MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

VI SEMESTER

CORE COURSE

BA PHILOSOPHY

(2011 Admission onwards)

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

Calicut university P.O, Malappuram Kerala, India 673 635.
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

STUDY MATERIAL

Core Course

BA PHILOSOPHY

VI Semester

MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Prepared by: Dr. Biju Koonathan P.
Assistant Professor,
Dept. of Philosophy,
Sree Kerala Varma College, Thrissur

Scrutinized by: Dr. V. Prabhakaran,
‘Sree Visakh’ Thekke Gramam Road,
Sastha Nagar, Chittur
Palakkad.

Layout: Computer Section, SDE

©
Reserved
Core Course-12  4 Credits

**Aim:** To present the characteristics of Modern Western Thought and to give an account of the systems of thought of modern thinkers.

**Objectives:** (1) To present the characteristics of Modern thought.
(2) To introduce Rationalism and Empiricism as modern epistemological theories and present Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Locke, Berkeley, Hume as representatives of the two theories respectively.
(3) To present Kant and Hegel as revolutionary thinkers and their systems contributing much to the tradition of modern thought.

**UNIT 1 THE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY**

The modern era in western philosophy spans the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Modern era spurred mainly by advances in science, but also by criticisms of revealed theology, philosophers attempted to accommodate new learning with a broad view of human abilities, and to construct systematic understandings of the world that leads to the enlightenment in the west. The medieval philosophy had close nexus to theology, but the modern philosophy developed the philosophical method, formation of philosophical systems and humanism. The modern western philosophy flourished with philosophical traditions of Rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, and Empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The modern western philosophy has further carried by transcendentalism of Immanuel Kant and of Hegel’s Absolute.

The history of modern era viewed as an awakening of the reflective spirit, as a quickening of criticism, as a revolt against authority and tradition, as a protest against absolutism and collectivism, as a demand for freedom in thought, feeling, and action. Modern philosophy is independent in its search for truth. It is rationalistic in the sense that it makes human reason the highest authority in the pursuit of knowledge. It is naturalistic in that it seeks to explain inner and outer nature without supernatural presuppositions. It is scientific keeping in touch with the new sciences particularly with the sciences of external nature.

Modern philosophers are scientific in their usual attitude, in contrast to the more frequently aesthetic tendencies of ancient philosophers and the dominantly theological interests of the scholastics of the middle Ages. Ceasing to be the handmaiden of theology, philosophy has instead become the interpreter of rapidly advancing sciences. Yet the modern philosopher is not afraid to speculate more boldly than scientists do, and he seeks to recognise the results of the various natural and social sciences in a picture of the world as...
a whole in which room will be found for such of the values of art, morality, and religion as can be shown to be consonant with the established results of scientific investigation. But it is necessary to disclose facts as they may be, and to learn to live as well as possible in the light of this knowledge. So an uncompromising search for truth is the chief characteristic trait of the modern philosopher. He loves beauty and he esteems personal virtue and social justice. But he cannot take a universe friendly to these values simply for granted. The first necessity is to know things as they are.

The spirit of modern philosophy is individualistic, while those of both ancient and medieval philosophy were, in different ways, inclined to be institutional. A modern thinker is an individualist in the sense that he makes experiments for himself, verifies hypotheses with his own eyes, and tests the logic of arguments with his own thinking. He looks to authorities for suggestion, but he accepts nothing for truth simply because it is asserted by some authority, no matter how venerable or widely esteemed. Thinkers developed a keen critical faculty refusing to accept traditions and scriptures without critical examination. People began to prefer democratic forms of government to the monarchical or aristocratic forms that existed. There was more vehement demand for social justice and equal rights. This tendency towards freedom, characteristic of the modern period, is best expressed by the opposition to state interference in the private lives of citizens. The widespread desire for freedom found its expression in the field of thought in the form of idealism. Reason and logic were accepted as the final criteria both in the field of science and of philosophy. The desire for independence found expression in the freedom of enquiry and thinking and the opposition to all forms of tyrannical domination. Objective knowledge in every sphere was demanded and produced.

The epoch of modern philosophy which began in 1453 is called the Renaissance. It is subdivided into two periods. During the first of these, the Humanistic period (1453-1600 Bruno), the leadership in philosophy was in Italy, and inspiration was drawn from the study of the Greek and Latin classical philosophers, although there was also much interest in what little modern science then existed. The second period of the Renaissance is known as Natural Science Period (1600-1690). All the philosophers of this period consciously imitate and adapt the methods and points of view of the natural scientists contemporary with them, and themselves in some case make contributions to mathematics and the natural sciences. All are confident of the ultimate success of philosophy in disclosing the nature of reality, and most of them do not hesitate to develop systems. Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes in England, and Descartes, Spinoza and of Leibnitz on the continent of Europe are the thinkers of this period. The Enlightenment (1690-1781) was inaugurated with the publication of Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding in 1690. Among the great thinkers in this period are Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in Great Britain and Voltaire and Rousseau in France. These philosophers are not elaborate system builders like those of the preceding period; they believe that the proper study of mankind is man rather than the universe; they are vigorous demolishers of superstition and upholders of individual liberty and the rights
of man. Their thought was stimulated by the English Revolution of 1688, and their influence was a partial cause of the American Revolution in 1776 and the French Revolution. The Idealistic Period is usually dated from 1781 when Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason appeared to the death of Hegel in 1831. Germans then led the world in the originality and depth of their philosophical thought. In some form or other, each of the German philosophers of this period believed that the world is spiritual in nature—the expression of a universal Mind or Spirit. Such a point of view was inspiring to poetry and religion. This was the great Romantic age in German literature (Goethe, Schiller etc.-). English poets like Wordsworth, Shelley, Coleridge, Tennyson and Browning as well as he American Emerson express thoughts strikingly similar to the German idealistic philosophers.

Modern means something which is not traditional, to break with the endless reiteration of classical themes, topics and myths; to offer a critique of existing feudal superstructure (political, moral, religious and legal systems), to defend and develop scientific explanation of every phenomenon, and to explain reality not only objectively but also as experienced by the subject.

Modernist was a shift from faith to reason. Enlightenment is held to be the source of critical ideas, such as the centrality of freedom, democracy and reason as being the primary values of a society. In this view, the tendency of the philosophers in particular to apply rationality to every problem is considered to be the essential change. From this point on, thinkers and writers were held to be free to pursue the truth in whatever form, without the threat of sanction for violating established ideas.

Bibliography


UNIT II  RATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this unit is to introduce rationalism especially Descartes’ rationalistic thinking. It helps the students to know the method of abstraction as well. In this unit we shall try to understand how Descartes thinking deviate from classical philosophy. Finally we see how Spinoza and Leibnitz developed rationalism which was developed by Descartes in Modern Western Philosophy.

The rationalists maintain that there are certain fundamental principles of reality, which are innate and recognized as true by reason or intuition. Intuition is immediate apprehension by reason. All other truths are deduced from them. With the help of mathematical method we must reject the vague and obscure light of the senses and imagination, and select the simple, clear, self-evident, and innate ideas of reason, and deduce other truths from them.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650)

In the history of Western Philosophy, it is Rene Descartes (1596-1650) who ushers in such new lines of thought as would clearly mark the beginning of the modern era and earn him the title ‘Father and originator of Modern Western Philosophy’ and France’s greatest philosopher. He emphasise the role of the individual and his reasoning power against the background of church domination. He pronounces that it is within the power of every individual to know the truth. He highly influence on mathematics and scientific method. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England looked at scientific method and claimed it for empiricism-a triumph of the method of observation and experimentation over reason, theories, and systems. Descartes, however, looked at scientific method and claimed it for rationalism-a triumph of mathematics, of geometry, and of reasoning by axioms and deduction; it is these which make science into knowledge into certain. His vision was of a plan for a single, unified science in which philosophy and all the sciences would be interconnected in one systematic totality. All qualitative differences of things would be treated as quantitative differences, and mathematics would be the key to all problems of the universe. By contrast with Plato, who saw the unity of all sciences in the mystical Idea of the Good, for Descartes the unity of science was a rationalistic and mathematical unity based upon mathematical axioms. By contrast with medieval Aristotelianism, explaining change teleologically as the movement of matter toward the actualization of forms, for Descartes all change is explained mechanically, as the movement of bodies according to the laws of physics. Descartes was a philosopher, a mathematician, and a man of science. He used the analytic method, which supposes a problem solved, and examines the consequences of the supposition. Modern western philosophy has very largely accepted the formulation of its problems from Descartes, while not accepting his solutions.

INTUITION AND DEDUCTION

According to Descartes, knowledge must be certain and indubitable. In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae), he states, “All knowledge is certain and evident cognition” which is “incapable of being doubted”. Such indubitable knowledge, he holds, can be had only
School of Distance Education

Modern Western Philosophy

7

through intellect or reason. He specifies two actions of the intellect through which we arrive at certain knowledge, *viz.* Intuition and deduction. Intuition, according to him, is “the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind, which proceeds solely from the light of reason”. Hence by intuition; he means the rational power of the mind to perceive clearly and distinctly. Such knowledge, according to him, is self-evident, standing in no need of proof. Intuition is undoubted, immediate apprehension of a self-evident truth by reason. God imprints certain innate ideas on the mind at the time of birth. The ideas of causality, infinity, eternity, perfect Being of God and the like are innate ideas. In his view, we can also acquire certainty when the facts are “inferred from true and known principles through a continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought in which each individual proposition is clearly intuited”. This is what he calls Deduction, which attains it’s certainty from the intuitive certainty of the first principles and the intermediate steps. Thus Descartes applies the mathematical method to philosophy. His mathematical method consists in intuition and deduction. First principles are given by intuition. The remote conclusions are deduced from them. Intuition is prior to deduction. Deduction is necessary inference from truths known with certainty. Intuition is necessary in deduction. Though he subordinates deduction to intuition, he speaks of these as two mental operations.

According to Descartes, it is through intuition i.e. the natural light of reason, that we come to know the existence of the self or mental substance and then we gradually deduce the existence of God and the external material world. Descartes accepts the existence of all these three substances—mind, matter and God. In accordance with his definition of substance as “a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist,” he declares God as the absolute substance. However, in the restricted sense of the term ‘substance’, he claims that both mind and matter come under it because they do not depend on anything else but “concurrence of God in order to exist.” Descartes recognises Mind and Matter as relative substances, dependent upon the absolute substance, i.e., God. Mind and Matter have been created by God. But the term substance is not applicable to Mind and Matter in the same sense in which it is applicable to God. In this context, Spinoza points out that if substance stands for complete independence, then it is contradictory to regard matter and mind as substances because they depend on God for their being.

**INNATE IDEAS, FACTITIOUS IDEAS, ADVENTITIOUS IDEAS**

In his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, we find Descartes accepting three kinds of ‘ideas’ based three different sources, *viz.* ‘innate’, ‘adventitious’ and ‘factitious’. While he considers ‘innate ideas’ as implanted in our understanding and ‘factitious ideas’ as creations of our imagination, he views the ‘adventitious ideas’ as as productions of sensations. The ideas imposed on the mind from without or sensations are adventitious; they are not clear and distinct. The ideas created by the mind by the conjunction of ideas are factitious; they are the ideas created by the imagination; they are also are not clear and distinct. Both are doubtful. But the innate ideas, which are neither adventitious nor factitious, are clear and
distinct and implanted in the mind by God at the time of birth; they are self-evident. He distinguishes sense perception from reason on the ground that the former is liable to illusion, and hence needs to be judged by reason before being accepted as true. His only point of warning is that we should not accept reports of sense perception “without having (carefully and maturely) mentally examined them beforehand.” With the help of his mathematical method we must reject the vague and obscure light of the senses and imagination, and select the simple, clear, self-evident, and innate ideas of reason, and deduce other truths from them.

Descartes starts with the certainty of the self which is known intuitively. He deduces the existence of God from the innate idea of God. The idea of God is the idea of an infinite Being. It cannot be produced by myself, because I am a finite being. The finite things cannot produce the idea of an infinite Being. The cause must contain at least as much reality as is contained in the effect. So God or the infinite Being is the cause of the innate idea of God. Therefore, God exists. He is perfect and truthful. We have a conviction that external things exist; so they must exist. Thus Descartes deduces the existence of God and the world from the innate ideas in the self, which are distinct, clear and self-evident.

**DOUBT: METHODOLOGICAL SCEPTICISM**

The object of Cartesian methodology was to apply mathematical method of philosophy with a view to obtaining certitude in knowledge. Descartes believes that the single certain truth can be systematically sought be deliberate doubt. When doubt is pushed to its farthest limited then it will reveal something which is indubitable, which is clearly perceived. Now in order to discover the indubitable intuition, let us doubt all that can be doubted. (1) Sense-testimony can be doubted. (2) Even the truths of science can be doubted. That I doubt cannot be doubted: When the doubt has done its worst it finds a fact of completely unassailable certainty. I may doubt anything but I cannot doubt that I am doubting. Whether it is a dream or a real consciousness, I must exist as a doubting or thinking being. Let there be a demon to deceive me, but then I must exist as a thinking being to be deceived. Descartes starts with universal doubt. To doubt is to think. To think is to exist. “Cogito ergo sum.” “I think, therefore I exist.” is the one certain truth which may be taken as the foundation of philosophy. If I ceased to think, there would be no evidence of my existence. I am a thing that thinks, a substance of which the whole nature or essence consists in thinking and which needs no place or material thing for its existence.

The doubt of Descartes should not be confused with psychological doubt. Descartes’ doubt is not a thing of direct feeling and experience but is a deliberate and dispassionate attitude towards human experience in general. It is not directly determined by the nature of objects. The doubt of Descartes should not be confused with scepticism. Descartes is not asserting that whatever can be doubted is false, but he is only supposing it to be false.
Again, the scepticism is the finished conclusion about knowledge which professes the
denial of any certain knowledge whatsoever. However, the Cartesian doubt is only a
starting point to find out that which cannot be further doubted.

In Descartes’ theory of knowledge, the one truth that is unshakable, safe and secure
from any doubt, is that of my own existence as a conscious subject. Thus the Cartesian
Cogito introduces subjectivism into modern western philosophy. Subjectivism is the view
that I can know certainty only myself as conscious subject and my thoughts. It is the view
that I can know with certainty only my own mind and its content. Subjectivism carries the
implication that the knowledge of other minds and of material objects can be proved, if at
all, only by inference from what I know with certainty, the existence of my own subjective
consciousness and my thoughts or ideas. Therefore for subjectivism the knowledge of the
existence of everything other than my own mind becomes questionable, problematic.

The existence of the self, according to Descartes, is a self-evident truth, because the
very attempt to doubt its existence implies its existence. “For it is a contradiction to suppose
that what thinks does not at the very time when it is thinking, exists.” Hence Descartes
discovers that “I think, therefore I exist” (Cogito ergo sum) is an indubitable truth. Further,
he also realises that it is nothing but the clearness and distinctness of the fact ‘I think’ which
makes it an indubitable truth. So, he establishes the criterion of truth as ‘all things which I
perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true.” From this criterion of truth, Descartes
deduces our knowledge of the existence of God. According to him, we have within us the
idea of God who is a supremely perfect being and we clearly and distinctly perceive that
such an idea can be implanted in us “only by something which possesses the sum of all
perfections, that is, by a God who really
exists.” As an all-perfect Being cannot be lacking in existence, he claims, God must exist. In
his ‘Meditations’ and ‘Principles’, he goes to the length of arguing that the existence of
material

According to Descartes knowledge of external things must be by the mind, not by
the senses. He takes an example a piece of wax from the honeycomb. If we put the wax near
the fire, all qualities (taste, smell, colour, size, shape etc-) change, although the wax
persists; therefore what appeared to the senses was not the wax itself. The wax itself is
constituted by extension, flexibility, and motion, which are understood by the mind, not by
the imagination. The thing that is the wax cannot itself be sensible, since it is equally
involved in all the appearances of the wax to the various senses. Knowledge by the senses is
confused. The perception of the wax is not a vision or touch or imagination, but an
inspection of the mind. From my sensibility seeing the wax, my own existence follows with
certainty, but not that of the wax. Knowledge of external things must be by the mind, not by
senses.
ATTRIBUTES AND MODES: MIND/BODY DUALISM.

Descartes suggests matter as corporeal substance and mind as spiritual substance. These two are independent of each other. The fundamental property which expresses the very essence or nature of the thing is attribute. The attribute of Mind is consciousness or thought and the attribute of Matter is extension. Matter is divisible, figurable, movable quantity. The secondary properties of substance are known as modes or accidents and these modes are variable modifications of created substances. The modifications of Matter are position, figure, motion etc and the modifications of mind are feeling, volition, desire, judgement etc. Consciousness and extension, mind and body (two independent substances), are independent of one another and do not involve each other’s existence. There is no real relation between body and soul for they are diametrically opposed. This is known as Cartesian dualism.

If the two substances are opposite to each other, how can there be interaction between them? My arm moves when I will that it shall move, but my will is a mental phenomenon and the motion of my arm a physical phenomenon. Why then, if mind and matter cannot interact, does my body behave as if my mind controlled it? To solve this problem Descartes introduces the Psycho-physical Interactionism. According to this theory, body and mind act upon each other in the ‘Pineal gland’ of the brain which is the seat of the mind. The body acts upon the mind in sensations and the mind causes movements to take placed in the body through the will. So the body at sometimes affects the mind, at other times the mind directs the body. Having separated mind from matter, and assigning them two distinct domains, Descartes prepares the ground for advocating mechanical explanation of the material world. All occurrences, in his view, are due to the transference of motion from one part to another. He holds that even the functions of the human body follow from the mechanical arrangements of its various organs. Even in the absence of mind, he contends, “it would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those cases where movement is not under the control of the will, or, consequently, of the mind.” The relation of the soul to the body is of the nature of the pilot to his machine. But Interactionism is objectionable. Interactionism holds that cerebral processes affect mental processes and that mental processes affect cerebral processes. But two quite heterogeneous substances cannot act and react upon each other. Action and reaction presuppose a certain similarity in nature among the things which act and react upon one another. Qualitative likeness is the invariable precondition of causal connection. Dualism contradicts the law of Conservation of Energy. According to this law, the total amount of physical energy in the universe is constant, and one kind of physical energy can be transformed into another kind of physical energy without any loss of quantity, but no physical energy can be transformed into non-physical or mental energy and vice versa as dualism supposes. For, in that case, the total amount of physical energy in the universe would not he constant but it would be constantly increased and decreased.

The Cartesian dualism appeared to have two features. The first was that it made the soul wholly independent of the body, since it was never acted on by the body. The second
was that it allowed the general principle: “one substance cannot act on another.” There were two substances, mind and matter and they were so dissimilar that an interaction seemed inconceivable. It explained the appearance of interaction while denying its reality.

**Benedict De Spinoza (1532-1677)**

Followed by Descartes mathematical method Benedict De Spinoza (1532-1677) starts with the innate idea of God or substance which is self-existent and conceived by itself, and deduces the finite minds and the finite physical objects from it. Spinoza had the vision of the unity of all things. Descartes ‘dependent substance’ is contradiction in terms. A substance cannot depend on anything else. As such there can be only one substance. If there were more than one substance then they would limit each other and thus would take away their self-sufficiency. This one substance, he also calls God whom he defines as a “Being absolutely infinite; that is, substance consisting in infinite attributes each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence”. He calls it *causasui* or self-creative. By describing substance as *causasui*, Spinoza means that the reality is a self-explanatory, all-inclusive, inter-related whole, outside which nothing can lie. Therefore there is one substance which is infinite. He calls the single substances as God. Nature conceived as a whole is identical with God. Nature is known as *Natura Naturata*, i.e., sum-total of all that exist. Nature is governed by eternal laws. God and Nature are one. “All determination is negation”. There can be only one Being who is wholly positive, and He must be absolutely infinite. This is known as pantheism, according to which the reality of a single impersonal God permeates and in dwells all things.

Spinoza rejected Cartesian dualism and rejected the substantiality of mind and body. The attribute of Mind and Matter, i.e., thought and extension cannot interact are two parallel attributes of the same absolute substance God. God has also an infinite number of other attributes, since He must be in every respect infinite number of other attributes, since He must be in every respect infinite; but these others are unknown to us. Spinoza believes that Mind is the expression of the infinite consciousness of God and Matter is the appearance of God’s unlimited extension. God is extended as well as thinking. Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance. Every mode of extension correspond a mode of thought, in the same order or series. This parallelism excludes materialism as well as idealism, for matter cannot explain mind, nor can mind explain matter. By admitting only one substance God, Spinoza fails to explain the plurality, diversity, motion and change of the objects of the world.

**ABSTRACT MONISM**

Spinoza is a typical exponent of abstract monism. He regards One substance or God as the only reality. He defines substance as that which exists in itself and is conceived by itself. God only exists in Himself and is conceived by Himself. So God is the only substance. Spinoza accepts Descartes’s definition of substance, but does not recognize matter and mind as substances, because they do not exist in themselves. God or substance is *ens*
absolute indeterminatum (an absolute indeterminate being). Determination is negation. To ascribe some qualities to substance is to deny other qualities of it. To determine it is to limit it. It is infinite, absolute, unqualified, attributeless, and yet it is not a nonentity. It is both an unqualified substance and an infinitely-qualified substance. It has infinity of attributes which are the different ways in which the human understanding conceives it. Attributes are the qualities which the human intellect ‘conceives’ as constituting the ‘essence of the divine substance. This definition has been interpreted in two ways-subjective and objective. If stress is laid on the first word, then it yields a subjective interpretation. If, on the other hand, stress is laid on the second word, then it yields an objective interpretation. In the first sense, attributes are merely attributed to the divine substance. In the second sense, attributes constitute the essence of the divine substance. The celebrated dictum determination negation est does not signify: determination is negation, but limitation is negation. By calling God an absolutely indeterminate being, Spinoza does not mean to say that God is an absolutely indeterminate being or non-being, or negative being, but, on the contrary, that he has absolutely unlimited attributes, or absolutely infinite perfections, that he is a positive, concrete, most real being, the being who unites in himself all possible attributes and possesses them without limitation. God has an infinite number of attributes, each of which is infinite. Thought and extension of God only are known to us. He has infinite thought and infinite extension. God has neither intelligence nor will yet he has infinite thought in the sense of intuitive understanding as contrasted with discursive understanding. Modes are the modifications of the attributes. Infinite modes are the infinite modifications of the attributes. Finite modes are the finite modifications of the attributes. Infinite intelligence and infinite will are the infinite modes of infinite thought of God. Infinite motion is the infinite modes of infinite extension of God. These modes are infinite: Motion, intellect and will are without beginning or end. The physical universe and the intellectual universe are uncaused and unending. Each of the infinite modes is an infinite series of finite modes. Finite modes are the infinite modifications of the attributes. Finite minds, or finite intelligence and finite will, are the finite modes of thought. Finite bodies, or finite movements, are the finite modes of extension. The substance is the absolute, eternal, and necessary cause of itself, while the modes are relative, temporary, and contingent. The substance is unchanging and immutable, and yet it is the sum of finite modes or changes. How can these be reconciled? Either the immutable substance or God is the only reality, modes or changes are nothing. Or, both the immutable substance and it infinite series of finite modes are real. Both tendencies are found in Spinoza’s writing. Sometime she regards God alone is real and co-eternal. Unmindful of the principle of contradiction, he affirms both the immutability and perpetual change of beings.

Mental order and physical order are parallel to each other. Wherever there is an idea, there is a bodily change. Wherever there is a physical motion, there is an idea corresponding to it Spinoza says, “just as thoughts and mental processes are connected in the mind, so in the body its modifications, and the modifications of things are arranged according to their order.” To avoid the difficulties of Dualism and Interactionism, Spinoza
started the hypothesis of universal parallelism or parallelistic monism, according to which mind and matter are not two distinct and independent substances, but only two parallel attributes of the same substance, God. Mind and matter are the correlative aspects, internal and external, of one and the same substance (viz. God), which is, in itself neither mind nor matter but appears in its two parallel attributes of thought and extension. Hence, for every unit of extension in the universe there is a corresponding unit of consciousness, and vice versa; for every change in the body, there is a corresponding change in the mind and for every change in the mind, there is corresponding change in the body. There is a thorough going correspondence between thought and extension, mind and body mental processes and physiological process. Thus, parallelistic monism explains the relation between mind and body by their consubstantiality or co-inherence in one and the same substance. Thus, it affects a compromise between dualism and monism, by combining the dualism of attributes with the monism of substance. There is the identity of the divine substance behind parallelism of thought and extension.

God is the causal chain or process, the law and structure of the world, the underlying condition of all things. He is the chain of natural events, the universal laws of nature. Spinoza says, “God is the immanent, and not the extraneous cause of all things. All is God; all lives and moves in God”. He conceives nature as \textit{natura naturans} and, \textit{natura naturata}. The former is nature-producing, while the latter is nature produced. He affirms the identity of God and nature in the sense of \textit{natura naturans}: he denies the identity of God with nature as \textit{natura naturata}. Spinoza’s monism is abstract, because he lays stress on the eternal nature of one substance or God and regards the phenomena of nature and human volitions as unsubstantial modes having no reality of their own and following necessarily from it, and because he regards the human minds as devoid of freedom of the will, and therefore, of moral responsibility. He is an advocate of pantheism (pan-all; theos-God; all is God). Pantheism leads to a cosmism and illusionism, denies human freedom and saps the very foundation of morality. It regards God as an eternal substance, devoid of intelligence and will, freedom and purpose, love and grace. It reduces religion to a myth, which believes in personal God of love and grace, who responds to human prayer and makes communion between Him and man possible. Its conception of God as an eternal impersonal substance does not satisfy our religious aspirations. Its conception of man as a finite mode of God, its core and essence, devoid of freedom and purpose, does not satisfy our moral aspirations. Its denial of beauty and ugliness does not satisfy our aesthetic aspirations. Its denial of morality and religion, in the strict sense of the term, forfeits its right to be regarded as rational metaphysical hypothesis. It is right in so far as it recognizes the reality of one substance or God. It is wrong in so far as it denies the reality of many objects and minds.

\textbf{Leibniz (1646-1716)}

Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz (1646-1716) based his philosophy on the notion of substance, but he differed radically from them as regards the relation of mind and matter, and as regards the number of substances. Descartes allowed three substances, God,
mind and matter; Spinoza admitted God alone. For Descartes, extension is the essence of matter; for Spinoza, both extension and thought are attributes of God. Leibniz held that extension cannot be an attribute of a substance. His reason was that extension involves plurality, and can therefore only belong to an aggregate of substances; each single substance must be unextended. He believed, consequently, in an infinite number of substances, which he called “monads”. Each of these would have some of the properties of a physical point, but only when viewed abstractly; in fact, each monad is a soul. This follows naturally from the rejection of extension as an attribute of substance; the only remaining possible essential attribute seemed to be thought. Thus Leibniz was led to deny the reality of matter, and to substitute an infinite family of souls.

Leibnitz rejects matter and the reality of extension and defines substance as indivisible, self-active and spiritual units. Therefore, according to Leibnitz the real elements must be spiritual. He calls these indivisible, self-active and spiritual units as monads. They are the true metaphysical points which though indivisible are non-existent. They are, again, different from atoms which though existent are not indivisible. Only a spiritual unit is indivisible like our own self-conscious existence, and yet in real. Hence the monads alone are real.

Every monad is a mirror of the universe, but a living mirror which generates the images of things by its own activity or develops them from inner germs, without experiencing influences from without. The monad has no windows through which anything could pass in or out, but in its action is dependent only on God and on itself. All monads represent the same universe, but each one represents it differently, their difference consists only in the energy or degree of clearness. The clearer the representations of a monad the more active it is. Leibnitz suggests that to have clear and distinct perceptions only is the prerogative of God. He alone is pure activity; all finite beings are passive as well, that is, so far as their perceptions are not clear and distinct. No two monads can ever have any causal relation to each other; when it seems as if they had, appearances are deceptive. Leibniz held that every monad mirrors the universe, not because the universe affects it, but because God has given it a nature which spontaneously produces this result. There is a “pre-established harmony” between the changes in one monad and those in another, which produces the semblance of interaction. This is an extension of the two clocks, which strike at the same moment because each keeps perfect time.

Monads are real and infinite in number. They are eternal and cannot be destroyed. They are indivisible self-contained and exclusive of everything else. Being a real unit, each monad contains the whole infinity of existence. It has no windows through which anything might come in or go out. The infinite number of monads is qualitatively unlike, so that no two monads are alike. They are found in a hierarchical order of existence. Each monad imperceptibly leads to others. There is no abrupt change anywhere in the connexion granule. Only with the help of the absolute continuity between the monads we can explain
every variety of experience. Besides with the help of the law of continuous series we bridge the gulf between mind and matter, men and animals, conscious and unconscious states. Monads being spiritual have two important characteristics of perception and appetite. By virtue of its perception each monad mirrors the whole infinity of existence. The more developed monad in the series has clear perception and the less developed monad has confused perception. The infinite gradations in the monads correspond to their stages of development; there are different degrees of perception. Because each monad is a force, therefore, it has appetite by virtue of which it tends to become the whole. Again, by virtue of its appetite each monad tends to pass from obscure to clear perception. If an action is done from very obscure perception then it is known as impulse and if it is done from clear perception, then it is known as will. Thus the activity of the low monads is prompted by will and desire. The distinction between impulse and desire is one of degree and not kind. The monads are found in a continuous series, one imperceptibly passing into the other. However, in this series we can note the main types of monads. The lowest or bare monads are those in which the perception is most obscure. They go to make the inorganic bodies. They are scarcely more than centres of forces and they express themselves in the form of motion which appears to us purely mechanical. They may be said to be in profound stupor or deep sleep. Then there are conscious monads endowed with memory. This may be called souls. They go to make the plant and animal world. However, the highest monads called spirits having reason and universal necessary knowledge. They are raised to the knowledge of the self as well as of God.

**THE THEORY OF PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY OF MONADS**

Leibnitz tried to explain the relation between body and mind by his theory of Pre-established Harmony. According to this theory, God at the time of creation established such a harmony between mind and body-pre adjusted them to each other in such a way, that they always correspond to each other without calling for his constant intervention as occasionalism supposes. Body and mind thus may be regarded as two clocks which once constructed and set to the same time go on keeping the same time without either of them acting upon the other. Leibnitz says, “Each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in the case of animal is the soul”, “The soul follows its own laws, and the body its own likewise, and they accord by virtue of the harmony pre-established among all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe. There is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the motions of the bodies, pre-established at the outset between the system of efficient causes (bodies) and the system of final causes (minds). Here consists the concord and the physical union of the soul and the body, which exists without the one being able to change the laws of the other.

Leibnitz spiritualises body and mind and considers them to be composed of monads. Monads are spiritual atoms or active perceiving forces. They are self-centred, self-contained, self-active, substances of different degrees of complexity. The body is a cluster of lower unconscious monads. The mind is a self-conscious higher monad. It is a dominant
monad—a queen monad. The body and the mind correspond to each other, because God established a harmony between them, adjusted them to each other after creation. Their correspondence is due to pre-established harmony.

Leibnitz does not go to the root of the matter, and cannot explain how even God could establish harmony between two entirely heterogeneous substances like body and mind. Besides, body and mind both are composed of monads. Monads are self-contained entities. They cannot act upon each other. So God, the Monad of monads cannot, act upon other monads, and adjust them to one another; and establish harmony among them. Causation is interaction. Leibnitz denies it in the monads. So he cannot admit it in God. In order to solve the difficulty of interaction between body and mind, he makes the hypothesis of the interaction of God upon monads. This is pushing the difficulty further back but not solving it.

CONCLUSION

Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who is the father of modern western philosophy and rationalist philosopher, follows a method of abstraction which is evident from his fundamental contention that ‘reason’ is the source of clear and distinct knowledge, and ‘sensibility’ is a faculty of confused knowledge. Descartes rationalism goes from concrete things to something highly abstract and he rejects the objects given by means of senses. Descartes sees that one firm and immovable truth, cogito ergo sum, ‘I think, therefore, I am’ that even the most extravagant skepticism cannot touch. This is the highest possible abstraction. Following the method of abstraction, Descartes proceeds to analyse the nature of material substance by separating it from mental substance. So there is no meeting ground between mind and matter, both are diametrically opposed to each other. This is generally known as Cartesian dualism which constitutes the basis for the development of European philosophical thought in terms of two opposed trends—idealism and materialism. Descartes himself could not furnish any satisfactory solution to this problem. We have to go beyond dualism and search for its solution. Spinoza’s (1532-1677) attempt to solve Cartesian dualism by admitting only one substance God by abstraction fails to explain the plurality, diversity, motion and change of the objects of the world. Leibnitz (1646-1716) was a pluralist, for according to him, each monad meets the requirement of substance. But once it has been established that there are numerous substances—windowless monads—in the universe, it becomes impossible to establish, the unity of the world.

What are the major limitations of rationalistic thinking? Rationalism rejects all knowledge derived from the senses of experience (posteriori), and condemns it as illusory. But we actually perceive the things around us clearly and distinctly, and so they cannot be treated as unreal. Our life presupposes the existence of external things which produce clear and distinct ideas, and to which we react successfully. We cannot spin out philosophy by mere reason without experience. Philosophical knowledge is not like mathematical knowledge. Mathematical knowledge is abstract; it deals with abstractions and deduction.
from them. The knowledge that is deduced from them is not concrete. But philosophy does not deal with abstractions or imaginary entities: it deals with real entities. It seeks to give a rational concept of the realities as whole by rational reflection of the facts of experience. So it cannot condemn experience as illusory. The facts are given by experience, organized by sciences and finally harmonized with one another, and reduced to a system by philosophy by rational reflection. Philosophy cannot do without reason; nor can it do without experience. It is criticism of life and experience. The doctrine of innate ideas advocated by Descartes is not tenable. Locke severely criticized Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas. Hume opposed Descartes’ rationalism with a more powerful empiricism. Hume rejected the Descartes’ Cogito proof, proofs of God and metaphysical dualism.

KEY WORDS

**Metaphysics:** The philosophical inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality. In contemporary usage, the term includes the analysis of fundamental philosophical principles.

**Epistemology:** (theory of knowledge): The branch of philosophy which studies the sources, validity, and limits of knowledge, it inquires into perception, meaning, and truth.

**Deduction:** Orderly, logical reasoning from one or more statements (premises) which are assumed, to a conclusion which follows necessarily.

**Intuition:** Direct and immediate knowledge, as in the case of our comprehension of self-evident truths, such as the axioms of geometry.

**Idealism:** Any metaphysical theory which holds that reality is mental, spiritual, or has the nature of mind, thought, or consciousness.

**Materialism:** Any monistic metaphysical theory which holds that ultimate reality is matter and that all seemingly nonmaterial things such as minds and thoughts are reducible to the motions of particles of matter.

**A priori:** Refers to knowledge that is derived solely from reason independently of the senses (neither derived from sense nor alterable by it). The truth of *a priori* knowledge is claimed to be both necessary and universal.

**A posteriori:** Refers to knowledge that is derived from the senses.

**Rationalism:** The view that appeals to reason, not the senses, as the source of knowledge. In its most extreme form, rationalism insists that all knowledge is derived from reason.

**Empiricism:** The view that all human knowledge derived from the sense.

**Dualism:** Any view which holds that two equal but opposed ultimate, irreducible principles are required for the explanation of reality. Good and evil, mind and matter are dualism.
**Abstract:** Defined as a part of whole, one-sided, simple or undeveloped. Abstract is the product of the mind alone. In abstraction, things, events and phenomena are conceived separately, independently and mutually isolated. At the level of conceptualization, in abstraction, things, events and phenomena are conceived separately, independently and mutually isolated.

**Concrete:** It is many-sided, complex or a developed whole. Concrete is understood as the sensuously perceived multiformity of individual objects, events and processes are seen as mutually interrelated, interdependent and in appropriate circumstances pass into one another.

**Part C**

*(Each answer not to exceed 150 words each question carries 2 weightages)*

1. Write a short note on Occasionalism

   To avoid the difficulties of the theory of interaction, the followers of Descartes, Geulincx and Malebranche, resorted to the hypothesis of occasional cause or occasionalism. According to this theory, mind and body are opposed to each other and consequently cannot interact upon each other; but still there is a correspondence between the two; and this correspondence is brought about by God, who upon the occasion of certain changes in the one, intervenes to bring about corresponding changes in the other; whenever changes arise in the body, God intervenes and produces corresponding sensations in the mind, and whenever there are volitions in the mind to move the body, He produces corresponding movements in the body. Geulincx uses the example of two watches to explain this point, an example, which was later laboured by Leibnitz. Imagine, two watches adjusted to solar time so that both ring at exactly the same time, although there is no relation between the watches themselves. Their similarity is caused not by the fact that they are related, but by the fact that they have been made by the same individual and have been adjusted to some external factor common to both. This theory is quite inadequate as a scientific explanation of the relation between mind and body. It makes too large demands upon pious credulity. To bring down God at every moment to produce changes in the one on the occasion of the corresponding changes in the other is quite absurd.

2. Describe Descartes Proofs for the Existence of God

   Descartes has given following proofs for the existence of God:

   1. **The Causal Proof:** The causal proof of the existence of God is based on two assumptions, namely (i) individual consciousness knows itself to be finite, and, (ii) This consciousness of ‘God’ is derived only from the conception of an absolutely perfect being. Of course, some may object that the infinite being may be a negative idea, i.e., that which is not finite. Now Descartes points out that the idea of the
infinite being is the most positive idea for in comparison which the fullness of the Perfect Being we realise our finitude.

2. **Argument from clear and distinct idea**: Descartes believes that a concept which is absolutely clear and distinct among other concepts should be accepted as true. The concept of God stands this test fairly. Hence, God does exist.

3. **Cosmological Proof**: There must be some creator of all objects and living beings in the universe and man obviously cannot even create himself. He asks, what can be the cause of myself, my parents and all other finite beings? This he concludes, can be proved only with the help of the idea of a Perfect Being who has created everything else in the world.

4. **Ontological Proof**: According to this, the existence of God follows from the very idea of the perfect being. The most perfect being cannot be thought without thinking of Him as actually existing. Of course, the idea and the actual finite thing are not inseparable. One can think of a winged horse though there may be none in reality. But this idea of a perfect being, according to Descartes, cannot be thought apart from His existence.

3. Explain Attributes and Modes

There can be no substance without attributes. However, they may be either essential or accidental. The essential attributes define a substance, i.e., without which the substance would cease to be substance. The accidental attributes are those variable characters which can lose without ceasing to be what it is. As substance is self-contained and is infinite, so it has an infinite number of attributes. Hence, the substance of Spinoza has an infinite number of attributes, each of which expresses the essence of the substance infinitely. Spinoza holds that out of an infinite number of attributes, human intellect can perceive only two, namely extension and thought. There is possibility of an infinite number of attributes, coexisting together which neither limit one another nor the substance.

Modes can never exist without the substance though the substance can exist without them. Every mode is in God for nothing can exist without God. The modes are individual things of finite experience. Modes are said to be actual in so far as they exist at a certain time and space. Spinoza sometimes regards the modes to be real affections actually existing in God and sometimes looks upon them as mere illusions created by abstract imagination which views things as separated and unrelated.

**FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCE**


UNIT III  EMPIRICISM

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental principle of empiricism is that sense perception (including direct observation by the senses, indirect observation by use of instrumentation, and experimentation) is the only reliable method for gaining knowledge and for testing all claims to knowledge. Empiricism is basing knowledge upon the senses, upon the flux of the sensible world, which the rationalist Descartes rejected as an inferior way of knowing. Nowhere is this challenge taken up with more devastating result than in the work of David Hume (1711-1776), the eighteenth century empiricist and sceptic, who elegantly, and relentlessly, pursues Cartesian insights and premises to what he sees as their inevitable logical outcome. In this unit, we shall present an exposition and critical examination of Hume’s thinking with the influence of Locke and Berkeley in his thinking. He was the most mercilessly destructive of all the British empiricists and he took delight in demolishing the claims of philosophy, shocking the defenders of religion and undermining the validity of scientific laws and the Enlightenment belief in progress.

John Locke (1632-1704)

ATTACKS UPON DESCARTES THEORY OF INNATE IDEAS.

John Locke (1632-1704) in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) criticizes Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas, and expounds the doctrine of empiricism. The theory of innate ideas asserts that clear and distinct, self-evident ideas are innate in the sense that they are “born with us,” as Descartes said, they are imprinted upon the soul. Examples of innate ideas are the ideas of substance, cause, God, and the principles of logic. If there are innate ideas, says Lock, they must be equally present in all minds. But Locke contends that there are no such ideas, which are universally present in all minds. Children, savages, idiots and illiterate persons are quite unconscious of the so-called innate ideas such as causality, infinity, eternity, God and the like. If there are innate ideas in the mind, they must be the same in all minds. But the so-called innate ideas of God, morality and the like differ in different societies, in different countries, and in different ages. They differ in different persons even at the same time in the same society. Even if there were the same idea in all minds, it would not prove their innateness. All persons have the same idea of fire. But it is not an innate idea; it is derived by all from experience. Universality of an idea does not prove its innateness. The so-called innate principles are general truths, which are induction from particular facts of experience. They are not the primary facts of knowledge, but generalisations from particular facts, which are acquired from perception. Perception is experience. The so-called innate principles are derived from experience; they are empirical truths, and not innate and intuitive. They are not a priori or prior to all experience. Thus Locke disproves Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas.
Locke maintains that the mind is a *tabula rasa* in the beginning. It is like a clean slate, blank white paper, on which experience writes, and this writing by experience is all the mind can know. Mind has no innate ideas. It receives ideas from experience. Experience is twofold; sensation and reflection. Sensation is external perception. Reflection is internal perception. Sensation is the source of our knowledge of external objects. Reflection is the source of our knowledge of the internal states of mind. There is not a single idea in the mind, which is not derived from sensation or reflection. The child gets his first ideas from sensation; then at an advanced age he reflects upon them. He cannot think before his mind is stocked with sensations. Descartes maintains that the mind always thinks even before it is furnished with sensations and that it can think independently of sensations. But Locke maintains that the mind cannot think before it has sensations. Sensations are the materials on which the mind thinks. The mind is passive in receiving sensations. But it is active in comparing them with one another, combining them into complex ideas, and forming general ideas out of particular ideas. It can form complex ideas out of simple ideas. “There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense.” This is the dictum of Locke.

All knowledge is derived from experience; it is posterior to or after experience. Knowledge is inductive in procedure and not deductive as Descartes and Spinoza think. Knowledge starts with particular facts of experience, and makes generalizations from them. It does not start with some self-evident innate ideas or principles, and deduce other truths from them. This theory is called *a posteriori* theory of knowledge. It is called empiricism because experience is the only reliable source of knowledge and testing all claims to knowledge.

Empiricism is thus basing knowledge upon the senses, upon the flux of the sensible world, which rationalism rejected as an inferior way of knowing.

According to Locke, we have sensitive certainty of the existence of matter; we have intuitive certainty of the existence of our own minds; and we have demonstrative certainty of the existence of God. We are compelled to assume the existence of matter as the unknown and unknowable substratum, of primary qualities—extension, solidity, figure, rest and motion—which are real and known through sensation or external perception. The mind is the substratum of the powers of perceiving, thinking, feeling and willing. We infer the existence of God from the external world as its maker. We form the idea of the infinite by negation of the finite. Thus, Locke, an empiricist, believes in the existence of matter, mind and God and reaches the same metaphysical conclusion of rationalist Descartes.

Locke also takes over the subjectivism of Descartes, the view that what I know best is my own mind and its ideas. Thus there enters into empiricism the problem inherent in subjectivism which we found in Descartes: the chasm or gap between my own mind with its ideas and the physical objects and human beings to which my ideas refer, and which are external to me, in the physical and social world. How can I know them since I am confined to knowing with certainty only my own ideas?
George Berkeley (1685-1753)

SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM OR MENTALISM

George Berkeley (1685-1753) pushes ahead with the argument of empiricism and demolishes Locke’s acceptance of the belief held by Descartes that physical substances exist. We can never have sensory experiences of material substances, says Berkeley. We can experience only sensory qualities. What is my actual experience of substance? It is only the experience of qualities. I perceive a tree as a certain size and shape, I perceive the diameter of its trunk, the length of its branches, the brown colour of its trunk and branches, and the green colour of its leaves; I touch its rough textures and smell its woody aroma- but I can never perceive its substance itself. All that I have perceived of the tree are its qualities. I have no perception of a substance. The existence of physical substances, Berkeley concludes, is only in their being perceived. According to Berkeley, esse est percipi, the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived; a substance, in order to be real, must be perceived by the mind. So Locke’s unknown and unknowable substratum is a meaningless abstraction. A substance, so far as matter is concerned, is nothing but a cluster of sensations. Physical substances cannot be known to have any other existence than in the qualities we perceive. For Berkeleian empiricism matter -physical substance, the physical universe- do not exist. But he believed that mental substances exist, in the form of finite minds and also in the form of God as infinite mind. The laws of nature for Berkeley are only the regularities of our own perceptions or ideas. Berkeley assured us that with the help of God our perceptions are reliable and orderly and that we can therefore trust in the uniformity of experience and in the dependability of scientific laws. But Hume gleefully asks how does Berkeley know that mental substance exists? Under this attack we will see collapse the idea that there are mental substances.

Berkeley developed the empiricism of Locke to its logical consequence in subjective idealism. He propounded his doctrine in his three books: Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1907), The Principles of Human Knowledge (1970) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1973). According to his subjective idealism matter is nothing but a cluster of qualities; and all the qualities of matter, both primary and secondary, are nothing but subjective states or ideas of our minds. Hence Berkeley argues that the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived (esse est percipi i.e., existence-perception); if all knowledge comes from experience, as Locke holds, we know nothing but the ideas of our minds, since what we perceive is an idea of the mind. Thus the conception of extra mental matter is a dogmatic and superfluous assumption. The external world does not exist, and consequently, the qualities the world, both primary and secondary, are the subjective ideas of the mind. The world outside us is neither hot nor cold, neither bright nor dark, neither sweet nor sour, neither fragrant nor foul smelling, and is neither extended nor impenetrable, neither mobile nor immobile. The world and its primary and secondary qualities are nothing but perception or ideas of our minds. But the perception or ideas...
are not created by our own minds, but communicated to us by God who is the cause of
oursensations. He produces sensations in the finite minds according to fixed laws. He
admits the existence of minds alone, of the finite minds and of God or the infinite Mind. He
denies the existence of the external world. Hence his doctrine is called subjective idealism.

Berkeley offers the following arguments for the subjectivity of the primary qualities.
First, the primary qualities extension, solidity, number, rest and motion are perceived by the
mind. Therefore, they are ideas of the mind. They are sensible qualities. They are sensible
because they are perceived. Apart from their relation to our sensibility, they have no
existence. They have no existence apart from our sight and touch. They are perceived by the
mind; and whatever is perceived are ideas of the mind. They have no existence apart from
the mind that knows them; they have mind dependent existence. In this sense, they are
ideas. Berkeley says, “It is evident that extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing
in the mind, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an
unperceiving substance.” Locke wrongly maintains that they are the original, primary
qualities of matter which imprint their ideas on our minds. Secondly, the primary qualities
and the secondary qualities cannot be perceived apart from each other. Colour cannot be
perceived apart from extension, and extension cannot be perceived apart from colour by
sight. Heat and cold cannot be perceived apart from extension, and extension cannot be
perceived apart from heat and cold by touch. So if colour and temperature are ideas of the
mind, then extension also must be an idea of the mind. If the secondary qualities are ideas,
then the primary qualities also must be ideas. Berkeley says, “if it be certain that those
original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and, not even in
thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the
mind. Extension, figure and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable.
Thirdly, the same temperature appears different to different persons or to the same person at
different times under different conditions. Dip your hand into hot water; it appears hot to
you. Dip the same hand into warm water; it will appear cool to you. But the same water
cannot be hot and cool at the same time. So Locke argues that temperature is not a real
quality of matter but only an idea of the mind. Berkeley likewise argues that extension,
weight, motion and number appear different to different persons or to the same person
under different conditions. A person, who appears tall at a short distance, appears short at a
great distance. A stone that appears heavy to one appears light to another. A motion that
appears swift to one, appears slow to another. The same thing is one, three, or thirty six
according as it is measured by a yard, a foot, or an inch. So extension, weight, motion and
number are ideas of the mind.

Solidity cannot be perceived apart from extension, which is an idea. So solidity also
is an idea; all primary qualities are ideas.
Berkeley says, “great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs or sense varies. The extension, therefore, which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion which exists without the mind is neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. That number is entirely the creature of the mind will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, three or thirty-six- as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch.

Then Berkeley refuses the existence of matter. He offers the following arguments for the non-existence of matter. First, Locke regards matter as the unknown and unknowable substratum of the primary qualities. The primary qualities are real, and so they must abide in matter. It is their substratum and support. Berkeley argues, “esse est percipi” Existence consists in being perceived. Locke himself admits that matter cannot be perceived. It is unknown and unknowable. So it does not exist. Secondly, matter is said to be the support of the primary qualities. But does it support them as the pillars support a building? They are perceived to support it. But matter is not perceived to support the primary qualities. It cannot be said to support them in an unknown manner. Thirdly, matter is regarded by Locke as the substratum of the primary qualities. But there are not external primary qualities. They are ideas of the mind only. So there is no need of assuming the existence of matter to support them. Fourthly, if matter exists, it is known either by the senses or by reason. If it is known through the senses, it is nothing but an idea. Whatever is perceived is an idea. Nor can it be known through reason or inference. We are not compelled to infer the existence of matter to account for our sensations, because dreams are ideas of the mind, which are not excited by external objects. So sensations also may be produced in our minds without external material things. There is no necessary connection between sensations and material things. Sensations are produced by God in our mind. Fifthly an object can never be perceived apart from its sensation. Berkeley says, “It is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. In truth, the object and sensation are the same thing and cannot therefore be abstracted from each other”. An object can never be perceived apart from its sensation. Therefore, a perceived object is identical with a sensation. It has no existence outside of mind. Sixthly, Locke advocates representative theory of perception, and maintains that ideas are copies of representations of external objects. Berkeley argues, if ideas are like objects the objects must be ideas. Berkeley says, “An idea can be nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another idea. If there is likeness between ideas and their objects, they must be identical in their nature, and the objects must be nothing but ideas.

Sensations are independent of our will; they are not created by our own minds. Nor can they be created by other finite minds. The sun, the moon, mountains, rivers, oceans are sensations, which cannot be produced by the finite minds. Nature is a system of sensations or ideas produced in the finite minds by God according to fixed laws. The laws of nature are the uniform ways according to which sensations are produced by God in the finite minds. There is neither matter nor physical causation. There is only spiritual causation or will-
causality. God is the cause of sensations. This is the doctrine of subjective idealism, immaterialism, or spiritualism. Berkeley denies the reality of material substance. He reduces the material world to appearances presented to the senses or subjective ideas perceived by the finite minds. He admits the reality of the finite spirits and the Infinite Spirit or God and their ideas. The conception of God saves Berkeley’s philosophy from lapsing into solipsism. According to Solipsism, I and my ideas are real; I am certain of my own existence and of my ideas. I do not know anything beyond myself and my ideas. Berkeley is not really solipsist, for he explicitly holds (a) that the world contains, in addition to me and my ideas, other finite spirits with their ideas, and (b) that I am not the source of my presentations, but I am dependent for them on God, who cause them to occur in a fixed and regular order”

Is there no difference, then, between real things and imaginary things? Berkeley replies that real things are sensations produced in the finite minds by God according to fixed laws but that imaginary things are the ideas of imagination, creations of the finite minds. Sensations are stronger, livelier, more regular, and independent of the finite minds, while images are weaker, fainter, less lively, and irregular. Berkeley says, the ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things; and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are mere properly termed ideas or images of things which they copy or represent. Both sensations and ideas are mind dependent and subjective, and have no existence independently of the finite mind. Berkeley says, the ideas of sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effect of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series”. But our sensations are never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas; that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. Thus according to Berkeley, real thing are different from unreal things because sensations are different from images, but still they both exist in the finite minds which have them.

David Hume (1711-1776)

SENSE PERCEPTION: IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS.

David Hume’s (1711-1776) exciting new philosophic outlook combined the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley, who argued that knowledge comes only from sense perception, with the moral philosophy of Francis Hutcheson, who argued that morality comes only from sentiment or feeling. Putting these two conceptions together, Hume began to move toward the shocking thought that our best knowledge, our scientific laws, are nothing but sense perceptions which our feelings lead us to believe. Therefore it is doubtful that we have any knowledge, we have only sense perceptions and feelings. Here in these thoughts of the young Hume was a radical, extreme scepticism, an extreme form of doubting the possibility that certainty in knowledge is attainable.
At the very outset of his book *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume holds, “All the perceptions of the human mind divide themselves into two different kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas.” It follows from the above citation that Hume accepts two basic premises of Locke. First, sense-perception is the only source of knowledge. Secondly, what we apprehend through sense-perception are impressions and ideas. Here, we may point out that what Hume calls ‘impressions’ are nothing other than the ‘simple ideas’ of Locke and ‘ideas’ of Berkeley. ‘Ideas’, for Hume, refer to the copies of impressions. It shows that all three of them—Locke, Berkeley and Hume, accept the Cartesian assumption, namely, the mind knows only its own ideas. Even with ideas as the immediate data of sense-perception, Locke attempts to establish materialism. Though Hume agrees with Locke that what the mind directly knows through sense-experience are ideas, yet as to Locke’s materialism, he takes the side of Berkeley. Following Berkeley, Hume rejects Locke’s abstract general ideas signifying material substances. On the ground that we cannot assert the existence of anything which is not ‘given’ through our sense-perception, Hume rejects not only the material substance of Locke, but also Berkeley’s spirit or mental substance. He advocates the reality of impressions and ideas, alone. To quote him, “Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, it follows that it is impossible for us to so much as conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions.” His implication is that as our concepts of matter and mind as enduring substances are specifically different from impressions and ideas, we cannot assert their existence.

Hume defines impressions and ideas in the following term, “Those perceptions, which enter with the most force and violence, we may call impressions, and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. By Ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.” In this definition, Hume makes it clear that both ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’ are ‘perceptions’ of our mind, and the difference between them lies not in kind but only in the ‘degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind’. ‘Impressions’, in his view, are the lively perceptions. When we reflect on these lively perceptions, we receive ‘ideas’, which are less lively copies of these ‘impressions’. In order to emphasise the mental character of ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’, Hume maintains that the difference between them is a difference of feeling and ‘thinking’. Thereby, he means that impressions are directly felt, strong and vivid perceptions, whereas ‘ideas’ are comparatively feeble perceptions acquired through recollection or imagination. Thus, putting all the stress on the degree of vivacity with which ‘impressions and ideas’ are received by the mind, he says, “Everyone of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking.” Here we notice the difference between Locke and Hume. According to Locke, the strength and vivacity of the simple ideas of sensation assure us of the presence of external material objects as the causes of these ideas. It is this fact of being caused by extra-mental reality which, in Locke’s view, distinguishes the ideas of sensation from the ideas of memory and imagination. Hume however does not refer to any substantial reality, material or mental as the cause of our ‘impressions’. By ‘impressions’, he simply means those mental awareness or ‘perceptions’
which are distinguished from ‘ideas’ in respect of the degrees of ‘force and liveliness’ with which they are felt. He does not distinguish between impressions and ideas by the manner of their production. To quote him “By the term impression I would not be understood to express the manner, in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the perceptions themselves”.

Hume attempts to exhibit the priority of impressions through different examples. For instance, he argues that if we lack any one of our sense-organs, then in the absence of specific impressions, we cannot have the corresponding ideas also. “A blind man can form no notions of colours, a deaf man of sounds.” To mention another example cited by Hume where he says, “We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pineapple, without having actually tasted it.” He means that we cannot form the accurate idea of anything without the previous impressions of it. In these examples, we observe Hume’s attempt to give a realistic interpretation of his epistemology and ontology. However, all these examples, in the process of showing the temporal priority of impressions, prove the existence of material objects also. Hence, it follows from Hume’s own examples that the distinguishing feature of impressions is not vivacity or temporal priority but the fact that they are caused by objective reality which is lacking in the case of ideas. Whereas Locke emphasises the objective ground of the simple ideas of sensation, Hume puts all the stress on the subjective characteristics of ‘impressions’.

Just like Locke’s division of simple ideas into those of sensation and reflection, Hume draws a similar distinction within impressions: namely, impressions of sensations and impressions of reflection. An impression of sensation, in Hume’s view, “arises in the soul originally from unknown causes”. This view implies that there are existents other than impressions and ideas but because they are not given in our sense-perception, they are ‘unknown’ to us. This statement contradicts his view that “we never....can conceive any kinds of existence, but those perceptions...” Hence, it seems to us that two different interpretations of Hume’s ontological position are possible. On the one hand, we cannot conceive any other existences than ‘perceptions’ i.e., impressions and ideas; on the other hand, his view implies that there are existences other than ‘perceptions’ but they are ‘unknown’ to us. Herein lays agnosticism in Hume. As according to Hume, we do not know either external material substances or identical mental substance, the origin of the impressions of sensation is unknown for us. Impression of reflection, in Hume’s view, “is derived in a great measure from our ideas...” An impression leaves its copy i.e., idea in the mind, and reflecting on this idea, the mind may again receive a new impression like desire or aversion. Hume calls it the impression of reflection. As this kind of impression is directly derived from an idea, we observe that neither of Hume’s two criteria, namely ‘liveliness’ or ‘priority’ is properly applicable to it.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS OF ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS

Impressions and ideas, which constitute the matter of knowledge, are disconnected from one another. They are connected with one another by the laws of association. The laws
of association are purely subjective. Discrete impressions and ideas are automatically combined with one another according to these laws. They do not require any innate ideas or a priori forms of reason to connect them with one another. Hume advocates through-going empiricism. Impressions or sensations are the first units of knowledge; ideas or images are their faint copies. They are combined with one another according to the laws of association to form complex ideas. Knowledge is composed of sensations and ideas combined by the laws of association.

Hume has said that our atomic (distinct and separable) ideas, which correspond to our impressions, are connected or associated by three laws of association, which are a gentle force or impulse leading us to associate one idea with another. The association of our ideas is based upon three qualities of our ideas, which tend to lead the mind from one idea to another, to connect or associate one idea with another. The first law is that ideas are associated or connected by the resemblance between ideas. The second law by which we associate or connect one idea with another is by contiguity, one idea being close to, or adjacent to, another in space or time. The third law of the association of ideas is by cause and effect. These three laws pertain to all our thinking, thus also to our scientific thinking. All our reasoning about matters of fact, says Hume, is causal reasoning. And our most important reasoning about matters of fact is scientific reasoning, with its causal laws of nature.

Hume claims that the relation of cause and effect is the crucial concept in all our thinking about factual matters. By necessary connection is meant the relation between cause and effect in which the cause necessarily produces the effect. Hume now asks the powerful question: From what impression, if any, does the idea of cause arise? The principle, that everything must have a cause that nothing is uncaused, that something cannot come from nothing was regarded by Descartes and by the scholastic philosophers before him and the rationalistic philosophers after him, as a self-evident truth that proves itself directly to reason. Hume concludes that there is no rational proof whatsoever of the causal principle. He says flatly: “Every demonstration which has been produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious.” If we believe in the causal principle, he says, it is only through habit or custom that we do so, there is no rational basis for it. Here in this astonishing conclusion we see the outcome of Hume’s early breakthrough: his notion of combining empiricism with Hutcheson’s view of morality as coming only from sentiment or feeling. This had led Hume to the startling thought that what is true of morality is also true of science: that our scientific laws have their source only in feelings.

Why do we think that a particular cause must necessarily have a particular effect? We cannot know this by reason. Hume comes up with the answer. We have the idea of a necessary connection between a particular cause and effect after we experience their conjunction repeatedly. He calls this constant conjunction. If repeatedly we have sensory impressions of fire as spatially contiguous to my fingers and temporally prior to my fingers’ having a sensation of burning, “without any further ceremony,” says Hume, “we call the
one cause and the other effect." Impressions of the constant conjunction, spatially and temporally, of the flaming match and the burning sensation in the fingers still do not provide an impression of necessary connection. If the idea of necessary connection has no corresponding impression, then on Hume’s empiricist principle: no impression, no idea— the idea of a necessary connection between cause and effects is worthless as knowledge and is meaningless, a fraud, nonsense. Thus Hume’s empiricist rule is not only a test of the worth of our ideas as knowledge (where there is no impression, the idea is worthless) but is also a test of the meaning of our ideas (where there is no impression, the idea is meaningless).

Since necessary causal relation does not come from sensory impressions, it must be subjective; it must come from the mind, and specifically from the psychological laws of association of ideas. The idea of necessary connection between causes and effects is not in the objects we observe, but only in the mind, he concludes. Thus the idea of necessary connection between particular causes and effects is derived not from rational self-evidence and not from any empirical sense impression, but only from the psychological association of our ideas. Hume has shown that causal necessity is not an objective relationship between things which scientists can observe, but is only a subjective compulsion to relate things by the psychological laws of association. There is no necessary connection between objects. There is only the psychological necessity of our associating ideas with one another. Hume says: “Objects have no discoverable connection together, nor is it from any other principle but custom...that we draw any inference from one...to the other.” Hume’s point is that the idea of necessary connection between cause and effect is something that experience can never give us. Each impression is a separate experience. Experience cannot guarantee that this effect is necessary. Thus Hume redefines the idea of the cause-effect relation. A cause is an object in constant spatial and temporal conjunction with another such that the experience of the one compels the mind to expect the other. This is all that we can mean by the cause—effect relationship.

MATTERS OF FACT AND RELATIONS OF IDEAS

For Hume all the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds of propositions, to wit, Matters of Fact and Relations of Ideas and they are mutually exclusive.

1. Matters of Facts: Here Hume attacks upon the validity of scientific knowledge. Propositions of matters of facts consist only in our impressions and ideas. There is no necessity that any particular impression will follow any other impression. The contrary of what usually occurs in observed constant conjunction is possible. How do you know, Hume asks, that the sun will rise tomorrow? No necessary causal law guarantees it. It is just as intelligible and without any logical contradiction to say “The sun will not rise tomorrow.” There is no more logical necessity for the one than for the other. We can never know that a fact must be so, that a fact is necessary.
2. **Relations of ideas:** Logic and mathematics, specifically arithmetic, geometry, and algebra, give us knowledge of the relations of ideas. This is the domain of certainty. The propositions of mathematics are either self-evidently or intuitively certain, or they can be demonstrated by deductive reasoning to have complete certainty. The truths of mathematics assert relationships between ideas, between abstract symbols. They are formal abstract truths. They tell us nothing about matters of fact, and on the other hand, matters of fact cannot refute them. It is true independent of any experience we might have. Mathematical propositions must pay a price for yielding absolute truth. Mathematics is not truth about anything which exists, about any matters of fact. Mathematics is only empty, abstract, formal truth, which tells you nothing about existence. No proposition which states a relation between ideas can establish any truth about existence.

Relations of ideas have certainty but no factual content, and matters of fact which have empirical content but no certainty.

Even though Hume has conceded that logical certainty can be attained through demonstrative reasoning in the field of the relations of ideas, he has implied in the *Enquiries*, that such knowledge is only verbal, or tautologous. As the ‘relations’ are already contained in the ideas, they do not provide any new information. In the *Treatise*, he has brought the faculty of reason into question. As human beings are not infallible, he argues that there is a possibility of error even with regard to rational knowledge. Hume has thus resolved both empirical and rational knowledge into mere probability.

**THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE**

With regard to the idea of substance, when we ask, from what impressions does it arise, the answer cannot claim to be from an impression of substance, but only from impressions of qualities we experience, such qualities as size, shape, colour. Then the idea of substance is nothing but these qualities which we experience. We cannot, therefore, say that substances exist. We can know that something exists only if we have an impression of it, only if we have sensory experience of it. And so Hume destroys the claim that substance exist by showing that we have no impressions of physical substances. As far as our knowledge of the world of facts is concerned, we are limited to our atomistic impressions and their corresponding ideas. These impressions and ideas appear repeatedly in our experience. We have no way of knowing what causes them. We have no knowledge that an external world exists, that physical substances exist, that a God exists. There is no God. There is no valid proof for the existence of God. We have no impression of God. We do not perceive Him, nor can we infer His existence. We wish to believe in God to fulfil our aspirations. So we believe in God. The idea of God is man-made. This is also the case for
the idea of mental substance, and specifically for Descartes’ claim that I am a thinking
substance. There is no sensory impression to which the idea of thinking substance
corresponds. On empiricist principles we cannot claim to have any knowledge of the self as
a unity, as permanent and continuous, but only as a series of perceptions. Hume says “the
rest of mankind.... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
movement.” This is Hume’s famous “bundle of perceptions” theory of the self. Hume
cannot claim that the flux of our perceptions have even the unity of a bundle. Hume is here
getting close to the view of self as a stream of consciousness. Hume himself says, “The
mind is a kind of theatre, where perceptions successively make their appearance, pass and
re-pass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.” There is no
continuity, no permanence, and no identity, in these appearances in the theatre of the mind.
But suddenly Hume catches himself and says that, strictly speaking, there is not even a
theatre that we can know anything about through a sense impression. And thus the outcome
of Hume’s driving, consistent empiricism, which requires that the basis for our knowledge
be solely in sensory impressions, leads to the conclusion that we have no knowledge. Not
only is metaphysics impossible, science is also impossible. The causal laws of science have
been reduced by Hume to the psychological laws of association of ideas. Through animal
instinct we have animal faith in the world of the senses, and thus we are able to function in
the world, says Hume. Animal faith, not philosophy, governs our lives.

In the Treatise, Hume not only brings the certainty of geometry to question, but also
expresses doubt with regard to the very capacity of reason. Hume argues that it is never
possible to claim certainty about a chain of reasoning as a rational proof. First of all, our
judgement about the proof is probable and not completely certain. Then, our assessment of
this judgment about the proof is also probable. Further, the evaluation of our ability to judge
our judgment is also probable. Thus, the process leads to an infinite regress. There is no
guarantee of certainty even in the field of ‘Relations of Ideas’ and in the realm of ‘Matters
of Fact.’ Thus for Hume, “all knowledge degenerates into probability” In Hume’s view,
probability is all that we can aspire for in our life.

CONCLUSION

David Hume’s (1711-1776) exciting new philosophic outlook combined the
empiricism of John Locke (1632-1704) and George Berkeley (1685-1753), who argued that
knowledge comes only from sense perception, with the moral philosophy of Francis
Hutcheson, who argued that morality comes only from sentiment or feeling. Putting these
together Hume states that our knowledge is nothing but sense perceptions which our feeling
lead us to believe. Hume’s philosophy is an example of the method of abstraction in its
extreme form. In the sphere of ontology, Hume is neither an idealist nor a materialist. He is
generally known as a neutral monist. He rejects the existence of the self as well as of God.
He also rejects the existence of the material substance. So what we are left with is the
plurality of perceptions and impressions. Following the method of abstraction, Hume divides all knowledge into two kinds: (i) relations of ideas and (ii) matters of fact. These are two completely separate kinds of knowledge with no mediating transitions. One is analytic and the other synthetic. Knowledge of mathematics, physics, and geometry, according to Hume, are analytic because these are universal and necessary. In the *Treatise*, Hume not only brings the certainty of Geometry to question, but also expresses doubt in regard to the very capacity of reason. Hume has resolved both empirical and rational knowledge into mere probability.

KEY WORDS

**Scepticism:** A philosophical conception questioning the possibility of knowledge of objective reality. Consistent scepticism is close to agnosticism and nihilism.

**Ontology:** Ontology is the metaphysical inquiry into the nature of being in general.

**Enlightenment:** A movement in Europe from about 1650 until 1800 that advocated the use of reason and individualism instead tradition and established doctrines.

**Causal Laws:** Descriptive laws asserting a necessary connection between events of two kinds, of which one is the cause and the other the effect.

**Causal Reasoning:** Inductive reasoning in which some effect is inferred from what is assumed to be its cause, or some cause is inferred from what is assumed to be its effect.

**Cause:** Either the necessary condition for the occurrence of an effect or the sufficient condition for the occurrence of an effect, understood as the conjunction of its necessary conditions. The latter meaning is more common, and is the sense of cause used when we wish to produce something or event.

**Necessary conditions:** Necessary conditions for something are those factors without which that thing cannot exist, as breathing is a necessary condition for human life.

**Substance:** (1) An individual thing, a unity of matter and form; (2) by contrast with properties, qualities, attributes, a substance is that which possesses or has properties, qualities; (3) by contrast with properties, qualities, a substance is that which requires no other thing in order to exist.

**Monism:** Any view which holds that one principle is sufficient to explain reality.

**Scholasticism:** The philosophy of the medieval cathedral schools which attempted to support Christian beliefs with elements of Greek philosophy and with the use of syllogistic reasoning.
Part C-(Each answer not to exceed 150 words each question carries 2 weightages)

1. Explain Berkeley’s Criticism of Abstract Ideas

Empiricist philosopher John Locke has maintained that all reality is individual, and that universals exist only in the abstract understanding. George Berkeley advances a step further by bringing into question the possibility even of abstract ideas. We have no faculty for framing abstract ideas. As all beings are particular things so all ideas are particular ideas, Berkeley suggests. He points out two fundamental mistakes—the assumption of general ideas in the mind, and the belief in the existence of a material world outside it. Berkeley claims, in reality there are only particulars, and in our minds there are only images, not concepts. In considering the individual ‘Paul’ I can attend exclusively to those characteristics which he has in common with all men or with all living beings. But it is impossible for me to represent this complex of common qualities apart from his individual peculiarities. Self-observation shows that we have no general concepts. Ideas are the only object of the understanding.

The real aim in the refutation of abstract ideas was to establish immaterialism. Matter is an abstract idea for it means something which is moving and stationary, hard and soft etc., all and yet none of these. Besides, it means something existing apart from its being perceived. But this is a vicious abstraction for what right have we to maintain that there can be something independent of our perception when everything in our actual experience is always in our perception? Thus matter is an abstract ideas but an abstract idea does not exist. Hence matter does not exist. This is the general refutation of matter.

2. Explain primary and secondary qualities

According to Locke and Descartes, there are six original or primary qualities of extension, figure, solidity, motion, rest and number are supposed to be really in things and the secondary qualities of colour, sound, taste, heat, cold etc- are supposed to be in the perceiver and not in the things. Primary qualities are utterly inseparable from material bodies, in all their different sizes and various changes. They are constantly found in the bodies. Locke points out that primary quality are found in their objective right. They are really existent whether there be any person to perceive them or not. But secondary qualities are totally dependent on human subjects and their various sense-organs. Without eyes, there are no colours, without ears there are not sounds. Besides, secondary qualities are relative for the same bucket of water may be cold or hot, according to different arrangement. Finally, secondary qualities are produced by the primary qualities of bulk, solidity etc. According to Berkeley the so-called primary qualities are also ideas. Ideas are mental. Therefore, even the primary qualities are mental. And, hence there is no matter.

FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCE


UNIT IV IMMANUEL KANT

INTRODUCTION

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is the most influential thinker because he gave a new direction to modern philosophy and of European Enlightenment. Kant have made great stir in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, morality and aesthetics. Today philosophers may disagree with Kant on many points, but no one can ignore him. By and large, contemporary philosophers, whatever their disagreements with Kant might be, would tend to accept his understanding of the role of metaphysics. In Kant’s time, as in the days of Greek philosophy, the term metaphysics referred to the inquiry concerning the nature of ultimate reality. Kant’s Copernican revolution, however, resulted in the internalisation of these questions and showed that questions of metaphysics and epistemology are interrelated. In his writing Kant had not merely a theoretical purpose but also a practical impulse. Philosophy was to answer the problems of our intellect and the demands of our moral nature. Kant attempted to answer Hume’s scepticism and to find a foundation for knowledge.

The main objective of this unit is to introduce Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy, an attempt to reconcile Continental rationalism and British empiricism. It helps the students to know the method of transcendentalism as well. We shall show Kant’s epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and enlightenment rationality. By the end of this Unit one should be able to read his famous works *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* and his famous pamphlet known as “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” (1784)

KANT’S CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES AND HUME.

Who is right in the epistemological debate: the empiricists, with their emphasis on the senses as the exclusive source of our knowledge of the world, or the rationalists, who insists on reason alone as the final arbiter of truth? Kant, who was familiar with the philosophy of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, was steeped in a form of rationalistic philosophy stemming from Descartes but was more immediately influenced by the German philosopher Leibniz. Are we to face only the dogmatism (Kant’s term for rationalism) or the scepticism (Kant’s term for empiricism)? Scepticism and rationalism appeared to Kant to pose twin threats to philosophy.

Kant shares Descartes’ conviction of the foundational role of the proposition “I think” on the one hand, of the concept of God on the other hand, in framing all cognitive use of reason. And in both cases, Kant’s discussion of the Cartesian view is focused primarily on the *statement of existence*. Descartes thinks he can derive from the proposition “I think” and from the concept of God, respectively. Kant criticizes the Cartesian proof of the existence of God, on the ground that existence is not a predicate of a thing or “real
predicate,” so that “God exists” cannot be analytically derived from “God is the most perfect being.” In contrast, Kant endorses Descartes’ claim that the statement “I exist” is contained in the statement “I think”. Kant most definitely disagrees with Descartes’ statement that my existence as a mind is more immediately known than the existence of bodies outside me, including my own. He criticizes Descartes for ignoring the fact that my consciousness of the existence of bodies outside me is just as immediate as my consciousness of the existence of my own mental states, at least insofar as I am conscious of this existence as determined in time.

Kant’s epistemology is a clear and explicit response to Hume’s scepticism, an attempt to provide both a foundation for empirical scientific knowledge and to show the limits of such knowledge. Kant freely admits that reading the work of David Hume was the stimulus that roused him from his “dogmatic slumber,” as he put it. Hume’s attack on the principle of cause and effect as unfounded in reason but due rather to custom or habit was a claim that, if allowed to stand, would undercut the legitimacy of natural science for a start, and could eventually destroy confidence in reason’s ability to do anything. A side effect would be to cast further doubt on the legitimacy of philosophy as a tool of analysis. The epistemological problem for Kant is quite simple. Hume is quite unable to provide a foundation for our knowledge about the world beyond the beliefs we have. Hume’s empiricism is inadequate to provide the kind of proof which Kant believes is essential to provide justification for the knowledge on which we base our day to day actions. Most significant of all Hume fails to provide proof of the necessary connection between cause and effect. His work clearly demonstrates that inductive reasoning cannot deliver these goods. This is the epistemological crisis which awakens Kant from his dogmatic slumbers and which has to be met in order to provide a foundation for the emerging empirical science of the eighteenth century.

The empiricists had shown a proper concern with understanding the origin of knowledge, but they were guilty of several unexamined assumptions about the knowing process. The first of these assumptions was that the mind of the knower is purely passive, a receptacle for impressions (Hume’s term) or sensations (Locke’s term). John Locke had explicitly described the knowing mind as a blank tablet, a tabula rasa on which the senses write, or as an empty cabinet filled with ideas which are but copies of sensations. The second unexamined assumption was that the mind is incapable of generating anything out of its own internal operations necessary for the knowing process. Kant challenges both of these assumptions. Even though “there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience,” Kant observes, “it does not follow that it all arises out of experience”. The empiricist were right in thinking that all our knowledge is based on our experience of the world; they were wrong in assuming that the mind has a purely passive role and contributes nothing to the knowing process. Kant referred to his views as a (second) Copernican revolution because they reversed the prevailing views in epistemology by emphasizing the active role of the mind in generating knowledge, in contrast to the mind’s passive role in the
empirical philosophies of Locke and Hume. Prior to the time of Copernicus it was believed that the Earth was the centre of the universe and that the heavenly bodies revolved around it. Now we know that the sun is the centre of our solar system, and the Earth one of the planets orbiting it. Similarly, prior to Kant’s time the empiricists thought that ideas were only copies of objects perceived by the senses. Kant’s revolution reversed prevailing epistemological theories by presenting the view that we know things as objects only because the mind itself contributes important organizing principles which make knowledge of objects possible. The emphasis has shifted from the mind as passive to its playing an active role in shaping the “world” that can be known.

In simple terms Kant wants to show how objective knowledge, that is knowledge about the world, which is independent of our own subjective perception, is possible. This question can be resolved into a question about the presuppositions of experience, or what it is that must be true for us to be able to have experience, as we know it. In this way Kant will bring together both the empiricism of Hume and the nascent rationalism of Descartes and, in so doing, produce a complete epistemology and an explanation of the process of relation between the conscious individual, the world and time. Kant will demonstrate, in the Critique of Pure Reason, not only the areas in which knowledge is available to us, but also areas in which the search for knowledge is fruitless, misguided and even dangerous, areas in which belief, or even faith, are all that we can expect.

SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGEMENT

There are two sorts of knowledge: knowledge completely independent of the senses (a priori knowledge) and knowledge wholly empirical (a posteriori knowledge). In defining a priori knowledge, Kant stresses its utter and complete independence from experience. The best example of completely a priori knowledge, Kant thinks, is found in mathematics, for in mathematics the concepts used are not derived from experience in any way but are generated entirely by the human mind. Sometimes Kant refers to that which is a priori as “pure,” meaning by that term simply that it has no admixture of the senses. For example ‘A senator is a member of the Senate’. A posteriori knowledge, or empirical knowledge as Kant usually calls it, is derived from our sense experience. For example ‘The Senator is corrupt’. There is really nothing much new in the distinction between a priori and posteriori knowledge; it is similar to Hume’s distinction between “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas”. But Kant takes this distinction one step further in relating it to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. In synthetic judgement predicate adds something and is not contained in the subject. In analytic judgement predicate adds nothing and is contained in the subject. Posteriori statements are synthetic and that a priori statements are analytic. It is clear that a statement cannot be both a posteriori and analytic, since a posteriori refers to that which is derived from the senses, and analytic means that which is independent of the senses- a manifest contradiction. There is, however, one class of judgment left-judgments that are both synthetic and a priori. Are there any such judgments or concepts? Kant answers that not only are there concepts which are both synthetic and a priori (we find many of them in natural science and mathematics, Kant argues), but that they are the important ingredient in knowledge that the empiricists
overlooked. *Synthetic apriori* knowledge would be that ideal knowledge, knowledge both certain and informative.

Kant offers to the most important *synthetic a priori* concepts involved in the process of achieving knowledge as categories and he is convinced that there are just twelve such concepts. The most important one in the light of Hume’s attack was the principle of causality. Hume was correct in thinking that causality is not a principle we can derive from experience, but he was wrong in thinking that there is no legitimacy to this concept. Kant argues that causality was one of the categories (i.e., *a synthetic a priori* concept) that we bring to experience and which makes experience possible. In an extended and detailed argument, Kant argues that without such categories as cause and effect, substance, and others, there would be no way of transforming sensuous intuition (Kant’s term for sensations) into judgments which can be dignified by the term knowledge. We need the data supplied by the senses if we are to have knowledge, but these data need to be processed by the concepts (such as cause and effect) that the mind supplies out of its own operations. Both sensing and thinking are important. Without either, knowledge is impossible. “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”.

**THE CONCEPT OF REASON AND LIMITATION IN KANT’S EPISTEMOLOGY**

Kant uses the concept of ‘limit’ in two separate but related contexts. On the one hand, knowledge vis-à-vis faith has to be restricted and on the other hand, given the peculiar ontological distinction that Kant makes between *noumenon* and *phenomenon*, it is necessary to restrict *phenomenon* (i.e. sensible intuition) from being extended to *noumenon* (i.e. *thing in itself*). The concept of phenomenon constitutes the sphere of actual and possible scientific knowledge. In Kant’s analysis human cognition is confined to the extent a thing can be given in sensible intuition and is determined by the categories. But human cognition can never penetrate into the *noumenon* and the thing-it-itself because they cannot be recognized by sensible intuitions. Kant thus prepares a border of cognition between what is cognizable in principle and what is incognizable. On the basis of what is cognizable in principle and what is incognizable, the epistemological problems in Kant arise. He expresses those problems in terms of possibility, validity and limit of human cognition. To understand the Kantian conception of ‘limit’, one needs to examine Kant’s separation between *noumenon* and *phenomenon* on the basis of threefold distinction between ‘reason’, ‘understanding’ and ‘sensibility. Sensibility, says Kant, is the faculty of intuition and understanding is the faculty of concepts. Through intuitions objects are given, through concepts they are thought. Sensibility furnishes the manifold materials, which are absolutely chaotic and unintelligible, while understanding gives them a unifying form and renders them intelligible. Therefore, in Kant’s epistemology, sensibility and understanding are the two factors, which constitute knowledge. Kant says, “All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and bringing it under the highest unity of thought.” The understanding throughout the use of
categories and principles unifies the manifolds supplied by the sensibility. Reason seeks to unify the concepts and judgments of understanding. Whereas understanding is directly related to sensibility, reason relates itself to sensibility only indirectly through understanding. Whereas sensation or sense-perception represents things only as they appear to us, reason-by means of rational-discursive apperception-provides us with insight into the real structure and essence of things. Kant realizes that our knowledge cannot be limited to mere empirical knowledge, for there are certain ordering principles presupposed by this very knowledge. These principles are known by reason. We learn by experience, for example, that fire causes heat—reason does not tell us this. But we do not learn by experience that every event has a cause. Rather we know it because the particular experiences we do have would be incoherent without it. So we may postulate rational knowledge in addition to empirical knowledge.

Kant’s analysis of epistemology is based on his concepts of space and time, and the categories which constitute the sources of human cognition. Human cognition, according to him, is *synthetic a priori*. The concepts and categories are “Original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself *a priori*”. In Kant’s *Transcendental Aesthetic*, “there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principle of *a priori* knowledge, namely space and time”. Space and time, the basic source of the unity of experience, derive from mind, not from the perceptual world. For Kant, though the thing in itself exists independent of the mind, space and time are mind dependent and cannot be applied to thing in itself. Space and time are logically prior to sensible intuition through which a material object is given to us. Time and space are not absolute because they are mind dependent and cannot be derived from sensible intuition, but every sensible intuition has to be posited and ordered in *a priori* forms of space and time. The sensible intuitions, synthesized in the forms of space and time, become the object of knowledge for Kant. Without space and time no objects would be perceived, and therefore space and time are precondition of our experiencing anything. Space and time are empirically real and transcendentally ideal. They are empirically real because they are universally present in our experience; they are transcendentally ideal because they do not arise from experience but are a product of the mind. Kant used the word *aesthetic* in its original Greek sense of having to do with the senses. All that has to do with the senses is in space and time.

Just as space and time are invariable categories of perception, there are also invariable categories of thought that set the mould in which we must think. These categories of thought are examined in the *Transcendental Analytic*, what Kant calls understanding. The transcendental aesthetic provides man with the structure with which to perceive sense objects, and the transcendental analytic provides him with the structure with which to think about the world of experience. Human cognition/ synthetic a priori is possible through the transcendental unity of apperception, which perceives all things and events in space and time, comprehend them under the categories of quantity, quality, substantiality, causality, reciprocity etc. These pure concepts (categories) of the understanding Kant considers to be
a priori, independent of experience, universal: they form the structure of any mind, of any consciousness and necessary: they are a necessary condition of experience; without them, there is no knowledge, there is not even any experience. Categories are not structures of reality; they are only structures of our consciousness, our minds. They are significant only epistemologically, that is, in relation to our knowing: they have no significance metaphysically, or ontologically, that is, in relation to reality. And so we can know that the laws of nature will continue to hold true, because the universal and necessary concepts of our own minds structure them.

Categories of understanding can be applied to phenomena. It cannot be applied to things-in-themselves, because the latter can never be given in sensible intuition. If they are applied to the thing-in-itself, they lose their validity. Kant concluded that the mind is constitutive of phenomena, the world of experience. Kant confines understanding to the sphere of phenomenon and the knowledge which it provides is the knowledge of what he calls the conditioned. Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic has to do with the activity of the mind directed at getting beyond experience and seeking to know ultimate reality or things in themselves. As different from understanding, reason in Kant’s opinion, has no immediate relation to objects. But reason fails to present the unconditioned in reality; because whatever can be presented in reality is always conditioned. Therefore, the unconditioned is regarded by Kant as an idea of reason, for which there is no experimental basis. There are three ideas of reason namely freedom of will, immortality of soul and existence of God. The ideas of reason are transcendent and a-logical. For Kant the ideas of reason are regulative than constitutive. They do not constitute knowledge but merely regulate it. On this basis there arises a conflict between idea and reality and this conflict is what gives rise to the antinomies of pure reason where Kant uses his dialectics as a method of exposing transcendental illusions and claims to curb what he regards as the dogmatic pretensions of reason by preventing it from presenting the unconditioned in reality. Now, given the conception of knowledge as synthetic apriori, it has a ‘limit’, i.e. it is limited to the phenomenal world and cannot penetrate into the noumenal world, i.e. into the ideas of reason, the realm of spiritual wherein lies the basis of Kant’s moral laws. Thus, the conception of limit as an epistemic category serves to maintain the distinction, as rigorously as possible, between the two realms, i.e. the noumenal and the phenomenal. Kant’s theory is a theory of limit in this sense. Kant assumes the existence of things-in-themselves on the basis that when appearances are given through the manifold of sensible intuitions, then there must exist something as the ground of appearances. Thing in itself is the ground and the cause of the appearances which affect our senses and thereby furnish the material element in our cognition. The sphere of the phenomenon is the possibility, validity and limits of scientific knowledge. Kant is of the view that we cannot transcend our experience or have a priori knowledge of the super sensible, of things in themselves, of things as they are apart from the way they affect us. Knowledge involves perception but things in themselves cannot be perceived by the senses. In sense perception, we know only the way things appear to consciousness, not what they are in themselves. So in his epistemology,
Kant has limited human cognition to the world of phenomena by giving room for faith. He regards the sphere of faith, where scientific knowledge cannot penetrate, as the sphere of "noumenon." Thing in itself is "an object of our sensible intuition," while "noumenon" is not which presuppose a special mode of intuition namely "intellectual intuition." Man can never comprehend the "noumenon" because the intellectual intuition, which comprehends "noumenon," is of a special kind, which he can never possess. The concept of intellectual intuition is based on Kant’s assumption that, "...we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition". Therefore, there must be an intellectual intuition in which "noumenon" can be given. Thing-in-itself can never be given in a manifold of sensible intuitions and the categories of understanding cannot be applied to them. Therefore, things-in-themselves, things as they are independent of our concepts, remain unknown and unknowable.

TRANSCENDENLISM

Kant assumes the existence of the "thing in itself" on the basis that there must be an external cause to our sensibility. But causation according to him is a category of understanding and as such it is inapplicable to the "thing in itself." This contradiction cannot be resolved by regarding the "thing in itself" as the ground of appearances because the ground itself is nothing but the category of cause unschematized. The struggle between idealism and materialism lies at the roots of Kantian enlightenment. And Kant’s solution to the problem lies in separating the two from each other and it is the transcendental consciousness or the "noumenon" self which gives rise to maxims of morality or the categorical imperatives. In obeying these maxims one realizes freedom. As a matter of fact, Kant’s views on freedom are greatly influenced by the Enlightenment movement of the time. Kant’s concept of reason and human rationality is another attempt to justify the claims of Enlightenment. The concept of freedom is located in human subjectivity in as much as causation is situated in the objective reality. The dialectic argument between freedom and causation emerges when reason comes to an unavoidable situation to postulate absolute totality of the series of conditions. It is the totalizing effort or attempt to apprehend series of appearances in totality or the cosmological idea of the totality of the composition of the appearances of a cosmic whole that lays at the centre of Kant’s solution to the antinomy between freedom and causation.

Kant differs from Hume’s distinction of knowledge between relations of ideas and matters of fact, because such a distinction cannot make scientific knowledge as synthetic apriori possible. Kant tries to show that the propositions of Mathematics, Geometry and Physics are not only apriori but also synthetic. Kant, therefore, demonstrates that the 'transcendental consciousness' consists of the 'forms of intuition' (space and time) and 'forms of understanding' (the concepts) which are not static forms but forms of operation that exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensibility. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensibility into spatio-temporal order. By virtue of the categories, they are brought to the universal and necessary relations of cause and effect,
substance, quality, limitation, etc. And this entire complex is unified in the ‘transcendental consciousness’, which relates all experience to the ‘thinking ego’, thereby giving experience the continuity of being ‘my’ experience. The ‘transcendental consciousness’ is the matrix, the ultimate source through which the order and regularity in the field of appearance is given. The knowledge that comes out is what Kant calls *synthetic apriori*. As *synthetic*, it amplifies the concept of subject in the predicate and as *apriori*, it expresses universality and necessity. What we require in knowledge is such ampliative knowledge with the characteristics of universality and necessity. But knowledge as *synthetic apriori*, Kant warns, has a ‘limit’ i.e., it is limited to the *phenomenal* world and it cannot penetrate into the *noumenal* world; i.e., the ideas of reason, like immortality of soul, freedom of will and existence of God. Here Kant proposes a critique of pure reason. He says, “Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge, it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which as transcending all its powers, it is not able to answer.”

**KANT’S MORAL POSITION: UNIVERSALITY, END IN ITSELF AND KINGDOM OF ENDS**

Kant's ethical theory is deontological. Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* established the dignity of the moral law and makes the ethical life fundamental in Philosophy. He says, “The only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is a good will. That is to say, a good will alone is good *in all circumstances* and in that sense is an absolute or unconditioned good. We may also describe it as the only thing that is good *in itself*, good independently of its relation to other things.” *(Ground work of the Metaphysics of Morals)*. The good will is the only absolutely good. A will is good, not because of its effects, but in itself and for itself. An action is moral if its motive is moral, if it is prompted by a consciousness of duty. Good will is good in itself, not with reference to any external acts. It must have its law entirely within itself. It is the rational will. It is the will that follows the categorical imperative; it commands categorically, unconditionally. It is *a priori* and not derived from experience: it is free from empirical factors, and ought to be done under all circumstances, it is known in advance of a particular situation. It is self-evident. It is not ‘hypothetical imperative’: the laws which are means to other ends are of the nature of hypothetical imperatives. A Hypothetical imperative is always conditional. It is always an ‘iffy’ things; it can tell us what we must do only if we desire to achieve certain consequences. Our laws are indeed hypothetical imperatives, they tell us we should not do such things as break windows if we do not want to go to jail. But the moral law which is imposed by practical reason upon itself is a categorical imperative. We ought to obey it not for the sake of any other end; it demands unconditional obedience; it is not a means to a higher end; it is an end in itself. It is not absolute unconditional command which admits of no question. What we *ought* to do we *ought* to do. It should not be actuated by an inclination, feeling, or desire for an end or consequence. Actions are right only when they are done for the sake of duty. To quote Kant, “A human action is morally good, not because
it is done from immediate inclination—still less it is done from self-interest—but because it is done for the sake of duty”. In other words, “Duty for the sake of duty” should be the rule of life. Duty should be performed whatever may happen. A man endowed with a spirit of duty should be indifferent to situation and personal inclination. Inclination may at best advise us as to how to act; but it is reason which can give us the command of duty.

Kant maintains that moral laws can be derived neither from sensibility nor from inclination, but only from reason, so that they can be regarded as a command to all rational beings under all circumstances, whatsoever. An act, to be virtuous, must exclude the influence of desire and be the outcome of a pure regard for the moral law. Good will is autonomous or free and is independent of any property of the objects of volition. Will is autonomous when it acts solely from a sense of duty. Will becomes heteronomous when it is subject to a desire for an end beyond itself. The will is heteronomous when it is guided by some end or moved by desire. ‘Duty for duty’s sake’ is the true rule of life. Moral autonomy is the source of freedom. We are autonomous when we act according to duty, according to the categorical imperative. On the other hand, we are dependent or heteronomous when we act according to our feelings and pleasures, which indicate our bondage. Kant's freedom, then, is not a freedom of indeterminism. A man who is subject to his passions and emotions is a slave; only the rational man is free, for he recognizes the validity of moral laws.

Good will should be prompted by pure respect for the Moral Law, or consciousness of duty. It is this: “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.” Perhaps it would be better to say that to act on the maxim of doing one’s duty for its own sake is to act out of reverence for the law. Moreover, the rightness or wrongness of an act does not depend on its effects or consequences; it is immaterial whether happiness or perfection results, so long as the motive of the agent is good. Pure respect for the law is the sole motive of genuine morality. This law is the supreme test of what is right and wrong. In the opinion of Kant, a right action should satisfy two conditions: (1) it should conform to the moral law revealed by reason (2) the agent should perform it out of pure respect for the moral law. The Categorical Imperative or the moral law has no reference to any external ends, but simply to the right direction of the will itself. The Categorical Imperative is the universal Moral Law; it applies to all persons; it is common to all mankind.

Maxims of Morality

Kant tries to make the moral law or categorical imperative more definite by laying down the following maxims.

Formula 1: The Formula of Autonomy or of Universal Law:

Formula 2: The Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons:

Formula 3: The Formula of Legislation for a Moral Community:

(1) The first maxim of morality shows that what is right is universal, and that what is expedient is not universal. Kant illustrates the maxim by the example of breaking promises and committing suicide. It is wrong to break a promise, because this act cannot be
universalized. If it were made a universal rule—if every one were to break a promise; promises, in fact, would cease to be made. And if they were not made, they could not be broken. Hence, it would be impossible for everyone to break his promise. To commit suicide out of disgust with life is not moral because it will lead to the annihilation of human life if it is universalized. “Act in such a way as you could will that everyone else should act under the same general conditions.” This is the first maxim of morality. This law, or categorical imperative, is a universal, necessary law, a priori, inherent in reason itself. Its claim is recognized even by the common man; though he may not be clearly conscious of it, it governs his moral judgments; it is his standard or criterion of right and wrong.

(2) “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end”. Second maxim orders us to treat personality as of absolute worth. A person is an end-in-himself. He should never be treated as a means. No one should enslave himself or others. A corollary from the second maxim is the following: “Try always to perfect thyself, and try to conduce to the happiness of others, by bringing about favorable circumstances, as you cannot make others perfect.” A person can make himself perfect, because he can control his own will and make it conform to the moral law. But he can never make others perfect, because he cannot control their wills. Moral will has to be cultivated by a person himself—and not to be imposed upon him by any other person. Perfection is to be achieved, and not to be given. So what a person can do for others is to bring about circumstances that are conducive to their happiness. Kant illustrates this maxim by example of breaking promise and committing suicide. In suicide the person is treating himself as a means to the removal of the disgust of life and is not regarding himself as an end. Similarly, by making a false promise, say, by not paying a debt, one is making use of another person as a means and is not regarding the person as an end.

(3) “Act as a member of a kingdom of ends.” Third maxim of morality says that treat yourself and every other human being as of equal intrinsic value; behave as a member of an ideal republic in which each citizen is a sovereign and a subject in which each is a means and an end, in which each realizes his own good in promoting the good of others. A “Kingdom of ends” is an ideal society of rational persons following the Moral Law. A “kingdom of ends” would be an ideal society in which every person would act in a rational way and follow the categorical imperative and thus live in perfect harmony with everybody else. In the ideal commonwealth of mankind the law would be willed and obeyed by each and all. In all our personal and social relationships, we should have respect for self and others as persons. And the more we cultivate mutual understanding and good will, the more we shall attain to freedom and sovereignty or autonomy.

The first formula is said to be concerned with the form of a moral maxim—that is, with its universality; the second with its matter—that is, with its ends; while the third combines both form and matter. The moral imperative insures the freedom of the will.
Postulates of Morality

As is well known, Kant assumes three postulates without which morality, in his opinion, cannot be explained. They are: Freedom of the will, Immortality of the soul and the Existence of God. A man cannot have any duty or cannot be responsible for what he does, if his will is not free. ‘Thou oughtest implies thou canst’-Free will is implied by morality-is a famous saying of Kant. If the will is not free, morality becomes impossible. The second moral postulate is immortality of the soul. It is a demand of morality that the virtuous shall be rewarded. But if the virtuous are not rewarded here, they will be rewarded hereafter. Hence the soul must be immortal. Finally, as the relation between virtue and happiness is not analytic, but synthetic, there is not certainty that happiness will automatically follow virtue; hence there must be some external agency, viz., God, to unite virtue with happiness. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant rejects all the old arguments for the freedom of the will, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul; the outcome of the first Critique is negative in this respect. In the Critique of Practical Reason, these three notions are reinstated on the basis of the moral law.

AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION ‘WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?’

Defining Enlightenment, in his famous pamphlet known as “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’”(1784) Kant says, “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapereaude! (Dare to know!) Have courage to use your own understanding!” This is in contrast to the state of humanity in its immaturity in which the prescription runs: ‘Don’t think, just follow orders’. The basic idea of enlightenment was the abandoning of socially held irrational dogmas and beliefs, in order to pursue that which was rational, universal and readily demonstrable. The overthrow of the authority of tradition and the enthronement of critical rationality in its place were the central movements in this process. There are four interrelated aspects of Kant’s project of Enlightenment. These are freedom, the public and private use of reason, criticism of religion and tolerance.

Enlightenment is possible only if there is “freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters”. The time when Kant wrote this article was the time of the dominance of clergymen who used to create problems in the public use of one’s reason. They used to prevent people from any argument against their authority. It is in this context that Kant says it is only “the public use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The public use of reason needs to have freedom, whereas the private use of reason is “narrowly restricted” according to the office with which the person is entrusted. Here, private use of reason means suppose a person has a post in civil services
or office he needs to maintain the confidential aspects and it cannot be made public; whereas civil rights like citizenship, right to property, etc- are of public use of reason.

Out of the public and private use of reason, Kant comes to the issue of the criticism of religion. During the time of Kant, in the German society there was a strong dominance of clergymen concerning all affairs of political, economic and cultural life. Kant proposes enlightenment to undermine the dominance of religion and thereby to support the new rising bourgeoisie. The original destiny of mankind is proposed by Kant in terms of “progress”. This progress is possible only under the enlightenment and not under the dominancy of the clergy. Kant says “it is absolutely impermissible to agree, even for a single lifetime, to a permanent religious constitution which no one might publicly question”. If religion is to be preserved, it has to serve the purpose of reason. Man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity is possible only if the “matters of religion” are put aside.

The next point that Kant comes to is the tolerance. In this context, Kant is supporting the role of the Prussian Kingdom. Whereas clergy is against human freedom, the king Frederick and the Price are in favour of complete freedom but at the same time to be tolerant in religious matters. Praising the King Frederick, Kant says “he deserves to be praised by a grateful present and posterity as the man who first liberated mankind from immaturity (as far as government is concerned), and who left all men free to use their own reason in all matters of conscience”. Kant believes that we do not live “in an enlightened age, but in an age of enlightenment”. This means that enlightenment is a process of coming out from the dominance of the clergy to the free public use of human reason. ‘Reason’, the supreme faculty, has an emancipatory goal. But this is contrasted by apriorism of the faculty of understanding, which can vindicate only a limited theory.

The attempt to get rid of self-imposed immaturity is both self-critique and self-reflection with the aim to attain emancipation. Emancipatory self-reflection depended on giving rational reconstruction of the universal conditions of reason. To use the Kantian analogy, only when we understand the possibility, validity and limit of theoretical knowledge and the categorical imperatives does it become intelligible to specify what must be done to attain autonomy and emancipation.

Kant’s Enlightenment occupies a central role in the justification for the movement known as ‘modernism’. Modern means something which is not traditional, to break with the endless reiteration of classical themes, topics and myths; to offer a critique of existing feudal super structure (political, moral, religious and legal systems), to defend and develop scientific explanation of every phenomenon, and to explain reality not only objectively but also as experienced by the subject. Modernist was a shift from faith to reason. Enlightenment is held to be the source of critical ideas, such as the centrality of freedom, democracy and reason as being the primary values of a society. In this view, the tendency of the philosophers in particular to apply rationality to every problem is considered to be the
essential change. From this point on, thinkers and writers were held to be free to pursue the truth in whatever form, without the threat of sanction for violating established ideas.

CONCLUSION

Kant on the one hand, has resolved the conflicting epistemological claims of the Continental rationalism and the British empiricism and on the other hand he has divided human experience into three kinds: Science, Ethics and Art, which become the milestones of the European modernity. In his epistemology, Kant tries to confine human cognition to the realm of phenomenon alone but in his enlightenment project, he tries to give universal emancipation to mankind. Post Kantian philosophers observe a fundamental contradiction in the above claim of Kant which results into totalitarian thinking. The limit-riddled constitution of human reason and its Kantian resolution remains an issue for the post-Kantian philosophers. Two points concerning this issue, namely, the dualism of noumenon and phenomenon and the unknowability of the noumenon provide the basis for criticism and reconstruction of Kant’s theory.

KEY WORDS

Categorical Imperative: A categorical imperative declares an action to be of itself objectively necessary without any reference to any purpose, i.e., without any end.

Dogmatism: A term used by Kant to refer to philosophical views, and especially metaphysical theories, offering a priori principles that are not rationally grounded.

Deontological: Derived from the Greek word for “ought” and referring to any ethical system which makes the morality of an action depend on one’s acting out of a sense of duty.

Synthetic a priori: That which is not contained in the very concept of subject but at the same time is known independently of experience

Postulates: Postulates are the presuppositions of reason from a pure practical point of view. In Kant’s practical philosophy, they are freedom, God and immortality.

Part C-(Each answer not to exceed 150 words each question carries 2 weightages)

1. Transcendental Aesthetic: In transcendental Aesthetic Kant shows that there are a priori forms of sensibility. Everything to be perceived must be spaced and timed as the very condition of its being perceived at all. Propositions of mathematics can be synthetic a priori only when space and time are a priori percepts. Kant proceeds to show that:

   1. Space and time are not concepts, but are percepts.
   
   2. They are not empirical percepts, but are a priori or pure percepts.
2. **Transcendental Analytic**: In transcendental analytic Kant shows that just as there are *a priori* forms of sensing, so there are *a priori* forms of thinking also. Here Kant deduces and approves twelve concepts of the understanding. Scientific knowledge, as in physics, according to Kant, results from interpreting and combining the discrete manifold of sensibility in judgments with the help of the twelve categories of the understanding. This section contains metaphysical, transcendental deduction of the categories, the Schematism and the Principles of pure understanding.

3. **Twelve Categories of Kant**: There are 12 basic categories (concepts) according to which the sense-data are thought. Each category is linked to a type of judgement. These judgements can be brought under four groups: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Each of these heads has ‘three moments’; the last moment is the synthesis of the first two moments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Judgements</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
<th>Derived Concepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quantity</strong>: Universal</td>
<td>All politicians are corrupt</td>
<td>Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular</td>
<td>Some are honest</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Vijayakanth is corrupt</td>
<td>Totality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality</strong>: Affirmative</td>
<td>Man is mortal</td>
<td>Reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>The soul is not mortal</td>
<td>Negation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infinite</td>
<td>The soul is immortal</td>
<td>Limitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relation</strong>: Categorical</td>
<td>God is just</td>
<td>Substance – Attribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
<td>If God is just, he will punish sinners</td>
<td>Cause – Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disjunctive</td>
<td>God is either just or unjust</td>
<td>Reciprocity of agent - Patient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modality</strong>: Problematical</td>
<td>This may be poison</td>
<td>Possibility - Impossibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertoric</td>
<td>This is poison</td>
<td>Existence - Non existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodictic</td>
<td>Every effect must have a cause</td>
<td>Necessity - Contingency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Beyond Dispute)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Kant knowledge is the application of pure concepts of the understanding or categories to objects furnished us by the senses and perceived as spatial and temporal. Categories serve to make experience possible.

4. **Transcendental Deduction of Categories**: Transcendental deduction means that there are a priori categories of the understanding which determine the objectivity of empirical statements and that by their means alone such statements can ever be obtained. Without the synthesizing activity of the understanding there can be no object of any empirical knowledge. This spontaneous activity of the understanding in synthesizing the discrete data is the a priori ground of any empirical knowledge, and is expressed in threefold syntheses, namely,

1. The synthesis of apprehension in intuition: The multiplicity of parts must first be run through and grasped together in one whole.

2. The synthesis of reproduction in imagination: The past experience of an object is reproduced and fuses into the presentative factors of perception.

3. The synthesis of recognition in a concept: If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless.

5. **The Synthetic Unity of Apperception**: In order that there be objects of knowledge, they must be presented as necessarily inter-related wholes. Further, to be inter-related wholes, they must be connected by means of certain fixed rules. These fixed rules of combining the percepts into objective judgements are known as the categories. Finally, in order that the rules be the same and identical for all, they must be grounded in the same unity of consciousness. This consciousness to be the same for all must be *a priori*. Hence, we can say that the combining functions of the categories are all derived from the fundamental unity of apperception. We can also say that the peculiarity of our understanding is that it can produce a priori unity of apperception by means of the categories. All the principles of combination of the understanding are derived from this fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. This transcendental unity of self-consciousness is neither empirical nor ontological but is wholly logical. Understanding is the sole faculty, according to Kant, which produces connection, order and synthesis into the discrete data obtained from sensibility. Understanding gives laws to nature which is only sum of phenomena, and not a noumenon. Understanding makes nature, that is produces an ordered system of appearances according to its categories, and is in conformity with experience.
6. **Schematism**: Kant makes a sharp distinction between sense and intellect but then the concepts must be applied to the sensible in order to constitute knowledge. However, the concepts are universal; involving no elements of time; but the sensible is essentially temporal. For example, the concept of causality being a logical category is timeless and yet being applied to the sensible something is necessary succession in time. Now there is the need for something which will mediate between the heterogeneous elements of sense and understanding. It is the form of time which is the forms of all perceptions, whether external or internal. Time is pure like the concepts and is yet at the same time sensuous. Every concept then to be applicable to the sensible must be cast in the form of time i.e. the abstract concept is to be imaged in the time-form. Each concept requires a general picture, an ideal particular. For instance the category of substance is the idea of something which is always a subject and never a predicate. When it schematized then it stands for something permanent in time. ‘A secret art in the depths of the human soul’ translates the intangible conception into a schema—a sort of generalised image, a universal which is withal sensuous: not so much a picture itself, as a general formula or recipe for drawing pictures. The concepts come to be applied to the sensible through the time-schema. Our real thinking in science is pictorial, always tinged with imagination. Thus the need for schematism ties down the intellect to a sensuous form, but then for the limitation to the sensible alone the schematism clothes the concepts in reality.

7. **Transcendental Dialectic**: In transcendental dialectic Kant shows that without percepts, with the help of the twelve categories of the understanding alone, one cannot know the super sensible entities called the World, Soul and God. Attempts to know these three Ideas of Reason lead to three transcendental illusions called *paralogisms* (concerning Soul), antinomies (with regard to the World) and Ideals of reason (in relation to God). Though these Ideas are not constitutive they are yet regulative of scientific knowledge.

8. **Paralogisms**: There can be no knowledge proper without sense-experience or empirical data. Therefore, the bold bid of reason to know the super sensible ‘self’ is bound to yield invalid conclusions. These are termed by Kant ‘*paralogisms*’. A transcendental *paralogism* is one in which there is transcendental ground, constraining us to draw a formally invalid conclusion. As we think, according to quality, quantity, relation and modality, so transcendentally there are four kinds of illusory statements, concerning the self.

1. The soul is substance. I am aware of myself as a subject and never as a predicate

2. It is simple, but nothing by way of its content can be asserted.

3. The self continues to be the same identical unity through the different times in which it exists.
4. Self is in relation to possible objects in space. It means that self alone is immediately given in our consciousness and all other things are mere inferences from perceptions in our consciousness. Hence, self is independent of all material things.

9. **Antinomies**: There are four antinomies according to quantity, quality, relation and modality which respectively refer to the fourfold problem of composition, division, origination and dependence of existence. Both the thesis and anti-thesis are formally valid and can be proved with equal show of reason. Nonetheless they are opposed and inconsistent with each other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THESIS</th>
<th>ANTI-THESIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>QUANTITY</strong></td>
<td>The world is limited in time and space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>QUALITY</strong></td>
<td>Nothing exists but the simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>RELATION</strong></td>
<td>There is a free cause and everything is not determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>MODALITY</strong></td>
<td>There is a necessary being in the world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the antinomies there is no formal fallacy and yet there is an opposition between them. This shows that human understanding trespasses its limitation and ventures beyond into the unknowable. This proves that valid knowledge is confined to the phenomena and must not be extended beyond into the noumena. Antinomies shows that nothing in the empirical discovery can be regarded final. The idea of the world constrains the understanding to find out the further term in the series.

10. **The Ideal of Pure Reason**: The ideal of reason is not a mere idea, but is an ideal. It contains the sum of all possibility. The ideal seems to be farther removed from objective reality than the ideas of the world and soul. Further, this ideal refers to an individual, popularly known as a personal God. The transcendental dialectic has shown the impossibility of knowing the three regulative ideas of Soul, World and God. Attempts to know these three Ideas of Reason lead to three transcendental illusions called paralogisms (concerning Soul), antinomies (with regard to the World) and Ideals of reason (in relation to God). There is nothing real corresponding to the ideas of reason. But these ideas have certain functions to perform:

1. They point out the model knowledge, the highest unity of which our reason is capable. Their use is not imminent for they do not constitute
knowledge; but they are transcendent in as much as they guide the understanding to clearer and wider knowledge.

2. They are the limiting concepts pointing out the utmost reaches of knowledge beyond which we must not venture.

3. They regulate the understanding by pointing out the ideal of knowledge. Sense and understanding can guarantee the actual i.e. what is; but reason points out the existence of what ought to be.

4. The reality of God, the immortality of Soul and the freedom of will cannot be proved and known but they cannot be disproved either. They are unknowable and the doubt about their reality is as indefensible as the dogmatic assertion about them. Kant thus speaks about the dogmatists and sceptics.

5. The ideas pave the way for faith in morality and religion. As a matter of fact it is the need for morality that keeps the transcendental illusion.

FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCE


UNIT IV HEGEL

The concept of ‘dialectic of reason’ is central to the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. Philosophical thinking for them presupposes nothing beyond this concept. This however does not implicate that ‘dialectic of reason’ in Kant is the same as it is in Hegel (1770-1831). The fact of the matter is that both Kant and Hegel have employed this term in the context of the historical development and the intellectual climate of their specific epochs. Whereas Kant critically investigates the capacity in the ‘dialectic of reason’ in the context of the two conflicting trends of rationalism and empiricism, Hegel expounds the same concept to overcome what he felt is a shortcoming inherent in Kant. Hegel recognizes very clearly that Kant’s ‘dialectic of reason’ presents the watershed between rationalism and empiricism, but Kant stops short at what is at best a half-way station. Hegel in fact, began his academic career greatly under the influence of the Kantian dialectic. Eventually, however, he realized that Kant's dialectic undermines the growth of cognition and freedom by making them antinomies. Kant tries to solve the problems of knowledge and freedom by separating the one from the other. Hegel on the other hand uses 'dialectic of reason' to overcome all the contradictions between knowledge and freedom. Dialectic, in Hegel, is a process of change and development in which not only contradictions are identified but also they are overcome.

It goes to the credit of Hegel to recognize the significance of identity in every moment of contradiction. The strikingly new interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic consists in his attempt to incorporate logic into it. It requires two lines of argument: first, showing that a given category is indispensable; the second, showing that it leads us to a characterization of reality which is somehow contradictory. Hegel, in fact, fuses these together. For Hegel, the operative terms for dialectic are ‘sublation’ and ‘contradiction’. Sublation, in Hegel’s dialectic, means to resolve into a higher unity or to bring into the wholeness that which is fragmentary. The deduction of categories from one another in the Science of Logic shows that all lower categories are sublated into the higher ones and they have a direct reference to the wholeness.

Hegel is influenced by Kant. Kantian antinomies hinted that in a dynamic antinomy, the thesis and antithesis both appear to be true. The only difference between them is that Kant did not think of any possible synthesis, while Hegel urges that speculative reason can proceed towards an all-harmonious and all-inclusive synthesis through a dialectical advance. Thus Hegel differed from Kant in holding that the resulting ‘contradiction’ was a challenge to think further. He believed that a higher and more concrete synthesis transcends thesis and anti-thesis and overcomes their partiality and abstractness. According to Hegel dialectic is not merely a property of all our “thoughts” in virtue of which each particular thought necessarily passes over into another; but also a property of “things”, due to which every finite things necessarily belongs to all other things. Hence the way in which thought
reaches truth is also the immediate expression of the innermost life of existence: when we think existence, existence thinks in us.

According to Plato every concept is dialectical. The same view is advocated by Hegel. According to him every concept as such is antinomical. Hegel, the greatest dialectician of modern period, was eager to stress that dialectic, together with its contradictions, was nothing accidental and subjective. For him, contradiction is necessary as a component of dialectic. It is not a product of misunderstanding. Dialectic for him is not sophistry. Kant was praised by Hegel for showing that contradictions are “essential and necessary”: that they do not spring from a causal error or conceptual mistake. Hegel believed that thesis, by rational necessity, gives rise to its opposite and so to contradiction. But reason cannot rest in what is self-contradictory and is, therefore, forced onwards to the synthesis. According to Kant no such synthesis is possible. For Hegel what was thought to be a contradiction was necessary in the development of Reason and also of the Universe. Hegel himself speaks of ‘contradiction’ as ‘the root of all movement and life’. Every determination, every ‘concrete’, every concept is essentially a union of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which pass over through determinate and essential difference into contradictory moments. From the Hegelian point of view, Understanding is the cause of contradictions, and the function of Reason is to integrate or unite contradictory notions into new unities, where they will be shown to be necessary conditions of each other. But these unities or harmonies, in his view, do not involve mere rejection of the disharmonies and contradictions of dialectical thought.

The concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers indicates that “Hegel gave a new turn to dialectic, which he regarded as a process, not merely of reasoning, but also found in history and in the universe as a whole, consisting of necessary movements from thesis to antithesis, and then to synthesis”. The basis of this conviction of Hegel is his assumption that “real is rational and rational is real”. The whole world is really a system of categories, inter-related dialectically in such a way that the Absolute is the reason of Being and all other previous categories, and, Being too is implicitly the reason of the Absolute. The whole system of categories returns into itself and is self-explanatory. This is tantamount to saying that reason is its own reason, and, is self-determined, wholly rational or logical. He conceived both thought and reality as “dynamic” and developing according to dialectic. For Hegel, thought proceeds from the most simple, most abstract and empty concepts to the more complex, concrete and richer ones. These new concepts suggest new problems and contradictions which, in their turn, must be resolved in other concepts. This dialectical process continues until we reach the ultimate concepts. i.e., Absolute Idea. He says, “Whenever there is movement, wherever there is life; whenever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there dialectic is at work.

The simplest way of explaining Hegelian dialectic will be to give a concrete example. For the sake of illustration we may take the following triad of categories of Hegelian logic.
i. Being - Thesis
ii. Nothing - Anti-thesis
iii. Becoming - Synthesis

Fichte for the first time introduced into German philosophy the famed triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. But he did not believe that antithesis could be deduced from the thesis. And, in his view, synthesis achieves nothing more than “uniting” what both thesis and antithesis already established. For Hegel the thesis or ‘Being’ means ‘pure’ being or entirely abstract idea of being, or being-as-such. Such a ‘being’ has in it no determinations. It is therefore, absolutely indeterminate, completely empty or a pure vacuum. The “Being” is the same as ‘nothing’. It means that the concept of “pure being” contains the idea of ‘nothing’. Consequently, we have a third category namely, the “idea of passage” or “Becoming”. The category of “Becoming” deduced from the relation between the two categories of “Being” and “Nothing”. The remarkable thing about Hegelian dialectic is that the first category in each triad is always an affirmative category; the second is always a negative or opposite of the first. This second is always contained in the first and the first category produces it out of itself. The first category contains its own ‘opposite’ and is ‘identical’ with it. This implies that the opposite categories are applicable to the same thing at the same time. But it is impossible to rest on this contradiction. The third category, therefore, resolves the contradiction. It contains within itself the “opposition” of the other two: but, at the same time, contains their underlying harmony and unity. This third category or synthesis presents itself as a new affirmative category, which thereby becomes the thesis of a new triad. The next point is that the ‘thesis’ is always regarded by Hegel as characterised ‘immediacy’. The second term is “mediate”. The third term is the merging of mediation in a new “immediacy”. Hegel believes in the two-fold activity of ‘syntheses’. viz., abolition and preservation. In this way, as the dialectic proceeds nothing is ever lost. The higher category contains the lower categories “explicitly”, while the lower categories contain the higher ‘implicitly’. Thus his dialectical is of logical nature. Hegel distinguishes between ‘Intellect’ or ‘Understanding’ and ‘Reason’. According to him, the intellect can do nothing but distinguish, oppose and relate; it cannot conceive the unity of opposites. Understanding deals with the static law of non-contradiction. Hegel says that “Speculative Reason” can proceed ahead due to the contradictions towards an all-harmonious Absolute, which is an “identity of opposites”.

The synthesis of a triad both abolishes and preserves the differences of the thesis and the antithesis. This activity of the synthesis is expressed by Hegel as aufheben or sublation which is the operative term of his dialectic. It may be seen as the manifestation of three distinct yet mutually interrelated, moments. “First it has the moment of ‘transcendence’, in which it goes beyond a ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’; secondly it is ‘negation’ of this first negation, this ‘limit’, in which it is the moment of ‘preservation’, in which what has been ‘gone beyond’ or transcended is brought again into a new relation”. Sublation may be seen as manifesting the moments of transcendence, negation and negation of negation. These three moments of sublation, though distinct, form a unitary process of Logic which is differentiated into its various components only for the purpose of helping an ‘understanding’ of the process itself. The very process by which a category ‘passes beyond itself’ and posits another category to which it is intimately related is at one and the same logical moment the process by which it transcends its limited abstract self-identity negates that identity and emerges into a connected unity or nexus in which it is preserved as an intrinsic part of some greater whole. The differences between the first and the second member of each triad are sublated by the third. In this process Hegel explicates three basic laws of dialectic (i) unity and struggle of opposites. (ii) transition from quantity to quality and vice-versa and (iii) negation of negation. These laws are operation in the whole process of Hegel's deduction of categories.
In the process of the deduction of categories from one another, Hegel arrives at the “system of subjective Logic” in the science of Logic. Hegel, here, develops the concept of subject which is the same thing as the doctrine of Notion in which the categories of Being and Essence are merged into a unity. With Notion, we come to the point where subjectivity is the true form of objectivity. The Logic of Being and the Logic of Essence finally culminate in the Logic of Notion which is nothing but the self-consciousness of the Geist. This means that all the categories of the objective Logic are ultimately derived from the Subjective Logic. So the dialectical laws operating in the deduction of the categories are ultimately derived from the Geist. Here it echoes Aristotle’s philosophy where, “matter and form are really correlative, though logically distinct; informed matter and inmattered form are two different ways of looking at the same thing” And since material things are constantly changing, so with them the forms and concepts also manifest such movements. Aristotle attempted to formulate the concepts and categories in dynamic terms. Hegel’s analysis of it goes in the following scheme: “the true form of reality requires freedom. Freedom requires self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth. Self-consciousness and knowledge of the truth are the essentials of the subject. The true form of reality must be conceived as subject.”

The Notion presents an objective totality in which every particular moment appears as the ‘self-differentiation’ of the universal that governs the totality. That is to say, every particular moment contains, as it’s very content, the whole, and must be interpreted as the whole. For explanation, let us refer again to the Phenomenology of Spirit where “the true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development.” The Notion designates the general form of being in which being, through development by means of contradiction and sublation, realizes its essence. At the same time, Notion expresses the free subject which adequately represents the true being. The free-subject exists in a movement from lower to higher modes of self-realization. Hegel calls the highest form of this self-realization-the Geist.

The Geist in its final form is the ‘free-subject’, the Notion. Its otherness and negation is the object, being. And both the Notion and its otherness are constantly overwhelmed by the ontological conceptions of Hegel’s absolute idealism. Hegel’s Science of Logic thus ends where it began, with the category of being. This, however, is a different being that can no longer be explained through the concept applied in the analysis that opened the Logic. For, being now is understood in its Notion, that is, as a concrete totality wherein all particular forms subsist as the essential distinctions and relations of one comprehensive principle-the Absolute Truth.

It may here be recalled that just as Socrates’ dialogue, due to contradictions, eventually ends with the participants in the same state of perplexity; similarly Hegel’s logic and with it his dialectic ends where it began. This similarity is, evidently, because of the similar driving force operating behind the possibility and progress of both the dialogue and the dialectic.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel postulates that man first seeks to aufgehoben the material world through the exercise of his Will. In the Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage or which is generally known as Master/Slave dialectic, Hegel demonstrates what are the social consequences for mankind of his attempt to construct his own sense of self, his need for recognition by another man, upon the basis of an exercise of will. There is an immediate conflict of Wills between Master and Slave with each one attempting to extract from the other an enforced ‘recognition’. This conflict is only resolved when one of them, under the threat of death, so to say, from the other, yields his will and grants a forced recognition of the other. In this moment one becomes the dominant and the other the subservient and there is created the realm of Lordship and Bondage. But as a result of the conflict of Wills there is also created something more than this mere domination of one man by another. As Hegel appreciates that the resolution of
this conflict has produced, on the one hand, an enforced recognition, and, on the other, a sense of unease. Says Hegel, “the lord relates himself mediatelysto bondsman through a being (a thing) that is independent, for it is just this which hold the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his independence in thinghood” The Master can never know that the Slave has recognised him out of the exercise of his, the Slave’s own will. The recognition that the Master receives is but his own will reflected back to him via the Will of his Slave. The will of the slave is nothing more than the will of the Master and therefore the Master in effect merely recognises himself.

The Slave, on the other hand, having been granted no recognition, has been forced to exercise what remains of his own Will upon the physical material world. He thereby begins the task of ‘overcoming’ the otherness of the material world through his physical labour and the development of the skills entailed therein. Hegel understands that the outcome of the struggle of Wills between the Master and the Slave for recognition is the creation of an unstable situation, a Master who is not confirmed in his Lordship, and a Slave who works for another without the recognition of himself as a Self. The outcome of Master/Slave dialectic is the creation of two realms in which the former dominates the latter. This analogy has its reflection in Hegel’s formulation of dialectic in the realm of concepts and ideas, and then its application to the external material reality. Just as Master becomes the exerciser of the Mental labour, of formulating ideas, planning and so on; and the Slave is the bearer of Physical labour, one who brings those ideas and plans into reality; similarly and exactly in the same process the dialectic of concepts are applied to the external material reality. The dialectic operating in the realm of concepts command the world of ideas; and the transformative activity performed in the material world is aimed towards the satisfaction of the dialectic of ideas.

There is yet another way of looking at Hegel’s attempts to apply the dialectic of concepts to the actual reality. In the Preface to Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes: “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. On this conviction the plain man like the Philosopher takes his stand, and from it philosophy starts its study of the Universe of mind as well as the universe of nature”. Actuality is that in which the discrepancy between the possible and the real has been overcome. Its fruition occurs through a process of change, with the given actuality advancing in accordance with the possibilities implicit in it. As stated earlier, ‘contradiction’ is the basis of all movement and ‘sublation’ is the basis of all development. And these together are operative terms of Hegel’s dialectic. A given ‘actuality’ moves, because of some contradiction, because it strives to express its potentialities. A given ‘actuality’ develops because the lower stage is not annihilated but assimilated in the higher stage. What is actual is rational because it is the actuality of an entity that undergoes through the whole process of growth—the reality of an entity. And the whole process of growth or development of every actuality is always dialectical and in it alone consists its distinction from mere transpassing of facts of Logical Atomism and Positivism. If, therefore, we understand by Hegel's dialectic as a gradual explication and development of the 'connectedness' of the categories of Logic, then dialectic is operating in our thought alone. But such a dialectical nexus of concepts is not itself sufficient to account for our knowledge of the objective reality. Dialectic must come out of thought and confront the world which is given. That is to say, it must have a relation to the objective world into which man daily finds himself thrown. Hegel recognizes this fact. He shows that everything that surrounds us maybe viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite as that which in itself is other than itself is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite. Hegel demonstrates that the laws of dialectic are not only operating in our thought but are also the fundamental features of the change and development taking place in the material reality. So, the dialectic has this dual function to perform, viz., to show that dialectic is operating in thought and that,
simultaneously it is operating in the objective reality. As an absolute idealist Hegel regards
dialectic of thought as primary and dialectic of nature as secondary being an externalization
of the dialectic of thought. This is evident from the fact that Hegel first formulates the
principles of dialectic in the sphere of Logic-the concepts and categories- and then
introduces the same laws to the world outside. This is how Hegel over-estimates the
moments of abstraction.

During Hegel's own life-time and immediately after his death, there emerged two
groups of thinkers to whom even the present day Hegel scholars associate themselves.
There were two fundamentally different kinds of reaction to Hegelianism. On the one hand
there were reactions from the irrationalism of Schopenhauer, the psychological reactions
from Herbert and Beneke, and the theological reaction from Weisse and Schleiermacher.
On the other hand, there were materialist reactions from David Strauss, Feuerbach, Marx,
Engels and Lenin. These reactions basically culminated in the idealists and the materialist
Hegelians. Originally, the Old Hegelians, who were known as Right-wing Hegelians were
von Henning, Hotho, Forster, Marheineke, Hinrichs, Daub, Conradi and Schaller. Here the
term Right-wing to indicate towards the idealist reactions to Hegel's idealism. Even the
present day Hegel scholars associate themselves to either of the Hegelians (to use the
word in the broad sense). For instance, J. N. Findlay, Charles Taylor, M. J. Inwood, Robert
B. Pippin. Errol E. Harris and others represent the tendencies of the idealist Hegelians in the
present-day intellectual climate in Europe. So also, Alexandre Kojeve, Herbert Marcuse,
George Lukacs, Theodore Oizerman and others represent the Left-wing Hegelians.

As an identifiable movement, Right-wing and the Left-wing Hegelians did not
survive for long. The Right-wing Hegelians started disappearing during Hegel's own life-
time. And the Left-wing Hegelians could survive for two decades after Hegel's death.
However, certain features of both the Right-wing and the Left-wing Hegelians are still
issues of great interest. These are the issues concerning abstraction and concreteness. The
Right-wing Hegelians, even today, try to develop Hegel's idealism and his dialectic
abstractly. The Left-wing Hegelians try to interpret Hegelian dialectic materialistically and
hence try to make it concrete. There is, however a lack of the participation between
abstract and concrete in both the Hegelians.

KEY WORD

Absolute Mind: Absolute mind is the state in which mind rises above all the limitations of
nature and institutions, and is subjected to itself alone in art, religion, and philosophy. For
the essence of mind is freedom, and its development must consist in breaking away from
the restrictions imposed on it by nature and human institutions.

FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCE

2. Dr. Chhaya Rai., Studies in Philosophical Methods, University of Jabalpur
   Publication
5. Singh, R.P., Dialectic of Reason: A Comparative Study of Kant and Hegel,