militarized and bureaucratized zone in the world and it has a variety of complex and violent primordial ethnic groups.

Geopolitically, the region of South Asia is identified as that which lies south of the former Soviet Union and China, south of the Himalayas; bordering in the east by Myanmar (Burma) and in the west by Afghanistan. In a sense Myanmar and Afghanistan are border line states of the regions of South East Asia and South West Asia respectively. The creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 represented the recognition of the geopolitical entity of South Asia. The methodologies used for identifying the regional area as consisting of geographically proximate and interacting states sharing some degree of common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds, became the basis of the formation of the association. The countries included in this regional organisation are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

2.1 South Asian Regional State System: Basic Features

The basic characteristics of the South Asian regional state system are as follows:

i) India, by virtue of its geographic size and location, economic and industrial base and military strength occupies a pivotal position in the region. The Indian aspirations for leadership, dominance or hegemony are a product of these geopolitical conditions of the region.
ii) South Asia, minus India, has two kinds of powers. Pakistan is one major power that can limit Indian hegemonic aspirations. Pakistan’s own limitations come from its geographic location and economic and military potentials. Unlike the pre 1971 Pakistan, the present Pakistan without its eastern linkage lies on the border of South Asia. It shares close ideological affinity with the Islamic West Asian State system. Pakistan may be described as a major power of the region and classified as a ‘bargainer’ or a ‘partner’ in the South Asian state system. Pakistan does not have the ability to substitute India as a leader of the region, yet it can bargain with India for partnership in the decision-making of the region.

iii) The other type of countries would include the smaller countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. They can pose problems to the core power through extra regional intervention, or their own internal stability. They can also legitimise the dominance of the core power by acceptance of the balance of power in the region.

iv) The major and most active power relationships in South Asia are affected by the intrusive powers. These extra regional powers, like the United States, Russia (formerly USSR), China and others have influenced policies of the region. All the South Asian countries, including India, have sought to use the extra regional powers’ ability to influence to their advantage.

2.2. Emergent Order in South Asia

The initial impulse of the Asian States on attaining independence was to isolate themselves from the Cold War bloc politics. The Indian approach under Nehru focused on the need to develop an independent understanding of world affairs and a peace policy. The application of these principles came in the series of conferences that took place in Asia that sought to establish the framework of peace through regionalism. The Asian Relations Conference (Delhi, 1947) was the first such conference that gathered the leaders of Asian countries that were still in the process of emerging from the colonial fold. It sought to establish an Asian identity and a common approach to such issues like peace and development. The Conference on Indonesia (Delhi, 1949) sought to create an international public opinion against colonialism and support the freedom movement in Indonesia. The Colombo Conference (1954) and the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference (1955) laid the foundations of regionalism. The former was a conference of South and South East Asian countries and the latter that of Afro-Asian countries. These conferences represented the growth of regionalism in the Third World, especially Asia. The Bandung Conference was to spell out the principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) as principles that should govern the relations between states. The movement towards regionalism did not create any institutional arrangements in Asia. It remained as an effort in identifying the common concerns of post colonial states focusing on the problems of development.
Unfortunately, regionalism never became a fundamental concern of the Afro-Asian states. Some of the obstacles to regionalism came from colonial legacies like the presence of large minorities within countries, unsettled borders, clash of elite, etc. The onslaught of Cold War in Asia after the Korean war proved to be the turning point for regionalism in the region. Bandung became the last Afro-Asian conference to be held. Though efforts were made to revive the spirit of regionalism, they remained unsuccessful.

The mid-1950s saw a shift away from regionalism towards the development of non-alignment. At one level, nonalignment became a redefinition of the basic principles of regionalism as stated in the Panchsheel formulations, but with a distinct thrust on independence and peace. At another level, it was a redefinition of independent understanding of world affairs within the emergent framework of Cold War rivalry. What is noteworthy is that both, regionalism and non-alignment, made no effort to translate ‘movements’ into a structure or an organisation. At the South Asian level, one can identify two ‘models’ for order in the regional state system. The first was based on the realities of the geopolitical situation of 1947. This model was based more on the potentials of India to be a major power in South Asia, rather than actual power realities. This model appeared to go unquestioned until the 1962 debacle at the hands of the Chinese. The India-China war put into question the Indian claims for a great power status in the region of South Asia. The second model was a product of the 1971 conflict with Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh and the Simla Agreement (1972) became the basis of this new model. The 1971-72 model was based on the recognition of India’s power status in South Asia. Pakistan’s acceptance of this status was implicit in the signing of the Simla agreement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to grant legitimacy to the new Indian position in South Asia. New Delhi’s success in opening up a dialogue with China indicated a similar legitimacy from China.

2.3 INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Certain important historical and geographic compulsions that surfaced at the time of the partition of India in 1947 have had significant bearing on the thinking of both the countries. Islam was considered as a rallying point for national unity of a people who claimed to hold a different national identity. It became a separatist force that was not in line with the national mainstream of anti-colonial struggle. This has been accepted as a root of the creation of Pakistan. There are three important issues these countries face in their bilateral relations: (i) the difference in world views, (ii) the dispute over Kashmir and (iii) the problem of nuclear confrontation.
2.3.1 World Views

India and Pakistan, as two core countries of South Asia had different worldviews that determined their foreign policies. During the early years after independence, the Indian worldview had been dominated by concerns about building a regional identity of the post-colonial nations of Asia. One of the important aspects of this policy was opposition to the extra regional intervention in South Asia. India sought to keep the South Asian issues within the ambit of South Asian countries. Opposition to the entry of Cold War alliances in Asia and eventual path of non-alignment is part of this worldview. The period from 1947 to 1971 saw two trends in India’s approach towards South Asia. One was the trend that was initiated by Nehru. It focused on regionalism as the dominant theme. The second emerged during the Lal Bahadur Shastri years. This came in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the need for resetting the Indian worldview keeping in mind its capabilities. Shastri was to stress on bilateralism as the key to foreign policy, especially in relation to South Asian countries. It is in the post-1971 period that India developed a coherent South Asia policy that was to determine India’s approach towards its South Asian neighbours. The base of this policy lay in India’s power status in South Asia. The architecture of the policy rested on a combination of two approaches: regionalism that was now restricted to South Asia and the consequent perception of South Asia as a regional state system; and bilateralism, which was the basis of the Simla Agreement of 1972.

Pakistan’s perception of its role emerged from the realisation of two simultaneous forces—the geopolitics of the country that was divided between East and West Pakistan and the Islamic worldview. The former placed Pakistan firmly in the South Asian regional state system while the latter brought it close to the Islamic world of West Asia. Pakistan thus saw itself as a nation with two distinct identities and roles, that of a South Asian power and that of an Islamic West Asian power that was to eventually emerge as an important country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. One of the dominant security concerns that Pakistan sought to address right from its inception is that of fear of India. The problem of Pakistan’s foreign and defence policy revolved around this central theme of Indian domination and safeguards that were to be instituted to counter this threat. Pakistan’s attempts to establish linkages with the Islamic world, with China and participate in the military alliances of the United States can be understood within this security concern of Pakistan. These links provided an opportunity for Pakistan to counteract India’s desire to dominate in what India considered its sphere of influence.
2.3.2 Kashmir Problem

This fundamental diversity in the views of India and Pakistan manifests on the issue of Kashmir, an issue that has come to be identified by Pakistan as the core of the bilateral divide. Kashmir, like Junagadh and Hyderabad, opted to decide its future as to whether to join India or to merge with Pakistan. In case of Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Indian government took steps to ensure that the wishes of the overwhelming local Hindu populace were respected and hastened the process of merger of these two states in the Indian Union.

Kashmir had a peculiar problem. It had distinct distribution patterns of its population, with the Ladakh area being predominantly Buddhist, the Jammu region Hindu and the Kashmir valley Muslim. Pakistan sought to force the pace of the decision making on Kashmir by permitting the ‘irregular army’ to enter Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh, realising the potential problems, signed the Instrument of Accession with India, thus merging the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union. The first Indo-Pakistan war that followed the merger of Kashmir into India left the state partitioned. India took the matter to the United Nations and agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiris. According to the cease-fire resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, the plebiscite was conditional upon the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir and the restoration of the situation to the pre 1947 position. This condition was never met by Pakistan and the plebiscite also never came to be conducted.

Kashmir has seen a tumultuous history since the first war of 1948. The new government formed by Sheikh Abdullah, a Kashmiri leader of long standing, came to be dismissed in 1953. Sheikh Abdullah was relieved of his post as his party the National Conference refused to accept the accession to India as final and vaguely talked of the final settlement of the state of Kashmir in the future. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to head the government in Kashmir in 1975 after he and Indira Gandhi signed an agreement. Now Sheikh Abdullah had given up the earlier separatist demand and had accepted Kashmir to be legitimately a part of India. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir. This war, as the Pakistani Air Marshal Asghar Khan put it, was a war to solve the problem once and for all. The Tashkent Conference (1966) also failed to provide any results. Though, the 1971 war was more a war about the future of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, it had a definite aspect of Kashmir about it.

The Simla Agreement of 1972 formalised the emergent situation on Kashmir. The agreement sought to establish some basic principles of Indo-Pakistan interaction. The Agreement specifically refers to bilateralism and acceptance of durable peace as the framework of resolving future India-Pakistan problems. On the very vital issue of
Kashmir the agreement states: ‘In Jammu and Kashmir the line of actual control resulting from the cease fire of 17 December 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line’.

The Simla Agreement sought to create a new framework of interaction for India and Pakistan and freeze the issue of Kashmir along the Line of Control indefinitely. One understands from the writings of Indian leaders involved in the making of this agreement that there was an implicit understanding of converting the LOC into a boundary in the eventual future. It is in this context that the return of Sheikh Abdullah became significant. Now India had a Kashmiri leader, heading a Kashmiri party the National Conference, taking the position that Kashmir is part of India. This was tantamount to a plebiscite. This was the test of the right to self-determination that the Kashmiris had been promised by the plebiscite. India could now talk of political legitimacy for the accession of Kashmir to India.

Several developments appear to complicate the problem in Kashmir in the 1980s. Global Islamic resurgence came to be a force to reckon with. The growth of fundamentalist Islamic groups and the spread in their activity had become a matter of concern even for the United States. Pakistan was in a unique position in those days. Given its relatively liberal Islamic posture and the possibility of emergent democratic governments in Pakistan led it to retain a relatively close relationship with United States. On the other hand, it had excellent relations with the core Islamic world. It had an excellent access to the new Afghan government of Taliban and also to other radical Islamic organisations. Pakistan thus appears to have benefited from the then international situation. The post-1975 developments on Kashmir constitute the beginning of an entirely new chapter in its history. Adverse reactions to Sheikh Abdullah rule started in the late 1970s. Partly it was a product of the growing divide between the ruling class in Kashmir and the common populace that remained deprived of the fruits of development that the state sought to create. Partly, it was the product of resultant frustration that came to be created in the minds of the Kashmiri about the utility of Indian rule. One of the significant popular level movements came in the form of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). As an organisation that had strong Pakistani connections, the JKLF demanded the right to self-determination for the Kashmiris to join Pakistan.

The 1980s saw two significant developments that had their impact on the developments in Kashmir. One was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that led to the massive arms supply by the United States to the Afghan rebels (Mujahideen) situated in Pakistan. Second was the change in Pakistani strategy regarding Kashmir. The American
arms supply to the Afghans had a spillover effect in Kashmir. This was linked to the change in Pakistani tactics in terms of shifting from direct conflict to insurgency.

Infiltration and insurgency has been a long pattern in Pakistani strategy on Kashmir. Prior to the 1965 war Pakistan had used this approach with little success. The failure to solve the problem through the use of force in 1965 and 1971 had led to a change in strategy. Now infiltration took the shape of low intensity conflict. Efforts to paralyse the local law and order situation and create uncertainty in the region came to be the tactics of the day. The large scale exit of the Kashmiri pundits from the valley was part of this protracted strategy.

This Pakistani strategy was buttressed with a new clarion call of human rights violation. In the early 1990s, concern about violation of human rights had suddenly acquired newly found acceptance. In Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, the world appeared to have suddenly become sensitive to human rights. In Kashmir too, the old paradigm of self-determination was fast replaced by the new paradigm of human rights violation. Suddenly the situation in Kashmir came to be analysed almost entirely along the human dimension. Demands came to be made by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), followed by the European powers for an on-thes pot survey of violation of human rights by the Indian forces. The Indian government was persuaded enough to create a National Human Rights Commission of its own to monitor the problem. It took several years for the international community to acknowledge that terrorist outfits also violate human rights and that the responsibility of violation cannot be that of the Government alone.

In 1999 India and Pakistan came into conflict over an intrusion by Pakistan into Kargil. Was the crossing of the LOC by the Mujahideens, and the Pakistani troops a logical culmination of the ongoing approach taken on Kashmir? Did it represent an assessment by Pakistan that time was ripe to exert direct force by crossing the LOC and force India to resolve the Kashmir problem? Several explanations may be given for this Pakistani adventurism. One, that Pakistan must have assessed the time as being ripe for such an action to achieve its goal about accession of Kashmir. The political uncertainty in India and the obvious lack of consensus across the political spectrum in India would have also been one of the considerations. Two, this assessment must have been a military and intelligence assessment based on the active participation of the militant outfits. It was quite likely that the civil government was pulled into this decision after it was in place. If this be true it confirms the pattern of Pakistani politics that is dominated by competing interests of the army, the civilian representative elite, the intelligence units and the Islamic groups. The Pakistani premier’s constant disclaim about the involvement of Government in the Kargil action may not be entirely true. Such actions cannot take place without the
knowledge and participation of the government (and that includes the army). But his statement may also indicate the truth that he has very little control over the Pakistan army and militant groups in Kargil. History shows that the creators of such groups eventually cease to control them as they tend to have a momentum of their own.

Having committed itself in Kargil, Pakistan appeared to have taken on more than it could digest. The international public opinion has shifted away from Pakistan. Its old and trusted ally China took a neutral position and advised restraint and dialogue. The Pakistani Premier was not able to move the United States either. The US visit of Premier Sharif proved counterproductive. The Americans asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops to the LOC and begin a dialogue with India. Eventually, India did manage to push back the Pakistani infiltration.

2.3.3 Nuclear Issue

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had generated a great deal of debate on the rationale and implications of these actions taken by both the governments. Much of the debate focused on the security considerations of this action, the regional threat dimensions and internal political compulsions. The Indian articulation focused on the threats from Pakistan and China, while Pakistan targeted India. The central questions raised about the Indian tests had been in the ‘why’ and ‘why now’ category. The debates used two distinct paradigms for analysis, the first using the security rationale and the second, the developmental rationale. The debates based on the first focused on the perceived threats from the regional order as manifested by Pakistan and China. The positions about the exact nature of threats and the methods of tackling these threats would vary from party to party at a political level. In case of the Pakistani tests, the answers would be more specific, in that they would point to India as the central culprit. Further, in both cases there would be very strong internal political compulsions. Now that the tests have confirmed the nuclear weapon capability (or actual weapon status) it may be safe to presume that the nations have achieved whatever minimal nuclear ambitions they had cherished.

The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 represented a demonstration of capabilities — technological and political. Technological capabilities were in the context of the denial of access to advanced technologies that India experienced over the years. The political capability represented the demonstration of political will of the elite to take on the G-7 regime. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent Third World. It is at that level that both, the Indian and Pakistani tests, demonstrate a commonality of approaches.
The Draft outline of Indian Nuclear Doctrine released on 17 August 1999 argued for autonomy in decision making about security for India. It takes the long established Indian line that security is an integral part of India’s developmental process. It expresses concerns about the possible disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a deterrence capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argued that in the absence of a global nuclear disarmament policy, India’s strategic interests required an effective credible deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It continues to hold on the ‘no first use doctrine’ and the civilian control of nuclear decision-making.

The utility of nuclear deterrence (at whatever level) between India and Pakistan may be still unclear. But the Kargil conflict presented a threshold (a ‘glass ceiling’, to borrow from feminist terminology) beyond which the two powers may not be able to escalate their conflict. This threshold, in the form of the Line of Control was adhered to by India and was also imposed by the United States and China on Pakistan. In the short run, one may have to make a distinction between conventional security considerations which include border conflicts and internal security problems on the one hand, and nuclear strategies on the other. Therefore, there is the need to reinitiate the nuclear dialogue of 1985 that sought to create an agreement on not attacking each others’ nuclear installations. This can now be supplemented by a declaration on ‘no-first-use’ policy.

Both India and Pakistan would have to stress on the need to develop their peaceful-uses programme for its economic and industrial growth. This may require the two countries to bargain with the developed world for the transfer of advance technology. The threat of sanctions on dual use technologies and the limited room for negotiations make it necessary for India and Pakistan to pool their resources for bargaining with the developed countries.

2.3.4. Dialogue

One must make a specific reference to the various attempts to establish a dialogue between the two countries and discuss their success and failures. India and Pakistan have signed two important treaties after they had fought border wars. The Tashkent Agreement (1966) saw a meeting of Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani president Ayub Khan. The agreement succeeded in freezing the Kashmir dispute but did not resolve the problems. The Simla Agreement (1972) saw an interaction between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who eventually went on to become the prime minister of Pakistan.
There have been other occasions when the leaders of these two countries have had
an opportunity to exchange views. One of these has been on the occasion of SAARC or
Non-aligned Movement summit meetings. Such meetings were usually carried on the
sidelines of the summits. Perhaps the more well-known recent meetings have been those
between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan Premier Nawaz Shariff at
Lahore (1999) and Vajpayee’s meeting with General Pervez Musharraf at Agra (2001). The
former saw the inauguration of the Delhi- Lahore Bus service and the signing of Lahore
Declaration which reiterated the principle of bilateral approach to Indo-Pak problems,
while the latter ended without any significant gains. In 2003 Prime Minister Vajpayee once
again called for a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan. This initiative saw some
forward movement with the exchange of parliamentary delegations and some informal
talks that began between the two countries. Both, India and Pakistan share some common
post colonial legacies. Both have attempted to address the problems of pluralistic societies
and overcome the resistance of feudal tendencies in their efforts at political and economic
modernisation. Both have strained their political institutions to accommodate socio-
political upheavals. One may argue that the Indian experiment appears to have survived
the test of time and that its political institutions have been able to cope with the demands
placed on them. On the other hand Pakistan still continues to experiment with its
institutions in search of stability.

2.4. INDIA AND OTHER NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA

British colonial policies have influenced India’s approach towards the small powers
of South Asia. Two important legacies have been carried over in Indian thinking: One, it is
the Indian ‘responsibility’ to look after the security needs of the small powers. This
‘responsibility’, in terms of security, is understood in the context of an ‘extended frontier’
or a ‘defence perimetre’ approach. This meant that care would have to be taken to ensure
that these countries do not become open to outside intervention. Two, India sought to
avoid interference in the internal affairs of these countries except in exceptional
circumstances. These circumstances were security considerations as interpreted by India.
For example, following the creation of Bangladesh the Indian position has always been
that the security and integrity of these states would be of vital national interest to India.

2.5. INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONS

Indian policy towards Nepal is determined by the following considerations: (i) the
geopolitics of Nepal makes it a landlocked country sandwiched between India and China.
Access to Nepal is easier from the Indian side; (ii) historically, both countries have shared
a common security perception; (iii) there exists a great deal of cultural affinity between the
two countries; Nepal is not only the birth place of Gautam Buddha but is also the only
Hindu kingdom in the world.
The parameters of bilateral relations came to be defined in the context of two treaties that India and Nepal signed in 1950: The Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Treaty of Trade and Commerce. The former was a security arrangement that took into account the possible threat of the Chinese from across the border. It provided for a close cooperation between India and Nepal on matters relating to Nepal’s security, thus ensuring that Nepal does not come under the Chinese sphere of influence. The second treaty provided for trade and transit arrangements with Nepal. The terminology of this treaty was subject to several discussions over the years. Since this was a ten year treaty that was to be renewed regularly, the discussions became important. One major change came in the phraseology of the treaty in 1971. The term ‘freedom of transit’ was replaced by ‘right of transit’. Another important change that took place during the Janata Government was the splitting up of this treaty into separate treaties, one for trade and dealing with transit.

In 1970s Nepal came forward with a fundamentally new approach to its foreign policy. In a formal announcement in 1975 Nepal proposed the establishment of a Zone of Peace for the region of Nepal. The proposal sought to adhere to the policy of peace, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. The central purpose of this policy appeared to be the reassertion of Nepal’s sovereignty and its identity that it feared was being submerged by Indian domination. While this proposal still stands as an objective of Nepal’s foreign policy today, India did not accept it. Instead, India favours the entire South Asia as zone of peace.

The movement towards restoration of democracy in Nepal began in 1980s. The creation of the new constitution providing for a constitutional monarchy in 1990 was a welcome step in the restoration of democracy. Since 1990 Nepal, like the UK, is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy.

The Indian attitude towards Nepal is linked to several factors. One concerns Nepal’s attitude towards China. Nepal has awarded building contracts to Chinese companies close to the borders. Nepal also purchased some armaments from the Chinese. In fact what was of critical concern to India was the reported agreement between China and Nepal for sharing of intelligence. India is also concerned about the open access that Pakistani militant organisations are suspect of getting in Nepal. The highjacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Nepal is just one example of the I.S.I. using Nepal’s territory for terrorism against India. On the part of Nepal, it views India as a dominant neighbour that it would like to balance by making some overtures with China. Nepal has broadly accepted the ‘special relationship’ with India. The strong historical and socio-cultural links ensure that this relationship will continue. However, Nepal is looking for greater economic flexibility from India in its economic/trade related issues.
2.6. Bangladesh

India had actively participated in the freedom struggle of Bangladesh in the wake of the Pakistani repression of the people of erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971. India also had an interest in ending a ‘two frontier threat’ that East and West Pakistan had posed to it since its independence. The 1972 Indo-Bangladesh Friendship Treaty was an attempt to assert India’s interest in the security and integrity of the new nation. The Treaty stipulated that the two countries would not enter into or participate in military alliances directed against one another. However, the goodwill in Indo-Bangladesh relations did not stay for long.

Between 1972 and 1975, India had a fairly good relationship with Bangladesh. Bangladesh was the largest recipient of the Indian aid. India also concluded various border demarcations that had been pending for long with Pakistan. The agreements involved the incorporation of various Bengali Muslim enclaves into Bangladesh without compensation. Later, in 1982, India agreed to lease the Tin Bhiga corridor to Bangladesh ‘in perpetuity’. But it did not materialise due to Indian Parliament’s refusal to amend the Constitution to lease the Tin Bigha. India’s relations with Bangladesh deteriorated after the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975. There have been three important points of dispute between India and Bangladesh. One concerns the problem over the Farakka Barrage; two is the issue of the New Moore or the Purbasha Island and third is the question of the Bangladeshi infiltration from across the borders, especially the Chakma refugees.

The construction of the Farakka barrage had started in 1962. The aim of the project was to divert the water from the Ganges to the Hoogly so as to flush out and desilt the Calcutta port. The then government of Pakistan had objected to this as it would have created water scarcity for the area in East Pakistan. In 1972 India and Bangladesh agreed to create a Joint Rivers Commission; however, the talks on the Farakka barrage continued to fail. It was only in 1978 that an agreement was signed between the two countries on the sharing of waters. But it lapsed after five years. Eventually in 1996 a treaty on sharing of Ganga waters was concluded, between India and Bangladesh, for 30 years. It takes care of the needs of water for both the countries during the ‘lean period’. In 1981, the Indian Navy laid claim to the island of New Moore that had been emerging in the mouth of the Ganga delta. This became a bone of contention between the two countries. The island called Talpatty by Bangladesh and Purbasha, by West Bengal is not inhabited. It can be resolved on the basis of the principle of mean line. Bangladesh has also objected to India’s attempts to fence the border to prevent infiltration of Bangladeshis into the North Eastern territories of India. This, besides the flow of the Chakma refugees into India, has created border tensions between the two countries.
2.7. Sri Lanka

Bilateral relations between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Republic of India have been generally friendly, but were controversially affected by the Sri Lankan civil war and by the failure of Indian intervention during the war. India is the only neighbour of Sri Lanka, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South Asia and have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean. Historically and culturally, the two nations have been considerably close, with 70% of Sri Lankans continuing to follow Theravada Buddhism to this day.

2.7.1 Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war

In the 1970s-1980s, private entities and elements in the state government of Tamil Nadu were believed to be encouraging the funding and training for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a separatist insurgent force. In 1987, faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, and a flood of refugees, India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time after the Sri Lankan government attempted to regain control of the northern Jaffna region by means of an economic blockade and military assaults. India supplied food and medicine by air and sea. After subsequent negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement/13th amendment. The peace accord assigned a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas with Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPLRF) controlling the regional council and called for the Tamil militant groups to lay down their arms. Further India was to send a peacekeeping force, named the IPKF to Sri Lanka to enforce the disarmament and to watch over the regional council. Even though the accord was signed between the governments of Sri Lanka and India, with the Tamil Tigers and other Tamil militant groups not having a role in the signing of the accord, most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement, the LTTE rejected the accord because they opposed the candidate, who belonged to another militant group named Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), for chief administrative officer of the merged Northern and Eastern provinces. Instead the LTTE named three other candidates for the position. The candidates proposed by the LTTE were rejected by India. The LTTE subsequently refused to hand over their weapons to the IPKF. The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict with the Indian Army, and launched their first attack on an Indian army rations truck on October 8, killing five Indian paracommandos who were on board by strapping burning tires around their necks. The government of India then decided that the IPKF should disarm the LTTE by force, and the Indian Army launched number of assaults on the LTTE, including a month-long campaign dubbed Operation Pawan to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. When the IPKF engaged the LTTE, the then president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa, began supporting LTTE and funded LTTE with arms. During the warfare with the LTTE, IPKF
was also alleged to have made human rights violation against the civilians. Notably, IPKF was alleged to have perpetrated Jaffna teaching hospital massacre which was the killing of over 70 civilians including patients, doctors and nurses. The ruthlessness of this campaign, and the Indian army’s subsequent anti-LTTE operations made it extremely unpopular amongst many Tamils in Sri Lanka. The conflict between the LTTE and the Indian Army left over 1,000 Indian soldiers dead.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, which had been unpopular amongst Sri Lankans for giving India a major influence, now became a source of nationalist anger and resentment as the IPKF was drawn fully into the conflict. Sri Lankans protested the presence of the IPKF, and the newly-elected Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa demanded its withdrawal, which was completed by March 1990. on May 21, 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated and the LTTE was alleged to be the perpetrator. As a result India declared the LTTE to be a terrorist outfit in 1992. Bilateral relations improved in the 1990s and India supported the peace process but has resisted calls to get involved again.

India has also been wary of and criticised the extensive military involvement of Pakistan in the conflict, accusing the latter of supplying lethal weaponry and encouraging Sri Lanka to pursue military action rather than peaceful negotiations to end the civil war.

2.7.2. Commercial ties

India and Sri Lanka are member nations of several regional and multilateral organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme, South Asian Economic Union and BIMSTEC, working to enhance cultural and commercial ties. Since a bilateral free trade agreement was signed and came into effect in 2000, Indo-Sri Lankan trade rose 128% by 2004 and quadrupled by 2006, reaching USD 2.6 billion. Between 2000 and 2004, India’s exports to Sri Lanka in the last four years increased by 113%, from USD 618 million to $1,319 million while Sri Lankan exports to India increased by 342%, from $44 million to USD $194 million Indian exports account for 14% of Sri Lanka’s global imports. India is also the fifth largest export destination for Sri Lankan goods, accounting for 3.6% of its exports. Both nations are also signatories of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Negotiations are also underway to expand the free trade agreement to forge stronger commercial relations and increase corporate investment and ventures in various industries. The year 2010 is predicted to be the best year for bilateral trade on record, with Sri Lanka’s exports to India increasing by 45% over the first seven months of the year. India’s National Thermal Power Corp (NTPC) is also scheduled to build a 500 MW thermal power plant in Sampoor (Sampur). The NTPC claims that this plan will take the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship to new level.
2.7.3. Fishing disputes

There have been several alleged incidents of Sri Lankan Navy personnel firing on Indian fishermen fishing in the Palk Strait, where India and Sri Lanka are only separated by 12 nautical miles. Indian Government has always taken up the issue of safety of Indian fishermen on a priority basis with the Government of Sri Lanka. Presently there is no bonafide Indian fisherman in the Sri Lankan custody. A Joint Working Group (JWG) has been constituted to deal with the issues related to Indian fishermen straying in Sri Lankan territorial waters, work out modalities for prevention of use of force against them and the early release of confiscated boats and explore possibilities of working towards bilateral arrangements for licensed fishing. The JWG last met in Jan 2006. India officially protested against Sri Lanka Navy for its alleged involvement in attacks on Indian fishermen on January 12, 2011. Even after the official protest, another fisherman was killed in a brutal manner on Jan 22, 2011. Over 530 fishermen have been killed in the last 30 years. The apathetic attitude of the Indian government and the national media towards the alleged killing of Tamil Nadu fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy is being strongly condemned. Several Tamil Nadu politicians like Vaiko and Jayalalitha have condemned the federal government for not doing enough to stop the killing of Indian Tamil fishermen.

Development Cooperation

India is active in a number of areas of development activity in Sri Lanka. About one-sixth of the total development credit granted by Government of India is made available to Sri Lanka. In the recent past three lines of credit were extended to Sri Lanka: US$ 100 million for capital goods, consumer durables, consultancy services and food items, US$ 31 million for supply of 300,000 MT of wheat and US$ 150 million for purchase of petroleum products. All of these lines of credit have been fully utilized. Another line of credit of US$ 100 million is now being made available for rehabilitation of the Colombo-Matara railway.

A number of development projects are implemented under ‘Aid to Sri Lanka’ funds. In 2006-07, the budget for ‘Aid to Sri Lanka’ was Rs 28.2 Crs. A training programme for 465 Sri Lankan Police officers has been commenced in Dec 2005. Another 400 Sri Lankan Police personnel are being trained for the course of ‘Maintenance of Public Order’. Indian governments have also showed interest in collaborating with their Sri Lankan counterparts on building tourism between the two countries based on shared religious heritage.
Other areas of Cooperation

The India-Sri-Lanka bilateral agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons was signed on June 9, 2010. The agreement provides for the conditions under which such transfers can take place and the various obligations of the transferring state and the receiving state. Accordingly, the requests made by eligible persons are processed by the Sri Lanka and forwarded to India for completion of the necessary legal procedures. The transferred persons would be completing the remainder of their terms in India. Sentenced Persons belonging to Kerala and Tamilnadu have been transferred under the agreement from Srilanka to India. But later Sri Lanka changed its position that it will prosecute Indian fishermen arrested for poaching instead of arranging for their early release.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Indian policy towards the smaller powers of South Asia has been more explicitly seen since the Indira Gandhi days. India supports and encourages regional democracies and has sought to tie up its regional primacy through series of regional, and bilateral arrangements, covering a wide range of agreements in the areas of defence, trade and science and technology. Yet difficulties continue to remain in coming to an understanding with India. Divisions and mistrust continues to dominate the region. The commonality of the region leads the small powers to continue to assert their differences so as to regain a sense of identity and independence.
MODULE III
RECENT TRENDS IN INDIA’S RELATIONS
(WITH USA, RUSSIA, CHINA AND IRAN)

3.1 INDO-US RELATIONS: FROM ESTRANGEMENT TO ENGAGEMENT

3.1.1 Introduction

India and the United States are widely recognised as the worlds largest and the most powerful democracies respectively. The relationship between these two countries is thus one of the most fascinating interactions witnessed in the relations among nations. The added significant features are marked by the fact that India is one of the oldest civilisations in the world, whereas the United States is relatively a younger civilisation. However, in terms of statehood experience, it is the US, which is considerably older than India. When India took birth as a newly independent country in 1947, the US was already more than a century and a half old. And by the time of Indian independence, it had emerged as a global superpower. Factors related to civilisation, statehood and governance thus made the relations between India and the US as one of the most complex bilateral relations in world history. Soon after independence, India chose not to join any of the two power blocs, and adopted the policy of non-alignment.

As and when the US promoted the formation of military blocs and security alliances, India vehemently opposed them. India was particularly critical about the formations of South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). These two organisations brought Cold War to India’s door-steps with Pakistan becoming an active member in them.

As the alliance politics conditioned the US thinking on a series of political events and armed conflicts around the world and non-alignment conditioned the Indian thinking, New Delhi and Washington differed on majority of such issues. The Cold War-related political divergences between India and the US were particularly visible and pronounced on issues related to decolonisation of colonial territories, the Korean War, Vietnam War, Suez crisis, Hungarian Crisis, Czechoslovakia Crisis, and the People’s Republic of China’s membership in the United Nations. However, India and the US also strongly differed on certain issues related to India’s national security. These were the Kashmir problem, American arms transfer to Pakistan and the nuclear issues.
Kashmir Problem: The Kashmir problem began with the Pakistan backed tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947. As the Maharaja of Kashmir agreed to Kashmir’s accession to India and requested the Indian military help, the first war between India and Pakistan began soon after India’s independence. The US failed to recognise Pakistani aggression, imposed arms embargo against both India and Pakistan and supported the UN Security Council resolution that did not condemn aggression. India complained that the US equated the victim with the aggressor through its policy. The US took a similar stand during the second Pakistani aggression on Kashmir in 1965. The US tilt towards Pakistan in the third round of Indo-Pak war in 1971 was an act of hostility towards India. But after the Indian victory in the war, the US began to support the Simla Agreement, which called for the resolution of the issue through bilateral dialogue. Nonetheless, Washington continued to view Kashmir as a disputed territory and did not accept the Indian point of view that it was an internal affair of India.

US Arms Transfer: Six years after the first Indo-Pakistan war, the US signed a Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan in 1954. It signed another agreement in 1959 on military cooperation. And in between, Pakistan had joined the SEATO and CENTO. Consequently, Pakistan received millions of dollars of military assistance from the United States. A substantial amount of that assistance was spent by Pakistan in procuring advanced weapons from the US. India, time and again, brought to the notice of Washington that its arms transfers policy encouraged arms race in the subcontinent and generated regional instability. Washington assured India that the US-supplied weapons to Pakistan were meant to contain communism rather than to be used against India. However, Pakistan did use those weapons during its war against India.

Nuclear Issues: The nuclear issue came to dominate India’s relations with the US ever since China went nuclear in 1964. Washington suspected that India would follow China and detonate its own bomb sparking off further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US, along with several other countries soon started a process to deal with proliferation, which culminated in the signing of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. India refused to be a party and opposed this treaty on the ground of its in-built discrimination against non-nuclear weapon states. It sought to prevent others from going nuclear, while allowing vertical nuclear proliferation by five nuclear weapon states—the US, USSR, Britain, France and China. Disregarding this discriminatory document, India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974. It created yet another round of political hostility between India and the US, since India did so after about three years of defeating Pakistan in 1971 War and in the midst of American decline indicated by US withdrawal from Indochina.
Notwithstanding the military distance and political differences between India and the US during the Cold War, the two countries had good working relations in other areas. New Delhi and Washington never perceived each other as enemies. In fact, when Sino-US détente coincided with Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation in early 1970s, the political distance between India and the US further widened. But even this development did not lead to a serious fracture in the bilateral relationship. India had been a recipient of American food assistance during drought and famine and token economic assistance through the Cold War years. The US used food aid as political weapon occasionally creating resentment in India, but there is little doubt that India benefited from the US assistance as well.

3.1.2 Evolving ties under Cold War climate

India’s entry into the international community of nations as an independent political entity almost coincided with the spread of the Cold War between the two erstwhile superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. As the two superpowers clashed and competed for spreading their influence around the world, India was faced with a Hobson’s choice to take sides in the Cold War. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru decided against making a choice and announced a policy of Non-Alignment. This policy challenged the ethical basis of the Cold War, aimed at preventing the Cold War and sought to adopt a policy that would facilitate India’s friendly relations with both the US and the USSR. Nevertheless, at times the Indian position was disliked by the U.S. and it went out of the way to support Pakistan and adopted anti-India posture.

3.1.2 Relations at the End of the Cold War

Although there was a relaxation in the Cold War since the mid-1980s with the rise of Gorbachev to power in the former Soviet Union, the Cold War practically came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. India’s relations with the US had considerably improved during the relaxation of Cold War, but the collapse of the Soviet Union brought in unprecedented uncertainties to international relations, including Indo-US relations. With the US emerging as the only superpower in the world, there was little doubt that it would not be able to give attention to its relations with India at this time of great transition in world affairs. Some analysts argued that South Asia was an area of low priority during the Cold War and it was unlikely that it would get any high priority in the new context of the post-Cold War era. In fact, as Bill Clinton became the first post-Cold War US president, India found its relations with that country in doldrums. The new Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel, who was in charge of South Asia, created new irritants in the Indo-US relations by challenging the legal validity of Kashmir’s accession to India. India was also put on the watch list of the US.
While the Clinton administration was dealing with the emerging challenges of the post-Soviet world, the American think tanks were aware of the importance of crafting a new approach to US-India relations. The Asia Society and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace brought out reports indicating the need for an intense and cooperative relations between the US and India. Two developments influenced the American debate on India’s policy. First, India had embarked on a policy of economic liberalisation months before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The economic openness was bound to enhance the attractiveness of the Indian market with a huge middle class to foreign business community. The second development was president Clinton’s emphasis on the economic issues in the US post-Cold War foreign policy initiatives. In the backdrop of all these events, the US Commerce Department identified ten big emerging markets in the developing world that would facilitate American trade and investment. India was considered to be one of such emerging markets. Prime Minister Narashimha Rao first took the initiative to reshape India’s relations with the US and visited Washington in May 1994.

The economic issues dominated his agenda and he called for enhanced ties in the field of trade and investment between India and the US. In November 1994, the US Undersecretary of Commerce Jeffery Garten visited India to prepare the ground for the visit of US Commerce Secretary to India. Visiting India in the third week of January 1995, Commerce Secretary late Ronald Brown signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commerce Minister Pranab Mukherjee to create a “commercial alliance” between the two countries. It was to be a super forum for consultation to facilitate closer business ties between the two countries. Chief Executives of 25 big corporations had accompanied Brown who concluded 11 business deals with India in four days of his stay. Since that time, economic factors have brought India and the US together. The US has become the largest source of foreign investment and the largest destination of the Indian exports.

### 3.1.4 Defence Co-operation

The most significant change in the Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War era, however, is the increasing defense cooperation between the two countries. Cooperation in this field was almost a taboo in the Cold War days. The first milestone in this direction
was laid by a visit to India by the US Defence Secretary William Perry in early 1995. He signed “Agreed Minutes on Defence Cooperation” with his Indian counterpart paving the way for bilateral security cooperation to deal with the post-Cold War uncertainties. Although it did not signify making of an alliance, it opened up a hitherto closed avenue for cooperation at least in principle. This agreement in the backdrop of US-Pakistan strategic differences was a significant security scenario in the subcontinent. Pakistan had been reeling under the American sanctions under the Pressler Amendment since 1990. Although the Brown Amendment gave a one-time waiver to the Pressler Amendment, Islamabad had lost all its strategic relevance to the US since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But today even though Pakistan continuing as a launch pad for their war on terror the trust deficit between the Pakistan and US are increasing. At the same time the defence and strategic engagement between US and India are increasing. The best example is Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement.

3.1.5 After Pokhran II

Increased economic cooperation and beginning of defence cooperation between India and the US did not mean that the two countries had no differences in the post-Cold War era. The Kashmir issue, now complicated by Pakistan sponsored cross-border terrorism, continued to haunt the Indo-US relations. India expected the US to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state. Washington refused to do that despite adequate evidence provided by its own intelligence community and the Indian Government. Simultaneously, some US legislators continued to raise the issue of human rights violation in Kashmir generating unease in India.

The differences over the nuclear issues also continued, as the Clinton administration adopted a policy of “cap, freeze and roll back” of nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. India had broadly four grievances against the US non-proliferation policy. First, Washington kept on providing military and economic assistance to Pakistan in the 1980s amidst intelligence reports about Islamabad’s quest for a nuclear weapon capability. As and when the Pressler Amendment was imposed, it was no punishment since Pakistan had already acquired nuclear weapon capability. The amendment required the US president to certify that Pakistan did not want to possess nuclear weapons (or nuclear weapons technology) before US aid could be released to that country. Moreover, the Clinton Administration was instrumental in the enactment of the Brown Amendment by the US Congress, which diluted the effect of the Pressler Amendment and amounted to rewarding a proliferator. India also accused Washington of inaction in the face of Indo–Pakistan cooperation in WMD programmes. Secondly, Washington, while showing laxity on Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, took a hard line on India’s indigenous nuclear and missile programmes. It scuttled the cryogenic rocket engine deal between India and
Russia. Thirdly, the US occasionally made common cause with China to address the South Asian nuclear issue, while India felt that China’s nuclear weapons were part of the problem of proliferation in the region. Finally, the US failed to appreciate the Indian sincerity to back a truly non-discriminatory comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and once again sought to craft a discriminatory document to target, among other things, Indian nuclear programme.

In the midst of the perceived discriminatory US non-proliferation policy and nuclearisation of India’s security environment with rising cooperation between China and Pakistan on nuclear weapons programmes, New Delhi conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998. Known as Pokharan II tests, it heralded the open nuclear age in South Asia, as Pakistan also followed Indian footsteps and conducted several nuclear tests of its own. The United States imposed comprehensive sanctions against the nuclear tests and Indo-US relations came to pass through a sky of dark clouds. Although India voluntarily declared that it was not going to conduct any more tests, the US continued pressurising India to sign the NPT and CTBT.

3.1.6 Relations in the New Millennium

The dark clouds over the Indo-US relations however, did not have a prolonged existence. It was soon realised by the Clinton Administration that the nuclear developments in the subcontinent could not be reversed. The American sanctions, the Asian economic meltdown and a period of global recession could not prevent the commendable growth of Indian economy. Washington saw positive benefit in engaging an economically vibrant, democratically stable and militarily powerful India. President Bill Clinton visited India in March 2000 and laid the foundation of a new relationship between the two countries.

The American position on the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in mid-1999 had removed yet another irritant in Indo-US relations and president Bill Clinton was heartily welcomed in India. New Delhi had appreciated Clinton’s pressure on Pakistan to stop its misadventure in the Kargil Sector of Kashmir in 1999 and Washington had praised India’s restraint in not crossing the Line of Control (LoC) and responsible conduct of the Kargil war. By visiting India for five days and Pakistan for four hours, Clinton made it clear where American stakes lay in the new millennium. The Indian and the American officials signed several cooperative agreements during Clinton’s visit and one of the most significant developments was a joint vision statement on the future course of the relationship.
As Bill Clinton came to India at the fag end of his presidential career, some analysts argued that Indo-US relations would once again enter the uncharted waters after the next presidential election. But as history is now witness, the victory of the Republican candidate George W Bush in the 2000 presidential election took the relationship to the new heights. President Bush considered China a strategic competitor and India a democratic strategic partner. India, in his view, is a major world power and the US-Indian relations would be important to maintain Asian and global stability in the 21st century. India’s quick support to Bush’s concept of national missile defence (NMD) surprised the whole world. But it symbolised the birth of a new and more intense strategic relationship between India and the US.

3.1.7 September 11 and After

As Indo-US relations kept improving and the Bush administration was about to lift nuclear related sanctions from India and at the same time the US-Pakistan strategic distance was widening, terrorist strike on the US on 11 September 2001 shook the entire world. India declared unconditional support to the US war against terrorism. But when Bush decided to make Pakistan a frontline state in his war against global terrorism, doubts were again expressed about the future cooperative ties between India and the US. The growth of the terrorist strikes in India, especially on Kashmir legislature in October 2001, and the futile attempt by Pakistan-backed terrorists to storm the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 created complications in the Indo-US relations. Washington considered Pakistan’s support crucial in its war against terrorism and failed to restrain Pakistan from continuing its cross-border terrorism against India. Mobilisation of troops along the border by India and Pakistan in the wake of 13 December event and Washington’s call for Indo-Pak dialogue was interpreted in India as America’s double standard in dealing with terrorism. Meanwhile, India had also snapped air, rail and bus links with Pakistan.

However, India decided to pull its troops back and normalise the situation along the border after successfully making the international community aware of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. This policy also removed an American worry over a full-scale war in the subcontinent, which could escalate into a nuclear war. The developments in Iraq, which led to the American military action against Iraq was another issue that created a little political hiccup in the Indo-US relations. The US did not accept in good spirit the Indian Parliament’s unanimous resolution calling for ending the war and the withdrawal of the US and coalition forces from Iraq. India later refused to send its troops to Iraq for its stabilisation, on the ground that there was no UN request for the deployment of the Indian troops, and that the Indian troops could not function under the command of anybody (meaning US). India would consider the issue as and when the UN called for it.
3.1.8 Current trends

India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, the dominant actor in its region, and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent Great Power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China. The Indo-US civilian nuclear Agreement is also considered as a part of this strategy. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes. The influence of a large Indian-American community is reflected in the largest country-specific caucus in the United States Congress, while from 2009-2010 more than 100,000 Indian students have attended American colleges and universities.

During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change. In November 2010, President Barack Obama visited India and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament, where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. From all the above analysis, it is very clear that India and US are moving from estrangement to engagement in this post Cold War period.

3.2 INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

3.2.1 Introduction

Russia as a new country in the modern political map of the globe is a little more than ten years old. It is actually the principal successor state to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), which disintegrated in December 1991. Russia was given the permanent seat in the UN Security Council (with a right to veto) which was held till 1991 by the USSR. Since Russia inherited the lion’s share of benefits and burdens of the USSR, Indo-Russian relations of today must be understood in the backdrop of Indo-Soviet relations.
India’s relations with the Soviet Union during the early years of its liberation from the British Raj were not very cordial. In fact, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was initially wary of the Soviet Union. Nor was the Soviet Union keen to establish any meaningful ties with the newly independent India. However, the spread of the superpower rivalry around the world motivated the Soviet Union to reexamine its relations with India, which followed a non-aligned foreign policy. India, on the other hand, suspicious of the emerging security ties between the USA and Pakistan, reconsidered its views of and policies towards the Soviet Union particularly in the post-Stalin period. By the mid-1950s India and the Soviet Union appeared all poised to establish closer relations. This trend was considerably strengthened in 1956 when, during a visit to India, Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Alexei Kosygin referred to Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. Kashmir being a core national security issue with India, the Soviet gesture was highly appreciated by the Indian leaders. In response, India voted with the Soviet Union in 1956 in the UN General Assembly, on the resolution calling for democratic elections in Hungary which was then under Soviet occupation.

However, it was after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that the Indo-Soviet relations assumed added importance. Although the Soviet Union did not have strategic relations with the non-aligned India during the Chinese invasion, Sino-Soviet rift had become crystal clear by that time. The refusal of the US-led Western camp to assist India in expanding its military capability led to the establishment of formal military cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. The two countries in 1962 agreed to begin a programme of military-technical cooperation. India was not keen to enter the Cold War politics. For India, the agreement with the Soviets was a commercial one based on economics and the dire necessity to modernise its armed forces after the 1962 debacle. After all, Soviet military contracts usually had favourable financial terms and provided for licensing of production.

India’s long term self-reliance in military procurement and search for strategic autonomy guided India’s security cooperation with the Soviet Union. In other words, India did not choose to join the Soviet camp, it only sought to use the Soviet supplied arms as a stepping stone to achieve strategic autonomy. The Indian non-alignment was, in fact, demonstrated a few years later, when Pakistan agreed to Soviet peace mediation at Tashkent after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.

The seismic shifts in regional geopolitics in the late 1960s and early 1970s culminated in an enhanced Indo-Soviet security cooperation. The US approach to befriend China with the help of Pakistan was interpreted in India as the emergence of a new axis of power consisting of those three countries. The simultaneous political upheaval in East Pakistan adversely affected India’s national security and economy. Before India and Pakistan would fight the third round of war in 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed a historic Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971.
Since then the two countries developed a kind of mutual trust and cooperation, which appeared solid and durable until the disintegration of the USSR. India met most of its defence needs from the Soviet Union. By a rough estimate, almost 60 per cent of the Indian army’s military hardware, 70 per cent of its naval hardware, and 80 per cent of air force hardware originated from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the two countries developed a convergence of views and interests on most of the international issues of the Cold War days.

3.2.2 Tensions after the Collapse of the USSR

The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of Russia led to several changes in the traditional foreign policy objectives and goals. As the new Russian Federation began to grope for new principles and practices of its foreign relations, three factors led to the sidelining of India in Moscow’s policy circles. First, president Boris Yeltsin emphasised a need for the “deideologisation” of its foreign policy, which resulted in a “wait and see” policy towards India. The new relationship with India was to be guided by “pragmatism and flexibility” and there was no hurry to devote much time to India.

Secondly, Russian political establishment was divided between two groups—“Westerners or Atlanticists” and “Asia first” groups. Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were “Atlanticists” who pinned their hopes on a renewal of the Russian economy with the help of a new version of the Marshall Plan.

Thirdly, a school of thought concerning future relations with India, headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, believed that Pakistan was a more valuable asset in fulfilling Russia’s immediate foreign policy and security concerns. They argued that Pakistan could become an effective middleman for Russia in dealing with Islamic fundamentalism. The views of this group prevailed in the early 1990s. Consequently, the Russian foreign ministry considered Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as having a higher priority than India.

Another school of thought comprising some academics, members of the Duma and the defence industry strongly believed that Russia should maintain its “special” relationship with India. A strong India, in their view, could be a better bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism and the hegemonic status of the United States. But this school failed to influence the course of foreign policy making.

As the anti-India school of thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making, a major shift in Soviet/Russian policy towards South Asia took place during transition days. In November 1991—about a month before the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow suddenly supported the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the
establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. It almost gave a political shock to India, since it would mean that India, along with Pakistan, would have to abandon its nuclear programmes. The support to the Pakistani proposal was partly guided by the desire to get the Soviet prisoners of war released from the “custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions.” In December 1991, when the Soviet Union was breathing its last, a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen travelled to Russia. In January 1992, the new Russian government severed all “military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military transport” that were sustaining the war efforts of president Najib’s government of Afghanistan against the Mujahideen. India once again was seriously concerned over the reversal in the Soviet/Russian policy.

Another event creating stress in the Indo-Russian relations centred on a contract dispute between the Russian space directorate Glavkosmos and the Government of India for the purchase of cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 18 January 1991, would have helped India gain knowledge of the liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order to advance India’s geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) programme. When the United States threatened to impose sanctions under the MTCR on both India and Russia, President Boris Yeltsin promised that he would not give in to US diplomatic pressure. But when the US actually applied sanctions in May 1992, and threatened further economic measures, Yeltsin in July 1993 agreed to suspend the transaction with India and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the cryogenic engines and not the technology. In return, Glavkosmos received bidding rights on more than $950 million worth of future US space projects. During the same time yet another controversy, the “rupee versus rouble” debate, negatively affected Indo-Russian relations. India had accumulated a debt of more than $12 billion owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While India was prepared and willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged with the new Russian government over the nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be used. This dispute led to a collapse of trade relations between the two countries in 1991-92. After considerable negotiations, a resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005 and the remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest free, over a span of forty-five years.

3.2.3 Revival of Close Co-operation

Russia realised before long that its hopes of Marshall Plan type assistance from the West were misplaced. The expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the crisis in the Balkans and several other instances of American unilateralism induced Moscow to reprioritise its foreign policy agenda. Those who supported closer ties with
Asian powers could vindicate their ideas. In January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s foreign minister, Indo-US relations began to change quickly. India once again came under Russian strategic focus.

At a time when US president Bill Clinton put pressure on India on the nuclear issue, Moscow sent a new signal to New Delhi by concluding an agreement to build two Russian light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear Suppliers Group ban. The accord paved the way for the construction of two 1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. It seemed that Russia would not succumb to external pressure this time. While Russia did criticise India for its nuclear tests in 1998, it refused to apply any sanctions against India. Besides, Russia fully supported India during the Kargil conflict of 1999, and it called upon Pakistan to pull back its troops on its side of Line of Control (LOC). President Putin has fully supported Vajpayee government’s position on cross-border terrorism, urging Pakistan to destroy its infrastructure of terrorism.

India would no longer face the military difficulties it faced after the Soviet disintegration. India’s concern in the early 1990s was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Soviet produced armaments. Lacking the indigenous capability to produce spare parts and supplies for the Soviet built equipment, India’s military faced an immediate crisis. On the reverse side, Russian inability to continue the flow of military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in the Indian military expenditures, “weakened the primary bond that had united India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War”. By the mid-1990s, in fact, the Indian economic growth and the financial needs of Russia’s military-industrial complex quickly mended the “hiccup” in the Indo-Russian military cooperation.

3.2.4 Terrorism

On international terrorism, India and Russia agree that there is no justification for terrorism, and this must be fought against, without compromise and wherever it exists. Russia has supported the Indian draft at the UN on Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism [CCIT]. The two sides signed a MoU on co-operation in combating terrorism in December 2002. A Joint Working Group on Combating International Terrorism meets from time to time and its fourth meeting was held in Delhi on 24 October 2006. Both Russia and India have faced the problem of terrorism, India has seen it in the context of its military presence in Kashmir and Russia has seen it in Chechnya and both the countries are supportive of each other on the issue of terrorism.
3.2.5 Nuclear Deals

On 7 November 2009, India signed a new nuclear deal with Russia apart from the deals that were agreed upon by the two countries earlier.[29] India and Russia are in discussion for construction of two more nuclear power units at Kudankulam. The two units already set up are ready for operation.[30] During Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to India for the 13th annual summit, a co-operative civilian nuclear energy road map was agreed to. Running until 2030, sixteen to eighteen new reactors will be constructed, with installed capacity of 1000 MW each. A 1000 MW reactor costs around $2.5 billion so the deal may touch $45 billion in worth.

3.2.6 Conclusion

India and Russia cannot afford to dilute their bilateral relations and they both require each other. Therefore, they need to synergise co-operation in the economic and security arenas in particular. In the present context, the challenge is to reexamine the current state of the partnership. As Russian Ambassador Kadakin aptly put it ‘India is Russia’s closest friend’. The reverse also holds true.

3.3. INDIA–CHINA RELATIONS

3.3.1. Introduction

The history of Sino-Indian relations left the fact that relations are not cordial always. Chinese were not happy with the Indian policy of Non-Alignment. Chinese expansionist policy, Mao-Nehru identity clash, Tibetan problem, Dalai Lama’s asylum and border problem between two nations finally lead to the Sino-Indian War of 1962, which ends the “honeymoon” between India and China. From 1976 onwards, India followed a policy of ‘normalisation’ towards China. But Chinese response to it was very slow and sharp. After war ambassadorial level relationship were restored in 1976. In December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India made a five day break through visit to China. This was considered as an important one in the post 1962 phase was concerned. Initiatives to settle border problem were also started during this period.

3.3.2 Normalisation after the war

Sino-Indian relationship from 1988 to 1998 can be termed as a period of “normalisation”. But in May 1998, India’s Defence Minister of the time George Fernandez made a statement that China is “potential threat No.1.” Just before this he had accused China of being the “mother” of Ghauri, Pakistan’s Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles and of intruding in to Indian territory to build a helipad in Arunachal Pradesh. In addition to this for rationalising the PokhranII explosion, Vajpayee government also
choose to target China as one of the two ‘threat’ factors. This brought a temporary setback in Sino-Indian relations. As a response to New Delhi’s allegations and to demonstrate its credentials as a responsible power supporting global non-proliferation principles, Beijing used its rotating presidency of the UN Security Council to undertake a series of initiatives. It includes the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1172, condemning the nuclear tests in South Asia and calling on India and Pakistan to stop their nuclear programs immediately and refrain from weaponisation. China also cancelled the November 1998 Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting in Beijing to express its displeasure.

The Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Beijing in June 1999 brought back the normalisation in Sino-Indian relations. Later Indian President K.R Narayanan’s week long visit to China between May 28 and June 3, 2000 was a significant one as far as the bilateral relations were concerned. China has adopted a policy of developing friendly relations with India on the one hand, and with Pakistan and other South Asian countries on the other. It has expressed its desire for South Asian countries to be friendly with each other. After several other high-level visits, the JWG resumed its regular meetings in April 1999. In November 2001, Beijing and New Delhi for the first time exchanged maps on the middle sector of the disputed border area, covering the Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh boundaries with Tibet. At the suggestion of President Jiang Zemin and his counterpart Narayanan, a bilateral China-India Eminent Persons Group composed of former diplomats, scholars, scientists, and others from each country held its first meeting in New Delhi in September 2001. The group provides advice on how to improve bilateral relations and other issues. Defence Minister George Fernandez’s weeklong visit to China in April 2003 held tremendous symbolic significance. His China trip was the first by an Indian Defence Minister in more than a decade.

Fernandez’s trip paved the way for a more substantive June 2003 visit by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, during which Beijing and New Delhi forged a consensus on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. They vowed not to view each other as security threats and reaffirmed their determination to resolve disputes through peaceful means. They also found converging interests in the development of a fair and equitable international political and economic order, the role of the United Nations, and global arms control processes, including efforts to prevent the weaponisation of outer space. Two years later, during Premier Wen Jiabao’s April 2005 visit to India, the two governments issued a joint statement characterizing their relationship as a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity”. These high-level visits have produced marked results in several areas. Most noticeably, bilateral trade has grown from $117 million in 1987 to $25 billion in 2006.
3.3.3. Issues

Although Chinese-Indian relations have achieved major progress over the last decade, obstacles to future development remain. Unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions, and growing rivalry in the areas of energy, regional influence, and realignment of great-power relations, could deny the two rising Asian giants the opportunity to cooperate and realize their potentials as the engines of growth and pillars of stability in Asia and beyond. India’s strengthening alliance with U.S, Chinese strengthening alliance with Pakistan and the unsettled border problem between India and China will increase the mutual suspicions between the two. Many strategic analysts in India argued that China is ‘encircling’ and ‘containing’ India; by maintaining more than cordial relationships with Pakistan and other South Asian countries. Their current nuclear deal between Pakistan is an effort to equate with Indo-US Civilian Nuclear deal. Border intrusions and maneuverings played against India in many ways by China created a trust deficit among Indian’s towards China.

3.3.4 Conclusion

In short, the current political relations between India and China can be termed as “strategic competition and strategic partnership”. It is clear that there is a great amount of trust deficit between two nations and the unsettled problems will remain as a stumbling block to a cordial co-operation. There is also many assertive policies from the part of China. Recent Arunachal Pradesh intrusions, stapled visa problems to Kashmiri Citizens are some examples. But the rapid growing economies know about the benefits of cooperation and there are many possibilities in the midst of these issues.

3.4 INDIA-IRAN RELATIONS

3.4.1 Introduction

Relations between India and Iran date back to the Neolithic period. The existence of several empires spanning both Persia and northern India ensured the constant migration of people between the two regions and the spread and evolution of the Indo-Iranian language groups. As a consequence, the people of Northern India and Iran share significant cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics.

3.4.2 During cold war Period

During much of the Cold War period, relations between the Republic of India and the erstwhile Imperial State of Iran suffered due to different political interests—non-aligned India fostered strong military links with the Soviet Union while Iran enjoyed close ties with the United States. Following the 1979 revolution, relations between Iran and India strengthened momentarily. However, Iran's continued support for Pakistan and India's close relations with Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War impeded further development of Indo-Iranian ties. Relations between the two countries warmed in the 1990s when India collaborated with Iran to support the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban.

Eventhough the two countries share some common strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues. India has expressed strong opposition against Iran's nuclear programme and whilst both the nations continue to oppose the Taliban, India supports the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan unlike Iran. Despite the decline in strategic and military links, the two nations continue to maintain strong cultural and economic ties. Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, India, continues to be a major centre of Shia culture and Persian study in South Asia. Iran is the second largest supplier of crude oil to India, supplying more than 425,000 barrels of oil per day, and consequently India is one of the largest foreign investors in Iran's oil and gas industry.

In 2011, the US$12 billion annual oil trade between India and Iran was halted due to extensive economic sanctions against Iran, forcing the Indian oil ministry to pay off the debt through a banking system via Turkey.

India and Iran have friendly relations in many areas, despite India not welcoming the 1979 Revolution. There are significant trade ties, particularly in crude oil imports into India and diesel exports to Iran. Iran frequently objected to Pakistan's attempts to draft anti-India resolutions at international organisations such as the OIC and the Human Rights Commission. India welcomed Iran's inclusion as an observer state in the SAARC regional organisation.

There is a small Indian community in Iran. There are Hindu temples in Bandar Abbas and Zahidan as well as a Sikh Temple (Gurdwara) located in Tehran. They were built in the 19th century by Indian soldiers in the British Army. There are also small communities in India who trace their ancestry to Iran.

A growing number of Iranian students are enrolled at universities in India, most notably in Pune and Bangalore. The growing Iranian film industry looks to India's Bollywood for technical assistance and inspiration. The clerical government in Tehran sees itself as a leader of Shiites worldwide including India. Indian Shiites enjoy state support
such as a recognised national holiday for Muharram. Lucknow continues to be a major centre of Shiite culture and Persian study in the subcontinent.

In the 1990s, India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime. They continue to collaborate in supporting the broad-based anti-Taliban government led by Hamid Karzai and backed by the United States. The two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement in December 2002.

In August 2013, while carrying oil in the Persian Gulf, Iran detained India’s largest ocean liner Shipping Corporation (SCI)’s vessel MT Desh Shanti carrying crude from Iraq. But, Iran stood firm in its stand that the detention of the oil tanker was “purely a technical and non-political issue”.

3.4.3 Economic relations

Iran's trade with India crossed US$13 billion in 2007, an 80% increase in trade volume within a year via third party countries like UAE this figure touches $30 billion.

3.4.4 Oil and gas

In 2008–09, Iranian oil accounted for nearly 16.5% of India's crude oil imports. Indian oil imports from Iran increased by 9.5% in 2008–09 due to which Iran emerged as India's second largest oil supplier. About 40% of the refined oil consumed by India is imported from Iran. In June 2009, Indian oil companies announced their plan to invest US$5 billion in developing an Iranian gas field in the Persian Gulf. In September 2009, the Mehr news agency reported a Pakistani diplomat as saying "India definitely quit the IPI (India-Pakistan-Iran) gas pipeline deal, in favour of Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement for energy security. Iranian officials however said India is yet to make an official declaration. In 2010, US officials warned New Delhi that Indian companies using the Asian Clearing Union for financial transactions with Iran run the risk of violating a recent US law that bans international firms from doing business with Iranian banks and Tehran's oil and gas sector, and that Indian companies dealing with Iran in this manner may be barred from the US. The United States criticises the ACU of being insufficiently transparent in its financial dealings with Iran and suspects that much of their assets are funneled to blacklisted repressive organisations in Iran such as the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. The United States Department of the Treasury also believes that Iran uses the ACU to bypass the US banking system." On 27 November 2010, the Indian government, through the Reserve Bank of India, instructed the country’s lenders to stop processing current-account transactions with Iran using the Asian Clearing Union, and that further deals should be settled without ACU involvement. RBI also declared that they will not facilitate payments for Iranian crude imports as global pressure on Tehran grows over its nuclear programme. This move by the Indian government will make clear to
Indian companies that working through the ACU "doesn't necessarily mean an Iranian counterpart has an international seal of approval". As of December 2010, neither Iran nor the ACU have responded to this development. India objected to further American sanctions on Iran in 2010. An Indian foreign policy strategist, Rajiv Sikri, dismissed the idea that a nuclear armed Iran was a threat to India, and said that India would continue to invest in Iran and do business. Despite increased pressure by the US and Europe, and a significant reduction in oil imports from Persian oil fields in 2012, leading political figures in India have clearly stated that they are not willing to stop trade relations altogether. To the contrary, they aim at expanding the commodity trade with the Islamic republic.

3.4.5 Decrease in import of oil

India has cut oil imports from Iran, after sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. India’s crude imports from Iran plunged by more than 26.5 per cent in the 2012-13 financial year (April-March) as US and European sanctions on Tehran combined to make it difficult for Indian refiners to ship Iranian oil. Imports of Iranian crude fell to 13.3 million metric ton(mt), or close to 267,100 barrels per day(b/d), in 2012-13 from 18.1 million mt, or around 362,500 b/d, in 2011-12. Imports from Iran were as high as 21.2 million mt, or 425,000 b/d, in 2009-10 before dropping to 18.5 million mt, or 371,520 b/d in 2010-11. India’s total volume of imported crude rose to 182.5 million mt, or 3.67 million b/d, in 2012-13 from 171.7 million mt (3.44 million b/d) in 2011-12, 163.4 million mt (3.28 million mt) in 2010-11 and 159.2 million mt (3.2 million b/d) in 2009-10.

3.4.6 India's nuclear vote with Iran and after

India, despite close relations and convergence of interests with Iran, voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005, which took Iran by surprise.

The USA considers support from India – which is on 35-member board of Governors at the International Atomic Energy Agency – crucial in getting a sizeable majority for its proposal to refer the matter to the Security Council for positive punitive action against Iran. Greg Schulte, US ambassador to the IAEA, said "India's voice will carry particular weight...I hope India joins us in making clear our collective concerns about Iran’s nuclear program". Schulte did not deny that the Indo-US nuclear deal was conditional to India supporting the US on the Iran issue. Appraising of the situation vis-a-vis Iran, a senior U.S. official told the New York Times that The Indians are emerging from their nonaligned status and becoming a global power, and they have to begin to think about their responsibilities. They have to make a basic choice.

The Bush administration, however, recognised India's close relations with Iran and tempered its position, stating that India can "go ahead with a pipeline deal involving Iran and Pakistan. Our beef with Iran is not the pipeline."
MODULE IV
ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

4.1 Introduction

Regional Organizations (ROs) are in a sense, international organizations (IOs), as they incorporate international membership and encompass geopolitical entities that operationally transcend a single nation state. However, their membership is characterised by boundaries and demarcations characteristic to a defined and unique geography, such as continents, or geopolitics, such as economic blocks. They have been established to foster cooperation and political and economic integration or dialogue amongst states or entities within a restrictive geographical or geopolitical boundary. India’s engagement with the regional and international organisations increased tremendously in the post Cold war Period. Increasing interdependence and emergence of new kinds of security threats and challenges accelerated the significance of the engagement of regional and international organisations. India’s engagement with ASEAN, SAARC, EU and UNO are analysing here.

4.2 INDIA AND ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

4.2.1 Introduction

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born in 1967 and was aimed at promoting regional trade, investment and joint ventures. It proved to be the nucleus of regional cooperation, was booming and looking for new markets and investment opportunities. It found India and Vietnam complementary, now attracting investment opportunities. It also perceived India and Vietnam complementary for strengthening regional political and security profile. Vietnam had started the process of Doi Moi (Renovation) aimed at liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. India on the other hand, adopted the policy of economic liberalisation under the stewardship of P V Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister and Finance Minister respectively, in 1991. The new government in India also started initiating the process of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. India too announced tax-free incentives for foreign investors. These policies encouraged the ASEAN for further consolidation of its cooperation with India.
ASEAN offered sectoral dialogue partnership to India in 1992. Accordingly, four core sectors of co-operation were recognised, namely trade, investment, tourism, science and technology. Sectoral partnership was instrumental in establishing the institutional linkage between India and ASEAN and the partnership proved so useful that the ASEAN upgraded it within two years to full dialogue partnership in 1995. This facilitated the growth of relationship in different areas with economic, security and political implications. India was invited to participate in the post-ministerial conferences of the ASEAN and also in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the security forum of ASEAN. Subsequently, both India and ASEAN began to talk of a common vision and a shared destiny.

ASEAN-India co-operation committee was established to function as a key institutional mechanism to provide substantive content to different sectors of co-operation. ASEAN-India working group was also established to find out the areas for co-operation in science and technology, trade and investment, human resource development and culture. The Joint co-operation committee recognised the Indian expertise in the field of science and technology, especially in biotechnology and IT (Information Technology). Proposals were given to co-operate in food processing, health care, agriculture, engineering, electronics, communication and service sectors. The meeting of the ASEAN-India co-operation committee decided to set up the India-ASEAN fund to develop co-operation in trade, investment, tourism, computer technology, solar energy and environmental protection. This fund was placed at the disposal of ASEAN Secretariat and administered by a joint management committee. Joint co-operation committee also agreed to set up an ASEAN-New Delhi committee consisting of the heads of diplomatic missions of the ASEAN countries. The then Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit announced the scheme of scholarship and said that each side could offer six post-doctoral fellowships up to six months in the area of science and technology. India and the ASEAN region also started ASEAN lecture series from eminent persons under which prominent ASEAN leaders and intellectuals delivered their lectures in India and vice versa. This has proved useful in the confidence building and objective understanding of the issues in the foreign policy and diplomacy of the ASEAN vis-a-vis dialogue partners.

4.2.2 Trade and investment

Economic paradigm is the main thrust of co-operation with the ASEAN. India has one billion population of which a major section is comprised of the middle class. As India believed in the socialistic drives and the nationalisation for decades, its relationship with ASEAN was limited. In 1991-92, when India embarked on the policy of liberalisation, the ASEAN group accounted for six per cent of India's total exports but for ASEAN it was less than 1 per cent of their global trade. This situation started changing in the post-Cold War
era. Indian expertise in IT, software development, small and medium enterprises and development of infrastructure, particularly in the area of power generation, transportation and construction were appreciated. Certain areas on the territorial borders of Southeast Asia were planned to be included in the growth areas. These included Andamans and Northeast part of India. Though, these proposals have not been operational so far, the potentials for future cooperation are streamlined. Trade turnover and the growing investments between India and ASEAN display confidence in each other and enhanced scope for closer partnership. India’s trade with Thailand has touched more than $1 billion per year. India exports gems, precious stones, cotton and fabric, urea and fertilizers etc. and imports pulses (urad and moong), rubber, synthetic fibre and inorganic chemicals.

The two-way trade between India and Malaysia which amounted to $772 million in 1994, has also touched billion plus now. India imports palm oil, petroleum, crude rubber and non-ferrous base metals and exports engineering goods, building materials, textile, yarn, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, molasses, fruits and vegetables. India’s trade with Singapore, which accounted for nearly $44 million in the past rose to $1.5 billion in 1992 and is increasing at the rate of 10 per cent per year. India imports engineering goods, oil rigs, palm oil, organic chemicals, glass and telecommunication equipments and exports textiles, spices, fodders, inorganic chemicals, jute, fruits and vegetables.

Trading figures with Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have also shown increasing trends. Burma is also emerging as an important trading partner after the opening of Tamu-Moreh borders. India is supporting a constructive engagement policy vis-à-vis the Burmese military regime and it is treated as an important gateway of trade especially with the ASEAN region. India and Burma signed an MoU on 20 May 2001 agreeing to the maintenance of Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewa road. Multimode transport projects concerning the upgradation of Sittwe port, navigation on the river Kaladan, and highway development from Kalewa to India-Burma border in Mizoram were other areas of co-operation. Energy related projects including solar, fossil fuel and hydroelectric energy remained items for future co-operation.

Bilateral trade figures between India and Burma stood at US $7 million, with Indonesia at $1,186 million, and with Malaysia $1,544 million in 1996-97. The Indian exports to the ASEAN region has been largely in the areas of animal feed, cotton, rice, groundnut, synthetic fibre, machinery and bio-chemicals. There is a great potential for trade in a range of products such as auto parts and components, electronic components, railway equipment, computer and software, synthetic and organics. Indian steel, herbal products, textiles and yarns are in great demand in the region.
The bilateral trade with the Indo-Chinese countries is also increasing. In 1997-98, bilateral trade with Cambodia amounted to Rs. 10.3 crores. India donated medicines worth Rs. 5 lakhs for humanitarian assistance and evinced interest in assisting agricultural development. On the other hand, bilateral trade with Laos increased to Rs. 2.9 crores in 1998 compared to Rs. 1.3 crores in 1996. Several Indian companies such as Kirloskar, Tata, BHEL, etc. showed interest in exploring Laotian market. Kirloskar exported irrigation pumps valued at US $ 30 million in 1998. Again bilateral trade with Vietnam registered a marginal increase of 12.5 per cent over the 1996-97 volumes of Rs. 425.2 crores. As far as Indonesia was concerned, bilateral trade amounted to Rs. 4330.3 crores as compared to Rs. 4226.2 crores in 1996-97. However trade with the Philippines showed a downward trend in 1998. India’s export to the Philippines at $ 90 million was down by 31.36 per cent in 1996-97

4.2.3 Conclusion

India-ASEAN relations reached a new high on 20-21 December 2012 during the commemorative summit celebrating twenty years of dialogue partnership and ten years of summit partnership. There is growing acknowledgement on the part of ASEAN that India has a much larger responsibility and much greater role to play in Southeast Asia in the second decade of the 21st century. New Delhi’s role is becoming critical in shaping the regional strategic discourse that has been drifting towards uncertainty, multi-layered rivalry and multipolarity. While both Manila and Hanoi called for New Delhi’s active participation in the regional security discourses, such as resolution of the South China Sea issue, Phnom Penh requested India for the financial assistance of US$57 million. This trend gained traction during the proceedings of the Delhi Dialogue III at the track-II level in March 2011 when demands for India’s active role in the region were sought by the experts and leaders in the backdrop of China’s growing assertion in the South China Sea since May 2010.

New Delhi cannot shy away from its responsibilities as a regional stakeholder. Perhaps, the most important contribution from India can come in the form of (a) acting as a positive force for regional peace and stability, (b) rallying its strength - material, diplomatic, and normative – behind the ASEAN cooperative architectures, and (c) engaging in capacity-building in the CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Burma, and Vietnam) countries. India has also agreed to ‘support and cooperate closely with ASEAN to realise the ASEAN Community in 2015.’

India must match its new-found profile either in terms of economic or strategic role by its tangible actions on the ground and ameliorate ASEAN’s precarious position of strategic uncertainty and instability. It is time for New Delhi to come true on promises
and start implementing the policy pronouncements. Perhaps, the early implementation of the setting up of Nalanda University and an ASEAN-India Centre can set in motion the wheel of an integrated India-ASEAN community.

4.3 INDIA AND SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL CO-OPERATION (SAARC)

4.3.1 Introduction

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an organisation of South Asian nations, which was established on 8 December 1985 when the government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka formally adopted its charter providing for the promotion of economic and social progress, cultural development within the South Asia region and also for friendship and cooperation with other developing countries. It is dedicated to economic, technological, social, and cultural development emphasising collective self-reliance. Its seven founding members are Sri Lanka, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Afghanistan joined the organisation in 2007. Meetings of heads of state are usually scheduled annually; meetings of foreign secretaries, twice annually. It is headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal.

4.3.2 Formation

The first concrete proposal for establishing a framework for regional cooperation in South Asia was made by the late president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, on May 2, 1980. Prior to this, the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia was discussed in at least three conferences: the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947, the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, and the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954. In the late 1970s, SAARC nations agreed upon the creation of a trade bloc consisting of South Asian countries. The idea of regional cooperation in South Asia was again mooted in May 1980. The foreign ministers of the seven countries met for the first time in Colombo in April 1981. The Committee of the Whole, which met in Colombo in August 1985, identified five broad areas for regional cooperation. New areas of cooperation were added in the following years.

4.3.3 Objectives

The objectives in the SAARC Charter include: promotion of welfare of people of South Asia and improving their quality of life; accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development; promote and strengthen collective self-reliance; contribute to mutual trust and understanding; promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields and strengthen
mutual cooperation. The Charter also sets out the following principles: respect for principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual benefit. Such cooperation was not to substitute, but to supplement bilateral and multilateral cooperation and was not to be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations. The Charter has two important General Provisions that are of significance. One, decisions are to be taken on the basis of unanimity and bilateral and contentious issues are to be excluded from deliberations.

The first SAARC Summit was held at Dhaka in 1985. Despite the brief references to some bilateral issues, the Summit kept clear of controversies. There appeared a deliberate effort made 14 to ensure that the formation of the SAARC does not come into controversy at its inauguration. The second summit at Bangalore in 1986 sought to continue the efforts at broad based cooperation. Some of the mutual bickering surfaced again. The bilateral issues between India and Pakistan surfaced in indirect references. Indo-Nepal issues also became a matter of debate. On the positive side, the Bangalore Summit decided to establish the permanent secretariat at Kathmandu. The Kathmandu Summit of 1987 took the bold initiative of signing a Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in South Asia. It was for the first time that a ‘political’ issue had been made the part of SAARC deliberations. These nations pledged to refrain from organising, instigating, and participating in civil strife or terrorist acts in member countries. However, the Convention did not provide for extradition facilities. SAARC also established the South Asian Food Security Reserve and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme. The Kathmandu Summit also saw the discussion on the possibility of including such issues like money, finance, banking and trade in SAARC deliberations. The fourth summit at Islamabad in 1988 is of particular significance to India as it afforded the opportunity for a direct dialogue between the Indian and the Pakistani Prime Ministers on Pakistani soil. Islamabad Summit suggested the preparation of a regional plan called ‘SAARC 2000’ to provide for basic needs of shelter, education and literacy. The summit took up environmental issues of the ‘green house effect’ for study. It also called for a war against narcotics. Islamabad is known for its action oriented programmes and also because it saw a spread of democratic order in South Asia.

The period 1989-90 saw some uncertainty in the process of co-operation in SAARC. The all round interest and enthusiasm that SAARC had been able to generate in the early years was marred by the uncertainty over holding of the fifth summit. Sri Lankan reluctance to hold the summit on account of Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral issues put serious obstacles in the progress of SAARC. Sri Lanka raised the issue of the presence of Indian Peace Keeping Forces as reason for its inability to hold the annual summit. The IPKF, despite having been sent on the invitation of the Sri Lankan government, became a bone
of contention. Eventually, the 1989 summit never took place and the fifth summit was then convened at Male in 1990. The Sri Lankan episode appears to have set a kind of a precedent. The subsequent years have seen the cancellation or postponement of annual summits for relatively minor reasons.

The Male summit of 1990 took place at the backdrop of an attempted coup in Maldives. India had assisted Maldives in its return to democracy. The major outcome of the Male summit was the signing of the convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. SAARC leaders also decided to initiate a dialogue with the European Union and the ASEAN. The sixth summit was held in Colombo in 1991. The preparations for the summit had witnessed some political bickering. Sri Lanka itself was facing internal political turmoil in the Tamil regions of the north. The uncertainties were further complicated by the lack of consensus on the dates. Eventually the summit came to be held in December 1991. Colombo started the talk on the liberalisation of intra regional trade. The Sri Lankan president, in an interview, stated that his proposal for developing a preferential trading system in South Asia had been accepted. The period from 1991 to 1993 was to eventually see the emergence of trade as the central concern of SAARC.

The Seventh SAARC Summit meeting at Dhaka in 1993 reaffirmed the need to liberalise trade as early as possible through a step by step approach. The agreement on SAARC Preferential Trade (SAPTA) was the first step in this direction. A preferential trading arrangement is the first, and perhaps, the mildest form of regional economic integration. The agreement aimed at promoting and sustaining mutual trade and economic cooperation among the states of SAARC through the exchange of various concessions. The New Delhi Summit (tenth, 1995) took this discussion further.

The Ninth Summit at Male held in 1997 was concerned about acceleration of economic cooperation in all areas. The leaders noted with satisfaction the progress of SAPTA but stressed upon the need to achieve the goal of free trade by the year 2001. The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced some major trade concessions at the Tenth SAARC Summit at Colombo in 1998. As a special gesture to SAARC nations, India announced the lifting of import curbs on over 2000 products on a preferential basis. India was also willing to consider bilateral free trade agreements with those countries which were interested in moving faster. In the wake of military coup in Pakistan in October 1999, India refused to attend the next summit. Thus, no summit meeting was held during 1999-2001. Trade relations continued to be addressed at the eleventh summit meeting held at Kathmandu in 2002. But, then again the next Summit meeting proposed for January 2003 at Islamabad could not take place due to India’s reluctance to attend it. Meanwhile, progress was made in the direction of achieving/enhancing free trade (SAFTA) in the SAARC Summit Meeting at Islamabad in early 2004.
4.3.4 Challenges of SAARC

Since its creation in December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has sought after to boost economic unity between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The organization was designed to improve both the economic and social progress of its member states. Unlike the EU or ASEAN, however, trade between the seven SAARC States has remained limited despite the fact that all are positioned within a close proximity of one another and all are part of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

A growing emphasis on attracting foreign investment and seeking access to new markets in SAARC states indicates that economic progress is central to the future of South Asia. SAARC, however, is likely to play only a limited role in that future because of India’s considerable position of power over the other SAARC states. This imbalance of power within SAARC allows conflicts between India and its neighbors to undermine organizational unity. Clashes between South Asian countries end up jeopardizing the formation and effectiveness of regional trade agreements. They also lead individual SAARC countries to advance their economic interests through bi-lateral agreements, reduce the incentive to connect in multi-laterally.

It seems that SAARC will act more as a forum to encourage regional discussion through conferences and seminars than as an architect for economic policy in South Asia. There are some challenges to the effectiveness of this regional organization. SAARC is structured in a way that often makes regional cooperation difficult. In the case of SAARC, India is the most powerful country in terms of its economic might, military power and international influence. Thus, India’s potential as a regional hegemony gives SAARC a unique dynamic compared to an organization such as ASEAN.

Pakistan was initially hesitant to join SAARC due to fears of SAARC succumbing to Indian hegemony. Indeed, if India does take a prominent role in SAARC, it could further fears that India will use SAARC for hegemonic purposes. While the smaller states in South Asia recognize that they will need India’s help to facilitate faster economic growth, they are reluctant to work with India, fearing that such cooperation will admit Indian dominance in SAARC.

Aside from a few overtures to its neighbors, India has done little to dispel the fears of other South Asian states. The core of these fears is likely derived from the displays of India’s power by New Delhi in the past. Realizing its considerable advantage in military and economic power, India has consistently acted in an - arrogant and uncompromising - manner with its neighbors. Bangladesh is afraid of India exploiting its geographical position to redirect water flows vital to Bangladeshi agricultural production. Nepal and
Bhutan are still worried about India’s control over their world trade and transit links as their geographical position will always make them dependent on India. These disputes between India and its neighbors have directly affected SAARC.

The disputes between South Asian states have undermined SAARC efforts to promote regional trade. These disagreements make consensus building and cooperation among SAARC states complicated. Attempting to promote regional cooperation while doing little to resolve regional conflicts makes SAARC mission looks nearly impossible. Moreover, SAARC has no institutional mechanisms or punishments capable of preventing or fully resolving a dispute. Two examples illustrate how conflicts in South Asia have proven detrimental to SAARC.

Indian intervention in Sri Lanka from 1986-1990 can be quoted. The Indian military intervention to suppress an insurgency by The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam made Indo-Sri Lankan relations tense during these four years. Subsequently, the apprehension between India and Sri Lanka was considered a primary reason behind Sri Lanka’s lukewarm support for SAARC into economic and social spheres of its member states until relations improved with India.

A second, more prominent example of a conflict tremendous SAARC progress is the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Pakistan has demanded a resolution to its dispute with India over the Kashmir Valley before discussing trade relations with New Delhi. India has recently attempted to improve its relationship with the rest of South Asia. Under the Gujral Doctrine established by former Indian Prime Minister I.K Gujral, India signed 30 years water sharing treaty with Bangladesh and a trade and transit treaty with Nepal.

India also joined a sub regional group within SAARC comprising of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India. Despite political impediments to trade, value of goods smuggled from India to Pakistan via a third party generally totals 250-500 million per year. If trade between the states was opened, Pakistan would receive cheaper imports due to lower transport costs and the absence of payments to a middleman.

SAARC is planning establishment of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). However, the agreement to establish this free trade zone will take 10 years of gradual tariff reduction. For a proposal that has already been delayed, it will take some genuine political cooperation for the tariff reduction process to run smoothly.

Comparing with the experience of ASEAN, an organization with a better track record in producing economic coordination among member states than SAARC, creating a free trade zone could become difficult. The ASEAN free trade agreement (AFTA) has been criticized for not producing substantial economic interdependence among the region. This lack of success results from distrust and protectionism among its member states.
4.4 INDIA AND EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

4.4.1 Introduction

The European Union is today one of the world’s most successful regional organisations. It is the largest trade bloc in the world, accounting for about one-fifth of the global trade. It is a major market for the developing countries and a major source of development assistance for them too. Two of its member states, France and UK, are nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Another country—Germany—is one of the strongest candidates for membership once the Council is expanded. Four EU countries are members of the G-8 and all are among the most advanced economies in the world today. The Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community, in March 1957 finally culminated through a long process of evolution in the creation of, what is today known as the European Union. The European Union was the outcome of European nation’s desire to minimise trade barriers and travel restrictions, and to have a common currency. This may eventually pave the way for a political union. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was to take care of military and security problems, the EC (now EU) was to concentrate on economic and commercial cooperation among the member states. However, the two structures were ultimately meant to deal with the issues of the larger Cold War politics.

The members of the erstwhile EC were in the US-led Western camp during the Cold War. While the EC struggled for a common political and foreign policy platform, it was clear that neither the organisation nor some of the members individually would forge cooperation with India, which followed a non-aligned foreign policy. Secondly, as long as Britain was not a member of the EC, the then EC members always considered South Asian issues, including that of India as largely an area of British and American influence and took little interest in them. It was only when Britain joined the EC in 1973 that the foreign policy outlook of this organisation encompassed the South Asian and Indian affairs to some extent. It all began with the signing of a Commercial Cooperation Agreement between India and the EC in 1973. Thirdly, India’s mixed economic system and socialist rhetoric and massive economic problems left little for substantive economic interactions between India and the EC. However, India was one of the first Asian nations to accord recognition to the European Community in 1962 while initially, India’s contacts with the Community were limited to economic and commercial links on the basis of the Community’s competence. As the Community took on a political dimension as well, India decided to establish a closer political relationship with it.
All the members of the EC were democratic countries and the vibrant Indian democracy had no major problem in interacting with them. Accordingly, in 1983, it was agreed to formally institute the India-EC political dialogue. There are several institutional mechanisms that foster India-EU relations: India-EU Summit Meeting, India-EU Troika Ministerial Meeting, Senior Official Meetings, India-EC Joint Commission, India-EU Joint Working Group on Terrorism, India-EU Joint Working Group on Consular Affairs, India-EU Round Table etc. But as in domestic politics in democracies, there always remain differences over political issues. India and the EU are no exception to it.

4.4.2 Political Differences

There were broadly three areas of political differences between the EC and India till 1993, and between the EU and India since 1993 (it was since 1 November 1993 that the EC came to be known as the EU). They are the Kashmir issue, the Nuclear issue and the issue of Human Rights. During the formative years of the EC, the member states considered the Kashmir issue as a dispute to be handled by the Americans and the British. But subsequently, especially after the conclusion of the Simla Agreement, the EC sought to take an even-handed approach towards India and Pakistan. After the emergence of militancy and terrorism in Kashmir, the EU expresses concern about terrorism, but simultaneously shows its disquiet about the handling of the situation by the Indian security forces. The language of the statement issued by the organisation is carefully crafted to “deplore the continuing violence and abuse of human rights in Kashmir” and to call for resisting the terrorist forces in ways that would not neglect “full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.

In other words, it tries to avoid taking a stand that would raise irritants in its relations with either India or Pakistan. But India does not appreciate the lack of adequate EU response to the deadly menace of terrorism and tries to urge the EU to take a stronger position on the issue. The terrorist strike on the US in September 2001 could have awaken the EU to the dangers of Pakistan’s role in abetting terrorism across the border, but Pakistan soon became a front-line state in the US-led war against terrorism. Consequently, India’s appeal to the international Community, including the EU to take a harder look at terrorism in Kashmir appears to have fallen on deaf ears.

India and the EU also differ on the issue of the human rights question. The EU often raises the question of violation of human rights in Kashmir in its dialogue with India. India feels that the EU reaction does not take into account the gross violation of human rights by the terrorist outfits and does not take note of the compulsions and limitations of the security forces while dealing with the terrorist violence. The third major area of political differences between the EU and India is on the question of nuclear
proliferation. All the members of the EU are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India considers the NPT a discriminatory document. India and the EU also differ on the question of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The EU desires India to sign both the NPT and the CTBT. India instead went ahead and conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared its status as a nuclear weapon power in May 1998. The EU strongly condemned the Indian nuclear tests, but unlike the US and Japan, refrained from imposing any sanctions. However, it made common cause with the G-8 and the UN Security Council in urging nuclear restraint in South Asia. Later, however, some individual members of the EU clearly stated that it was India’s sovereign right to decide how to ensure its security.

4.4.3 Economic Cooperation

While the European Union has been striving hard to evolve a common foreign and security policy than its predecessor—the EC and seeking a political role too in international affairs, it is the economic clout of this organisation that is key to its existence and growth. In a globalising world, politics cannot be separated from economics and the EU has realised that it has to have a larger political role even in its economic strategy in the context of the post-Cold War era. Consequently, it has opened up lines of political communications with a large number of countries including India in recent years. The idea is to enhance bilateral understanding and comprehend the complex politico-security issues with those countries the EU members are increasingly interacting with.

India’s primary interaction today with the EU, however, is economic and not politico-security issues. India formalised its bilateral cooperation with the EC in 1973 and 1981 and third such agreement was signed in 1994. The 1994 agreement was important in the emerging context of the evolution of the EU and India’s policy of economic liberalisation since 1991. With the new opportunities provided by India’s economic liberalisation and the EU’s search for a new relationship with the Asian countries, Indo-EU economic interactions became very dynamic and vibrant in the 1990s. The EU today is India’s largest trading partner, biggest source of foreign direct investment, major contributor of developmental aid, important source of technology and home to a large and influential Indian diaspora.

The EU-India trade has experienced a steady growth in volume and diversity since 1993, with a third of Indian exports reaching the EU destinations. Bilateral trade was approximately Euro 25.02 billion in 2001. It accounts for 26 per cent of our exports and 25 per cent of our imports. However, India is the EU’s 17th largest supplier and 20th largest destination of exports. India’s trade still lies in its traditional exports like textiles, agricultural and marine products, gems and jewellery, leather, and engineering and
electronic products. Some sectors like chemicals, carpets, granites and electronics are, however, showing considerable growth since the last five years. Indian imports have been dominated by gems and jewellery, engineering goods, chemicals and minerals. The EU is one of the major sources of foreign direct investment for India, with countries like the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands accounting for a large proportion of the investment. FDI flows from the EU to India amounted to Euro 1.1 billion in 1999 while FDI from India to EU was Euro 69 million. On the positive side of economic interactions, the pattern of EU investment in India has shifted towards the infrastructure, mainly power and telecommunications developments.

The EU has also a substantial stake in the industrial machinery, transport, electrical and electronics, textiles, chemicals and consultancy sectors. Significantly, the European Commission has a large number of development-oriented programmes in India, with education, health and environment as priority sectors. The main objective is to enhance human development by providing assistance for projects, which benefit the economically weaker and deprived sections of the society.

4.4.4 Economic Limitations

It is nonetheless clear that the European Union is more important for India than the other way around. There are several limitations faced by India in its economic interactions with the EU.

- First of all, there is an asymmetrical trade relationship between India and the EU. Although the EU happens to be India’s largest trading partner, India is yet to become an important target of EU’s trade, especially imports, and accounts for a little over 1 per cent of EU imports.

- Secondly, the EU is yet to make India an important investment destination. India accounts for less than 1 per cent of EU’s global investments and its investment in India actually got reduced in the 1990s with the rise of the new economies in Western Europe and Central Asia.

- India has not been able to take advantage of the vast EU market, as more than 70 per cent of its exports are concentrated in only four member countries, such as UK, Germany, Italy and Belgium-Luxembourg.

- Indian exports, moreover, are concentrated in a few resource-based items such as textiles, leather and pearls.
4.4.5 Trade disputes

India faces considerable problems in enlarging its exports market in the EU because of a series of barriers imposed by the EU. First of all, Indian exports of items such as textiles, footwear and clothing face double disadvantage in the form of high tariff as well as some non-tariff barriers. Of late, high tariff barriers are being reduced periodically, but protectionism is being practiced through the imposition of several non-tariff barriers. Indian exports to the EU face a spate of non-tariff barriers in the form of health, sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards. Quantitative restrictions under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) have been imposed on Indian textiles since 1972. Technical barriers have also been recently erected in the form of greater harmonisation of technical standards and regulations. There are also labour and environmental standards on goods and anti-dumping measures, which have led to effective protectionist measures in the EU adversely affecting India’s trade.

4.4.6 Conclusion

India’s relations with the European Union during the Cold War days were largely economic in nature, since that organisation had little role to play in international political issues. The European Union not only constitutes the largest combined regional market for Indian goods but also is the biggest source for Indian imports. India too benefits a great deal from the economic developmental assistance and foreign investment from the member countries of the European Union. There are some trade related disputes between the EU and India. But these have not been allowed to disrupt the overall friendly relations between India and the EU.

India has taken note of the EU’s desire to play larger political role in world affairs since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, it has sought to engage the EU in a series of political dialogue. The bilateral political dialogues aim to address the problems of misperceptions on political issues and to enhance political understanding.

The growing importance of the EU as a major player in world affairs has coincided with the increasing importance of India as a major power. The first ever summit meeting between India and the EU started in the year 2000 and has indicated the determination of India and the EU members to elevate the level of political and economic understanding among one another. The summit, in fact, highlighted the opportunities in the emerging areas of energy, telecommunications and information technology where India and the EU can benefit from cooperative arrangements.
4.5 INDIA AND UNITED NATIONS

4.5.1 Introduction

India was a founding member of the United Nations, joining in October 1945, two years before acquiring independence from the United Kingdom. In 1953, the chief delegate of India at the time, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was elected the first woman President of the UN General Assembly.

As a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement that started in 1955, India had traditionally represented the interests of the developing nations (or third world nations, as they were known at that time) and supported the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, its struggle towards global disarmament and the ending of the arms race, and towards the creation of a more equitable international economic order. In the early 1950s, India attempted, like the Soviet Union, unsuccessfully to help the People's Republic of China join the UN but was rebuffed by Western powers. India also had a mediatary role in resolving the stalemate over prisoners of war in Korea contributing to the signing of the armistice ending the Korean War in 1953. India chaired the five-member Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission while the Indian Custodian Force supervised the process of interviews and repatriation that followed. The UN entrusted Indian armed forces with subsequent peace missions in the Middle East, Cyprus, and the Congo (since 1971, Zaire). India also served as chair of the three international commissions for supervision and control for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos established by the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina. India also has served as a member of many UN bodies — including the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Commission, and the Disarmament Commission — and on the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, India played a prominent role in articulating the economic concerns of developing countries in such UN-sponsored conferences as the triennial UN Conference on Trade and Development and the 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. It has been an active member of the Group of 77, and later the core group of the G-15 nations. Other issues, such as environmentally sustainable development and the promotion and protection of human rights, have also been an important focus of India's foreign policy in international forums.

4.5.2 India and UN Security Council

India has been elected seven times to the UN Security Council. Only three countries have served longer than that (Japan, Brazil, and Argentina), except for the Permanent Five, and Colombia has served the same amount of time.
India has been seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council as a member of the G4, an organisation composed of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, all who are currently seeking permanent representation. According to their proposal the UN Security Council should be expanded beyond the current fifteen members to include twenty-five members. If this actually happens, it would be the first time permanent Security Council status is extended to a South Asian nation and supporters of the G4 plan suggest that this will lead to greater representation of developing nations rather than the current major powers.

India makes a number of claims to justify its demand. India has the world's second largest population and is the world's largest liberal democracy. It is also the world's ninth largest economy and third largest in terms of purchasing power parity. Currently, India maintains the world's third largest armed force. India is the third largest contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions after Bangladesh and Pakistan, all three nations being in South Asia. Although in absolute numbers the troops supplied by India is only 3000 more than that from Nepal, a small country in comparison with India.

Washington Post reported that "India was offered a permanent seat on the council 55 years ago, in 1955. But that offer, made by the United States and the Soviet Union, was declined by India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru said the seat should be given to China instead." The council seat then was held by Taiwan (ROC). This decision by Nehru is seen as a blunder and the loss of an opportunity to attain a stronger diplomatic stature by India.

If India were to accept this offer it would have required the United Nations charter to be amended to include India in place of Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Security Council or to expand the Council. It is not known whether the Taiwanese government representing China's seat at the time in the Security Council would have vetoed the amendment or accepted the amendment under US pressure as Taiwan was solely dependent on the US for its protection from mainland China.

Although the U.S. and other permanent Council members were not very supportive of expanding the Security Council, in his visit to India President Obama has offered his support for India to become a permanent member of the Council. However the reaction from other Council members are not very clear, particularly from China. Thus it is uncertain whether the demands by G4 nations will be implemented anytime soon.

4.5.3 India and UN Peace keeping

India is regular contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions. The number of troops contributing to UN peacekeeping operations as of March 2007 were 9,471. It also
suffered the death of 127 soldiers, who died while serving on peacekeeping missions. India also provided army contingent for performing peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990 as Indian Peace Keeping Force. In November 1988, India also helped restore the government of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in the Maldives under Operation Cactus.

India is one of the main contributors to the UN regular budget. Indian contribution to United Nations Democracy Fund was USD 16 million for 2009.

India has a permanent mission to the UN, which is led by the Permanent Representative (UN Ambassador. India, running unopposed in the Asian Group, was elected in 2010 as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2011-2012, after it garnered 187 votes in the then-192 member General Assembly.
MODULE V
INDIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

5.1 THE CRISIS OF NON ALIGNMENT POLICY

5.1.1 Introduction

The NAM dates from the early Cold War, when many nations, particularly newly independent states, were determined to avoid choosing between Moscow and Washington. Its early leaders—Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Josef Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Kwame Nkumrah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia—were giants of the era. In 1955, Sukarno hosted a landmark Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia—the first summit not dominated by major powers. The conferees pledged to uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations, embraced the equality of all nations and races, championed national liberation movements against colonial powers, and insisted on non-aggression and non-interference in international relations.

What began to emerge in Bandung was a distinctive, “Southern” vision of world order, in which the developing world would offer an independent center of gravity apart from the crumbling European empires and the colliding superpowers. Not all observers approved. The doctrine of non-alignment “pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others,” former U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles railed in 1956. “It is an immoral and short-sighted conception.”

The NAM really took shape in 1961, when Tito hosted the first “Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries.” For that first decade, the NAM’s substantive agenda focused on decolonization, moderating Cold War tensions, promoting nuclear disarmament, and pursuing greater equity in North-South relations. In the 1970s, the bloc increasingly attacked a world economy it perceived as fundamentally stacked against poor, developing nations. Under the influence of dependency theory, NAM members (as well as the parallel Group of 77) endorsed radical, redistributionist plans for a New International Economic Order—and the even more utopian vision of a New International Information Order. Neither scheme went anywhere, given resistance from the West, but the critique persisted, particularly as the “Washington consensus” triumphed in the 1980s. Politically, the NAM’s agenda focused on unredeemed national liberation movements, such as the anti-apartheid struggle and the Palestinian quest for statehood.
For good or ill, the NAM was an influential force in world politics during the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been a movement adrift. One possible ambition for the group, until recently, was to foil U.S. “unipolarity” and its (alleged) neoirperialist tendencies—typified by the “unilateral” invasion of Iraq and militaristic global war on terrorism. But the advent of a more conciliatory Obama administration, and the increasingly obvious diffusion of global power away from the United States, has undercut this narrative. Another NAM track has been to rail against the inequities of a Western-dominated global economy. But these claims ring hollow in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which has seen the United States, Europe, and Japan staggering under debt and struggling to regain growth, while much of the developing world (even sub-Saharan Africa) grows at an impressive clip.

The NAM today includes some of the world’s most dynamic economies, like Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore, not to mention four members of the Group of Twenty. India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia now have a curious split identity, with one seat at the “head table” of global economic governance and another in the NAM, alongside the likes of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and Papua New Guinea. The NAM’s political diversity is equally striking, combining vibrant democracies devoted to human rights like Botswana and Panama with unreconstructed autocracies like North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

Given this complex make-up, it is no surprise that the NAM faces increasing problems of coherence and cohesion. Agreement on basic principles like non-intervention and global economic justice is one thing, agreement on concrete plans of action and hard-hitting resolutions quite another. Accordingly, NAM summits tend to be glorified gabfests.

5.1.2 Crisis of Non Alignment Policy

The first challenge facing non-aligned states has been the increasing instability of many developing states within the developing world. Kennedy and Russett have termed these states as “failed states”. Failed states as characterised by them are states wherein “authority implodes… ethnic and religious conflicts erupt and millions flee across international borders. This has consequently resulted in an increasing demand for peacekeeping operations by developing states to implement cease-fires and agreements from disputants within a conflict. This was witnessed in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which was mandated by the Security Council to oversee the 1991 Paris Accords. The UNTAC operation can be seen as a model for United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era, that will increasingly be demanded by developing states in resolving intra-state conflicts.
The second challenge facing non-aligned states has been the increasing prominence of global environmental issues, such as the protection of the ozone layer, on the international agenda. The significance of these issues for the NAM has been the increasing perception on the part of northern states that these issues adversely impact on their interests. The NAM has therefore voiced concerns that the Northern states may use these issues to impose further conditionalities on developing states with respect to issues such as market access. Whilst the NAM has viewed these issues with suspicion and hostility, they have increasingly come to recognise that these issues can impact favourably on their interests by enabling them to link Northern concerns with these issues to developing states’ concerns with development. This was reflected in negotiations within the Montreal Protocol wherein the developed states recognised that the absence of developing state participation within the Protocol would significantly weaken the Protocol. This resulted in the London Conference of the Parties to the Protocol, wherein the support of the developing states such as India and China were secured by the establishment of an Interim Multilateral Fund of 160 million dollars to aid developing states to implement the Protocol. Whilst the developed states did not live up to their commitments entirely, this issue did emphasise that these issues provide developing states with an opportunity to attempt to place their developmental concerns onto the global agenda. The international agenda can be defined as the sum of the various access points by which issues are brought onto the global agenda.

The third issue relates to the developmental concerns of developing and non-aligned states within the global economy. This is seen in the fact that developing and non-aligned states continue to be in a dependent position within the global economy. Dependency can be defined as an “exploitative relationship between the advanced capitalist societies and the underdeveloped periphery, whereby peripheral states are forced to specialise within a hierarchical world division of labour.” This is seen in the fact the majority of non-aligned states remain primary commodity exporting states, wherein agricultural trade remains their primary source of trade income.

Furthermore most nonaligned states remain dependent on Northern markets. It is in this context that the emergence of agricultural trade conflicts amongst the United States and the European Community in the 1980’s consequently destabilised global agricultural markets and adversely affected the interests of developing and non-aligned states. Furthermore the United States and the European Union were unable to come to an agreement within the Uruguay Round in bringing agricultural issues into the GATT. The increasing participation of developing states within the Uruguay Round signalled that they recognise that a weakening of the GATT would adversely impact on their interests. The emergence of these issues on the international agenda, which have assumed greater significance for the NAM, requires new forms of leadership with which to deal with them.
5.1.3 Conclusion

So why does the NAM persist? Undoubtedly, the tenacity of post-colonial mindsets, combined with a persistent belief that the structure of global politics remains stacked in favor of major powers, contributes. These dynamics are most clearly at play at the United Nations. The NAM members object to the exorbitant privilege enjoyed by the permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the composition of which has not changed since 1945. To be sure, NAM members are deeply divided on how to reform the UNSC, but their resentment is palpable. (Similar criticisms apply to the structure of the main international financial institutions.)

Meanwhile, in the nuclear field, NAM members criticize the discriminatory nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That treaty rests on a bargain between the nuclear haves and have-nots. In return for foregoing such weapons, non-nuclear weapons states were assured under Article 6 of the NPT that nuclear weapons states would move steadily toward disarmament. That has not happened.

5.2 INDIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

5.2.1 Introduction

India’s nuclear policy is evolved from the vision and aspirations of the people who dedicated their lives for the freedom of the nation. Like the foreign policy, the chief architect of India’s foreign policy was Jawaharlal Nehru. Indigenous nuclear programme is the significant feature of India’s nuclear programme. The evolution of India’s nuclear policy can be summarized under the following phases.

5.2.2 Phase I: The Nehru Era, 1947 to the Mid-1960s

This was a period of voluntary nuclear abstinence. Nehru was not only deeply committed to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, but also opposed to their manufacture and possession by any state, including India. He was opposed to nuclear weapons on moral, political and strategic grounds, calling their possession a “crime against humanity”. He integrated this opposition into India’s foreign policy, giving it an activist edge. He was the first world leader to call for an end to all nuclear testing following U.S. bomb tests in the Pacific in 1954. However, India’s civilian nuclear energy programme under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) also had a dual-use capacity; major figures such as Homi Bhabha were not unaware of this. Bhabha himself was not as categorically opposed to a possible future Bomb as was Nehru.
On July 24, 1957, Nehru said in the Lok Sabha: We have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in making atom bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so and that in any event will we use nuclear energy for destructive purposes...I hope that will be the policy of all future governments. And just months before his death, when reports were pouring in of China’s nuclear preparations, Nehru rejected the suggestion that India should follow China and acquire nuclear weapons for “deterrence”.

5.2.3 Phase II: Mid-1960s to 1974

In this period New Delhi became increasingly disenchanted with the prospect for global disarmament. Quiet preparations were being made to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, while retaining a strong opposition to deterrence and weaponisation. India’s nuclear programme under Homi Bhabha underwent a significant shift at the ground level. Bhabha commissioned a plant to reprocess spent fuel from the CIRUS “research” reactor built with Canadian and U.S. assistance. In his speech in October 1964 following China’s first test, he said that India too could conduct a test in 18 months. But such changes were not articulated at the policy level. In October 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri told Parliament: Despite the continued threat of aggression from China which has developed nuclear weapons, the government has continued to adhere to decisions not to go in for nuclear weapons but to work for their elimination instead.

In April 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in the Lok Sabha: “India’s nuclear policy is framed after due consideration of the national interest, specifically with regard to national security... we do feel that the events of the last twenty years clearly show that the possession of nuclear weapons have not given any military advantage in situations of bitter armed conflict. She argued that “The choices before us involves...engaging in an arms race with sophisticated nuclear warheads and an effective missile delivery system. Such a course, I do not think would strengthen national security... it may well endanger our internal security by imposing a very heavy economic burden...”

Indian policy pronouncements in this post-Nehru period underwent a subtle shift from a categorical opposition to a “no Bombs now” orientation. The new uncertainties were reflected in the Indian attitude to the NPT negotiations, an arena where India had initially played a significant role. The final draft diluted what India and other non-nuclear weapons-states wanted - a better balance between the obligations of the nuclear weapons-states signatories and the non nuclear weapons-states signatories. Despite this watering down, the other non-nuclear weapons-states went along with the treaty, but India did not sign.
Why? First, there was China’s decision not to sign the NPT and India’s new reluctance to commit itself to complete or permanent future abstinence. Subsequent Indian opposition to the NPT is invariably and repeatedly stated in terms of India’s “principled” opposition to the discriminatory character of the NPT, or the very fact of its enshrining differential obligations for nuclear weapons-states and non-nuclear weapons-states.

The ground level preparations, and accumulation of unsafeguarded plutonium form CIRUS, gave Indira Gandhi an opportunity to conduct Pokharan-I in May 1974—a test which the DAE scientist had long been demanding. the test, purportedly for “peaceful” civilian purposes, or a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) was carried out for primarily domestic political reasons. Yet India continued to strongly reject nuclear deterrence or grant any kind of legitimacy to nuclear weapons.

On May 22, 1974, four days after Pokharan-I, Indira Gandhi wrote to Bhutto to assure him: I am aware that in popular parlance a nuclear explosion evokes an awesome and horrifying picture. however, this is because our minds have been conditioned by the misuse of nuclear energy for the development of weapons and by the use of these weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We in India have condemned and will continue to condemn military uses of nuclear energy as a threat to humanity. Mrs. Gandhi emphasised that “it is strictly in this context that our scientists have launched on this experiment... There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test.”

5.2.4 Phase III: 1974 to 1995-96

Further work on India’s nuclear weapons capability was suspended after adverse fallout. A conscious policy of nuclear ambiguity was adopted by New Delhi. This consisted in both affirming and denying that India had/could have nuclear weapons/capability and seeking a special status as a Nuclear Threshold State. Meanwhile, in 1978, under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the Indian government distanced itself from the 1974 PNE, and Desai emphasised the “peaceful” side of ambiguity while expressing misgivings about the safety of nuclear power.

After the mid-1980s, pressure mounted on New Delhi to go overtly nuclear in response to Pakistan’s reported nuclear preparations. India rejected seven proposals by Pakistan for nuclear restraint and regional disarmament, saying it would only discuss nuclear disarmament in “global, multilateral” fora, and in a “non-discriminatory” framework.

India’s sole strategy of containing an alleged “Pakistani threat” was to entreat the U.S. to exert pressure on Pakistan, through the Pressler Amendment, for instance. Meanwhile, its own stockpiling of high-grade plutonium continued, with an estimated 300 to 450 kg accumulated by the mid-1990s enough for 60 to 90 fission bombs.
However, in 1986, India joined the Five-Continent Six-Nation Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament and in 1988 put forward the Rajiv Gandhi Plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the UN. This involved a step-by-step process including restraint at an early stage by the threshold states, including India. This was not energetically pursued. As the negotiations for a CTBT, which India had pioneered, entered their final phase, New Delhi stalled, making signing the CTBT conditional upon “time-bound” disarmament by the P-5. It tried to hedge the treaty in with clauses that appeared radical, but were meant to delay negotiations and prepare the ground for non-accession to a test ban agreement.

Domestically, New Delhi came under growing pressure to oppose the CTBT and then “logically” proceed to conduct test explosions: why reject the CTBT as a “trap” and “conspiracy” and then behave as if it were still in place; why bear the cost of opposition without reaping the “benefits” of nuclearisation?

In 1995, before the CTBT “rolling text” acquired its penultimate form, the Narasimha Rao government launched preparations for a test at Pokharan. The Cabinet was divided, and US military satellites detected preparations. Publicity, as well as the fear of economic sanctions, deterred Indian from testing. But a big shift had occurred at the ground level.

Yet, at the stated doctrinal level, there was no change. In 1995 Indian argued passionately before the International Court of Justice that “use of nuclear weapons in any armed conflict... even by way of reprisal or retaliation...is unlawful... Since the production and manufacture cannot under any circumstances be considered as permitted...The threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance, whether as a means or method of warfare or otherwise, as illegal and unlawful under international law.” At the height of the CTBT debate, in March 1996, India’s Foreign Secretary Salman Haider made a special appearance before the Conference on Disarmament to say: “We do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for national security, and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard. We are also convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons diminishes international security. We, therefore, seek their complete elimination. These are fundamental precepts that have been an integral basis of India’s foreign and national security policy.”

However, slippages from India’s professed commitment to nuclear restraint and disarmament had by now become evident. “Ambiguity” degraded significantly. India blocked the CTBT’S passage at the CD, but the text was taken to the UN General Assembly and signed. Hawks within and outside the government raised the level of rhetoric in favour of India crossing the threshold. The BJP and right-wing commentators in the media seized on the anti-CTBT rhetoric, to which there was little organised resistance.
5.2.5 Phase IV: 1996 to May 1998.

Having yielded so much ground to hawkish positions and stoked jingoistic nationalism. New Delhi had now became a prisoner of its own devious manoeuvres. The nuclear and defence establishments got hyperactive in lobbying for explosions and a policy break to permit full weaponisation.

The BJP articulated this point of view most vociferously at the political level. By 1997, its demands for overt nuclearisation became insistent. Its manifesto for the February 1998 general elections promised to “re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.”

Till March 1998, the BJP was the sole the Indian party to advocate nuclearisation. But the situation changed with the BJP-led coalition’s “National Agenda for Governance” which repeated the precise formulation of the BJP manifesto. The BJP issued orders to the DAE, Defence Research & Development Organisation and the armed forces t prepare for and conduct tests - without consulting its coalition allies. But the RSS was privy to the decision.

The first statement of the strategic rationale of the tests was offered by Prime Minister Vajpayee, not to the people of India, but to the President of the United States. His statement made no reference whatever to the “unequal global nuclear order”, “nuclear apartheid” and the failure of the P-5 to disarm. Instead, it offered “close cooperation” to Washington to promote “the cause of nuclear disarmament” ... thus wrongly conceding that the U.S. has such a commitment. It only spoke of the threat form China and Pakistan, heightened by Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile collaboration.

On May 27, the government made an attempt to raionalise its reversal of earlier nuclear policies through a paper entitled “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy” laid in the Lok Sabha. This strung together half-truths and distortions to claim continuity - much in the same way that hawks seek to paint Mahatma Gandhi as a legitimiser of the Indian Bomb.

5.2.6 India after Pokhran II

But India’s stand on the role of nuclear weapons is quite clear. India has emphasized at the conference of disarmament that Pakistan has been involved in nuclear blackmail and the South Asian region is confronted with aggressive nuclear positioning and irresponsible threat of use of nuclear weapons by irresponsible military leadership. It is evident that India is not in race with any other nuclear power. India has exercised its nuclear option without violating any international obligations in order to the threats that world have compromised its national security.
India has its own nuclear doctrine which affirms its commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons and not using these weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The defensive nuclear doctrine has a command and control system under certain political authority. Landmarks of India’s nuclear doctrine are:

- Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.
- A posture of no-first-use: nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian forces elsewhere.
- Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
- Nuclear retaliatory attack can be authorized by a certain political leadership only through NCA.
- No-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon state.
- In the event of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere by biological or chemical weapons. India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.
- Continuance of strict control on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technology, participation in the fissile material cut off treaty negotiations and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
- Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear-free world through global verifiable and no discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

**5.2.7 Then the three pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine are:**

1. No first use.
2. Credible minimum deterrent.
3. Civilian control (NCA).

All other components of the doctrine survivability strategic trend, punitive retaliation in rapid response and shift from peace time deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time are all strict mathematical derivations of the above three basic principles.
5.2.8 No-first-use

The nuclear doctrine states that India is committed to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The theory of deterrence and no-first-use go together. The first aggressive use of a nuclear weapon will be a confession that deterrence has failed and use of nuclear weapons was the only recourse left. It is globally recognized that nuclear war between two nuclear powers would not lead to any meaningful military decision beyond appalling losses to both sides. In these circumstances no-first-use is the most appropriate policy.

5.2.9 Credible minimum deterrent

The concept of minimum nuclear deterrent will include sufficient survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, a robust command and control system, effective intelligence and early warning capability and comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy and the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons. The nuclear doctrine envisages a deterrent that has the capability of inflicting destruction and punishment to the aggressor. The principles of credibility, effectiveness and survivability will be central to India’s nuclear deterrent. The nuclear doctrine does not quantify the minimum deterrent. It calls for highly effective military capability. The nuclear doctrine stresses upon effective, enduring diverse forces which are based upon a nuclear tread of air-craft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets.

5.2.10 Nuclear command authority (NCA)

On January 4, 2003 India revealed a three tier nuclear command authority (NCA) to manage its nuclear weapons. This broad frame work was approved in the nuclear doctrine prepared by the National Security Board set up after the May 1998 nuclear tests. The NCA comprises of (a) political council, (b) executive council and (c) strategic forces command. Political council is headed by the Prime Minister. It is the body which authorizes the use of nuclear weapons. Executive council is headed by the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. Its function is to provide inputs for decision making by the NCA and to execute the directives given to it by the political council. The executive council may comprise of the chiefs of defense services, the IIC chairman, the convener of the NSAB, the cabinet secretaries, heads of intelligence agencies and secretaries of ministers represented in the Cabinet Committed of Security (CCS). The strategic force command (SFC) would be responsible for the administration of the nuclear forces and will be actually entrusted with the firing of nuclear weapons. SFC is the second tri-service command after the first one in Andaman and Nicobar Islands was established in 2001.
Indian's nuclear doctrine is the most responsible doctrine which aims at providing minimum credible deterrent. It is a consensus document which does not limit the country in any way in exercising its nuclear weapon options. It provides complete elasticity in deciding the number of nuclear weapons India should possess and classifies the emphasis on the survivability of the deterrent. Establishment of the NCA will add credibility to India's nuclear posture. The NCA stands out in its firm commitment to deterrent stability through civilian control over nuclear weapons. Most significant aspect of India's nuclear doctrine is that it is intimately tied up with continued commitment to total nuclear disarmament. The five major nuclear powers are reluctant to give up their monopoly over production and deployment of nuclear weapons while denying a similar privilege to other countries.

In contrast with India's nuclear doctrine there are ambiguous, questions about nuclear capability, precise doctrine and delivery systems of Pakistan. There is a fundamental difference between the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan. Whereas no-first-use of nuclear weapons remains the key element of India's nuclear policy Pakistan maintains the first strike option in its nuclear doctrine and has refused to sign an agreement no-first-use. With India's over-whelming superiority over Pakistan in conventional forces, Pakistan looks towards nuclear weapons as a Safe bet to overcome its disadvantages in a conventional view.

In its first ever meeting the nuclear command authority under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister reviewed the arrangements in place for the strategic forces programmed. In a significant departure from the earlier stand the government warned that India would retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons if attacked with chemical or biological weapons by even non-nuclear adversaries. It also said that WMD attack on Indian forces outside Indian Territory would result in a nuclear response.

5.3 THE THREAT POSED BY CROSS BORDER TERRORISM

5.3.1 Introduction

The terrorism means all kinds of violent acts, undertaken by a person, group or a state with an aim to create fear/terror for a religious, political or ideological goal. This is aimed towards government and civilians equally. It can be broadly classified into Political terrorism for political purposes (This could be domestic or cross border and for ideology or control of state) and Non-Political terrorism – Terrorism that is not aimed at political purposes but which exhibits “conscious design to create and maintain a high degree of fear for coercive purposes, but the end is individual or collective gain rather than the achievement of a political objective.”
India has been facing threat of cross border terrorism since independence, when Pakistan sponsored Azad Kashmir forces comprising of local militia of POK and FATA attacked J&K in 1947. The very fact that India shares its border with many nations, it makes its task of internal and external security more difficult. The ethnic mix of population also adds fuel to the fire, when ideology and aspiration of all religion in India are not met concurrently by the govt. This has been seen in Punjab terrorism in 1980s, followed by Assam and J&K problem in 1990s and now as Maoism in state of Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Orissa. India shares ethnic, religious and cultural affinities with its neighbours and in times of conflict, certain portion of tension flows inward in form of state sponsored terrorism. Since these states can unleash the terrorist activities in different capacity, they may use their own directly recruited and controlled terror squads, or may choose to work through proxies and client movements across the border.

The terrorist menace from across the border is supported financially and materially by the government and institutions of these countries. Therefore there are number of problems which poses a serious challenges to the national security of India, unless immediate measures for border areas are taken. Without peaceful borders with its neighbors, India can hardly play its legitimate role in global affairs.

5.3.2 Reasons for Cross Border Terrorism

India is emerging as economically and military strong nation in both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean region. In the present scenario, India faces a great threat from all the countries with which it has borders, in one or the other form. The form of threat varies from pure military to a combination of military and non-military. Today India faces more security threat from Pakistan than any of its neighbours, because of multiple conflicts since 1947 partition on issues like J&K, water sharing, Sir Creek etc. Pakistan has not accepted regional supremacy of India and undertaken many military and terrorist actions to destabilise India since independence. The dynamic nature of the problems concerning management of borders is brought out by manner in which the sensitivity of the India- Pakistan, Indo-Bhutan and India- Bangladesh borders have changed over a period of time. These borders, which have been open, were once peaceful and trouble-free. However, with the increasing activities of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in Pakistan and frequent movement of militants in other States, the nature of the borders has changed completely. The Pakistan is resorting to Cross border terrorism, to covertly bringing pressure to bear on India across the border through violence, so as keep it engaged in proxy wars, divert its resources from other development and garner support of Muslim community in India for creating separate Muslim state and finally to degrade India’s conventional superiority through a process of strategic fatigue.
5.3.3 Security Challenges for India

India is very sure that terrorist activities of Pakistan will extend far beyond the confines of J&K and will cover all parts of the country. There is credible information of ongoing plans of terrorist groups in Pakistan to carry out fresh attacks. Hence, India needs to be prepared for encountering more sophisticated technologies and enhanced capabilities of all terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan. India has been emphasizing at international level the need for combating terrorism and called for global action to counter terrorism and enactment of various political and economical sanctions against state responsible for sponsoring terrorism across international borders. However, due to political and military interest of super powers like USA and China in and around Pakistan nothing much has been done to control rogue activities of Pakistan. India has to fight this war alone by strengthening its military, police and paramilitary forces and at the same time garner international support for combating terrorism. There is also a need to keep Pakistan politically engaged on bilateral conflict issues, so that Pakistan is motivated to reduce/stop their support for terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan. This three prong strategy will ultimately reduce cross border terrorism in India. If India wants to assert itself globally in international politics and power game, it must control such misadventures from Pakistan.

India is a growing nation and in few years from now it will be an international power to reckon with, for which it must concentrate in economic, trade, infrastructure and agriculture development, but at same time keep Pakistan under check and well humored. India's Counter-Terrorism Set-Up

The state police and its intelligence set-up: Under India's federal Constitution, the responsibility for policing and maintenance of law and order is that of the individual states. The central government in New Delhi can only give them advice, financial help, training and other assistance to strengthen their professional capabilities and share with them the intelligence collected by it. The responsibility for follow-up action lies with the state police.

The national intelligence community: This consists of the internal intelligence agency (Intelligence Bureau), the external intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing), the Defence Intelligence Agency that was set up a year ago, and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces. The IB collects terrorism-related intelligence inside the country and RAW does it outside. The DIA and the intelligence directorates general of the armed forces essentially collect tactical intelligence during their counter-terrorism operations in areas such as Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, etc, where they are deployed.
Physical security agencies: These include the Central Industrial Security Force, responsible for physical security at airports and sensitive establishments; the National Security Guards, a specially trained intervention force to terminate terrorist situations such as hijacking, hostage-taking, etc; and the Special Protection Group, responsible for the security of the Prime Minister and former Prime Ministers.

Paramilitary forces: These include the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force, which assist the police in counter-terrorism operations when called upon to do so.

The Army: Their assistance is sought as a last resort when the police and paramilitary forces are not able to cope with a terrorist situation. But in view of Pakistan's large-scale infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir and the presence and activities of a large number of Pakistani mercenaries, many of them ex-servicemen, the army has a more active, permanent and leadership role in counter-terrorism operations here. In recent months, there have been two additions to the counter-terrorism set-up:

(a) A multi-disciplinary centre on counter-terrorism, headed by a senior IB officer, within the IB, expected to be patterned on the CIA's counter-terrorism centre. Officers of various agencies responsible for intelligence collection and counter-terrorism operations will work under a common umbrella and be responsible for joint analysis of the intelligence flowing in from different agencies and co-ordinate follow-up action.

(b) A counter-terrorism division in the ministry of external affairs, expected to be patterned after the counter-terrorism division of the US State Department. It will be responsible for co-coordinating the diplomatic aspects of counter-terrorism, such as briefing other countries on Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism against India, processing requests for extradition and mutual legal assistance, servicing the work of various joint working groups on counter-terrorism which India has set up with a number of countries, etc.

5.3.4 Options for India

India has to understand that there is a need to collectively address this problem through military means, bilateral diplomacy and international political support. At the same time India has to ensure that internal stability especially religious one is maintained and support of all religious groups is strengthened to fight the cross border terrorism.

5.3.5 Military Option

India needs to consider the military option seriously. This would not only enhance the deterrence in place against such attacks, but would ensure that the state-jihadi nexus
is constricted. The state element would likely be more sensitive to the likely hurt that India could inflict militarily and therefore exercise restraint over jihadi impulses. Any such consideration would enable execution of the military operation better and integrate it with the political and diplomatic prongs of the strategy that would likely unfold in real time. India must invest more in strengthening its security forces including army by procuring state of the art weapon and equipment, surveillance devices, mobility vehicles including helicopter and aircrafts and logistic support. There should be more cooperation and inter-operability amongst all security elements for synergy of operation. All sensitive areas along the border must be guarded and infiltration routes covered by deploying adequate forces. The intelligence must be shared by all to detect and counter any form of terrorist activity in time.

5.3.6 Diplomatic Dialogue

India must diplomatically engage not only Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, so as to formulate policies for cooperation in economic, military, cultural and terrorism fields and ensure mutual quest for regional peace, prosperity and stability. As far as Pakistan is concerned India needs to adopt test and trust policy in all future relations and engage them actively by giving more economic facilities and trade concessions. India must also ensure that Pakistan remains politically viable nation so that it is not taken over by non state forces.

5.3.7 International Support

India has initiated many dialogues in international forum for formulation of combined policy and guidelines for combating terrorism, some of which are in force and being implemented. India needs to especially motivate and convince USA and China to keep Pakistan under control, so that ISI can be checked for sponsoring and supporting various terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan. In wake of recent attack by Taliban on naval base of Pakistan, the security of their nuclear arsenal is threatened. If Taliban and Al Qaeda are successful in securing nuclear weapon from Pakistan, then India will be the nation to face the brunt of their hatred.

5.3.8 Internal Stability

India need to understand the importance of maintaining peace and harmony amongst all religion and community in India, with special reference to Muslim and people belonging to NE states and RED CORRIDOR( Maoism). Over last decades ISI has targeted these people and fuelled insurgency in these regions. The importance of good grievances detection, monitoring and redressal machinery so that the build-up of grievances in any community is detected in time and the political leadership alerted and
advised to take prompt action to redress them. The intelligence agencies have an important role to play as the eyes and ears of the government in different communities to detect feelings of anger and alienation which need immediate attention.

5.3.9 Conclusion

The fight against terrorism is very difficult and challenging task, for which concerted efforts by various responsible agencies, both national and international, is required. For fighting a successful war against cross border terrorism, an international political support and cooperation and coordination among the neighboring States is required. It is unfortunate that various states are pursuing cross border terrorism in spite of its prohibition, as International Law regarding the implementation and enforcement of its rules is not as strong as it should be. India- Pakistan relations have deteriorated over period of time even though continuous processes by both nations are being initiated for peace, harmony and cooperation. However, due to ideological and historical differences not much has been gained by either side. Pakistan policy to degrade India’s conventional superiority through a process of strategic fatigue is the main stumbling block in all peace process. ISI of Pakistan has taken up one point agenda of spreading terrorism in India by all means, and unless India takes all necessary actions to check its activities now, the threat of nuclear terrorism looms ahead.